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Analogical thought, thinking of one domain of experience in terms of another, 
helps us understand new ideas in relation to preexisting knowledge. This dissertation 
examines five parallel examples of analogical thought in United States Army doctrine 
in which various target domains are conceptualized in terms of traditional warfare.  
The first chapter examines the way in which “information” is explained in 
terms of a construct called “the cognitive hierarchy,” which is a blend of folk models 
of thought and the military command structure. Here, “information” is conceived of 
as a raw material to be refined to a useable state as it is processed by successively 
higher levels in the hierarchy. The second chapter analyzes the inclusion of 
“information” into the elements of combat power, a heuristic that staff officers use to 
plan operations. Unlike the first four elements, firepower, maneuver, leadership, and 
protection, which have independent but interrelated capabilities, “information” is 
characterized exclusively in terms of its ability to coordinate the effects of the other 
four. 
The third chapter explores the term “information operations,” a blend of the 
domains of cognition and communication, and of combat, that “weaponizes” 
information. Chapter Four analyzes a startling metaphor that represents persuasion as 
a form of lethal firepower. Finally, the last chapter examines the difficulty of 
portraying success in peace operations, which comprise both peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping. Because the event shape of a successful peace operation involves 
reducing forces, relinquishing power, and withdrawal by the peacekeepers, it 
conforms to the event shape of a failed attack. 
All five chapters share a rich and highly developed source domain, warfare 
that is used to explain the workings of relatively impoverished target domains, 
communication and thought. The result is that the target domains are distorted to the 
point that key elements in them are elided or altered beyond recognition. 
This dissertation is unique in that it analyzes not only analogical thought, but 
also the corporate thought of a large institution that uses it to solve problems in the 
real world. The resulting actions have far-reaching impacts on both international 
security and countless lives across the world.
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Chapter 1 – The Cognitive Hierarchy and the Army’s 
Theory of Mind
Introduction
How people solve problems is a key topic in many fields. In the discipline of 
cognitive psychology, one researcher, Dr. A. S. Luchins, investigated the impact that 
success in problem solving has on a subject’s ability to come up with new 
approaches. In this experiment, he gave the subjects three empty containers of 
specified capacities, with the goal of ending up with a given quantity of water. If a 
subject was given 21 ounce, 127 ounce, and 3 ounce jugs, with the requirement to end 
up with 100 ounces, he would fill up the largest jug, then fill up and empty the first 
jug once, and the second jug twice, to end up with the goal quantity. Subjects were 
given a series of problems, some of which required similar solutions, i.e., using all 
three jugs, while others required different ones, i.e., using only two jugs. What 
Luchins found was that if a subject could solve the problems with one type of 
solution, it became difficult for him to solve later problems with different solutions, 
even if those later problems were actually easier. The longer a subject had success 
with a particular type of solution, the harder it was for him to see other possibilities 
(Barsalou 335-336).
This is the challenge that the United States Army confronts today. It faces a 
radically different international security environment with a physical infrastructure 
and conceptual frame forged by decades of the Cold War. After the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, the American military was deprived of its primary purpose, and cast about 
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for an enemy that matched its own scale and focus. Missions such as peacekeeping 
and humanitarian aid were derided as “police actions,” and were given the collective 
name “OOTWA,” or Operations Other Than War (Department of the Army 1993 
Glossary-6). The acronym itself demonstrates that these activities were considered 
peripheral to the Army’s “true” mission. However, the events of September 11 2001 
not only galvanized the nation as a whole, but forcibly thrust these disparaged 
missions into the Army’s center stage. 
This dissertation examines a critical aspect of the international security 
environment that has been termed “information.” It involves aspects of human 
behavior and types of human activity previously ignored or underestimated in the 
Army culture, namely, thought, communication, and persuasion. An entirely new 
discipline, “information operations,” has been formed around these activities, 
spawning changes to the fields of warfare, psychological operations, command and 
control, and OOTWA, now called Stability Operations and Support Operations 
(SOSO) (Department of the Army 2003a, Glossary-14). The Army has developed 
additional doctrine and extensively rewritten previous doctrine to explain how to 
conceive of and carry out these newly significant activities. However, while the 
disciplines and environment in which they are exercised might be radically different, 
the approaches to them are not. Upon close examination, one finds that these new 
texts depend heavily on conceptual structures recruited from the Army’s institutional 
knowledge of warfare. The reliance is so profound that critical aspects of these 
disciplines are distorted or even lost. As a result, it is difficult to accomplish them 
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effectively, putting at risk entire operations, as well as the lives of those that carry 
them out.
The Corpus
The primary material I will be examining is selections from Army doctrine. 
The purpose of this literature is to lay down principles and techniques that its 
audience, the soldiers who plan and carry out warfare, can use in executing war and 
other missions as directed. It is hierarchical, divided roughly by specialty area 
(infantry, armor, intelligence, logistics) and by echelon (fire team to strategic level). It 
is also a truly corporate document, in that the field manuals and other documents that 
comprise it are often authored by multiple individuals. Once written, the manuals 
must then be disseminated to subject matter experts across the military to ensure that 
they conform to both the experiences of these other soldiers and any other doctrine 
they relate to (Department of the Army 2003d, paragraph 3-1). New manuals are 
relatively rare, being generated only when the need for them is clearly articulated 
substantiated (Department of the Army 2003d, paragraph, 13-7). Instead, most 
doctrinal literature is revised and updated on a predetermined schedule or as needed 
(Department of the Army 2003d, paragraph 13-8). Changing the basic doctrinal 
principles can be very contentious; the last update of Field Manual 3.0, Operations , 
the keystone manual of the doctrinal library, took eight rather than the normal five 
years because its authors had to respond to the dual impact of the end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of numerous unconventional entities that its demise unleashed 
(Department of the Army 1993, vi;  2001a, v). Because it both articulates and 
4
disseminates the values, beliefs and assumptions of a large organization that has a 
major impact on the world we live in, Army doctrine merits close study.
The manuals examined in this dissertation are FM 3.0, Operations, updated in 
2001, FM 6.0, Mission Command: Command And Control of Military Forces, 
initially published in 2003; FM 3-13, Information Operations, initially published in 
1996 and updated in 2003; FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, updated in 2000; 
and FM 3.07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, updated in 2003. Of these 
five manuals, two of them, Information Operations and Mission Command, represent 
new doctrine published in the last eight years.  Operations, while it is a long-time 
capstone manual, has more than tripled in length from its previous edition. The 
disciplines of the last two, Psychological Operations and Stability Operations and 
Support Operations, have gained newfound prominence in recent years. All these 
documents represent new doctrine, or new approaches to doctrine, and as such 
represent the Army’s responses to the changing national security environment. 
Collectively they embody the Army’s concepts of cognition, communication, 
persuasion, and cooperative activity, conceptualizations that depend heavily on the 
deep institutional knowledge of warfare and military structure.
Analogical Thought
The fact that the Army uses established approaches and frames to understand 
recent challenges is not surprising. Not only has the military extensively developed 
the art of conventional warfare, it is exceptionally good at it. The initial stages of the 
war in Iraq and the continuing success in Afghanistan demonstrate that the Army and 
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other military services have a high level of individual and institutional expertise. One 
of the principles of warfare that military professionals are taught is to reinforce 
success; an exploitation, for instance, is a type of offensive operation in which forces 
are committed into a breach in the enemy’s defense, expanding it and taking 
advantage of the enemy’s weakness (Department of the Army 2001, 6-1). On the 
conceptual level, the Army is relying on the success of its ability to execute 
conventional warfare to give impetus to its approaches to cognition and 
communication. However, this type of analogical thought leaves it in the same 
quandary as the subjects of Dr. Luchins’ experiments, trapped by the restraints of its 
own success.
Analogical thought as defined by Deborah Gentner is “the ability to think 
about relational patterns” (Gentner, Holyoak, and Kokinov 2). Human beings have 
the capacity to relate often disparate domains of their experience and knowledge in 
ways that allow them to understand new experiences or reinterpret previously held 
beliefs. They are such experts at analogical thought that they rarely notice when they 
are performing it, making this ability seem insignificant. However, because a 
phenomenon is inconspicuous does not make it inconsequential. Scholars in cognitive 
linguistics and other disciplines have propounded theories that describe the origins 
and workings of analogical thought, known as conceptual metaphor theory and 
conceptual blending theory. 
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Conceptual Metaphor and Language
One assumption that many scholars of language have held is that language is 
only meaningful in terms of truth conditions, that is, that statements only have 
meaning if they can be proven true or false (Lakoff and Johnson 1987, 167). From 
this perspective, metaphor, which represents one thing in terms of another, is merely a 
literary device. An example might be the following lines of Romantic poetry: “But 
most thro’ midnight streets I hear/How the youthful Harlots curse/Blasts the new-
born Infant’s tear/And blights with plague the Marriage hearse” (Blake 302.13-16). In 
this passage, the cry of prostitutes is seen as a metaphorical agent that causes 
marriages to deteriorate. Metaphor, therefore, has been seen as (1) phenomenon of 
language and (2) an exceptional use of language distinct from normal, truth-
conditional uses (Lakoff 1997, 202). 
However, theorists like George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Mark Turner have 
disputed this notion of metaphor. Their research demonstrates that metaphor, far from 
being exceptional, seems to pervade so-called literal or ordinary language. One 
example cited throughout Metaphors We Live By, is the conceptual metaphor, 
Argument Is War. Fluent speakers of English often refer to verbal disagreements in 
terms of physical combat:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I’ve never won an argument with him (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 4).
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Other persistent metaphors include Time is Money, in which minutes and hours are 
portrayed as material assets that can be saved, spent, or wasted, and Theories Are 
Buildings, in which systems of thought are conceived of as physical structure (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 8; 46) 
Cognitive linguists noted that not only do many people speak of argument as a 
form of warfare, but conceive of it in those terms as well. As Lakoff and Johnson 
observe, when people argue, they plan strategies for argument, see the person with 
whom they argue as opponents, and defend rhetorical positions (1980, 4). And even 
in carrying out an argument, people structure the performance of a verbal 
disagreement in terms of a physical battle, attacking, counterattacking, defending, and 
even declaring one opponent the winner (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 4). It seems as if 
the expressions with which we talk about argument are tied to concepts of warfare in 
a systematic way (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 7). Because of this systematic 
correspondence, Lakoff and others set off to uncover the generalizations that govern 
the phenomenon of metaphor (Lakoff 1993, 202). 
The theory of conceptual metaphor holds that metaphor is not a linguistic 
phenomenon, but a cognitive one in which humans conceive of one experience in 
terms of another (Lakoff 1993, 206). Structures of relationships from bodies of 
knowledge people already possess serve as the means by which unfamiliar notions are 
understood, remembered, and acted upon. These domains of experience, or frames, 




A metaphor like Argument Is War, embodied in the example “We battled it 
out over the mess in the living room,” depends on understanding one domain of 
experience, argument, in terms of another, warfare, for meaning. The concept of a 
domain is best explained through the theory of frame semantics put forth by Charles 
Filmore in his 1982 article. His work proposed that theories of semantics that 
depended on aggregates of features to define a word seemed inadequate, and that the 
meaning in words lies in its connections to other concepts; together, these 
connections form a kind of frame (Filmore 131-132; 119). A semantic frame 
“provide[s] an overall conceptual structure defining the semantic relationships among 
whole “fields” of related concepts and words that express them,” making a single 
term the tip of a semantic iceberg (Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 116).
As an example, the term “dog catcher” can be defined using an aggregate of 
characteristics, explaining the job as that of a civil servant whose primary function is 
to catch dogs.  This definition begins with the core concept of “civil servant” and 
adds the characteristics of his duties. However, when one examines the role more 
closely, one sees that the notion of “dog catcher” actually depends on a large and 
complex body of background information and relationships not captured by the initial 
definition. The frame of a dogcatcher entails at base a dog, a person, a restraining 
device, and a way to confine the dog once caught. To be truly comprehendible, 
however, this basic frame also needs a motivating context, which Filmore defines as 
“some pattern of practices, or some history of social institutions, against which we 
find intelligible the creation of a particular category in the history of the language 
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community” (119). “Dog catching” entails not only the act of capturing a particular 
species of animal, but common concepts of dogs as domestic animals that are 
restrained by their owners; the notion that such control helps stem the spread of a 
deadly infectious disease; and the base assumption that such safety issues are a 
government responsibility. Within this frame, there are no bat catchers, since bats are 
not normally domesticated, or caterpillar catchers, since these insects don’t pose a 
threat to humans, or freelance dog catchers, since this aspect of safety is a 
government responsibility.
The domain of warfare is similarly complex, as this dissertation demonstrates. 
In the most basic terms, it entails:
Two parties.
The parties are in conflict with one another.
They are fighting on a piece of terrain.
Each party seeks to destroy or defeat the other.
These goals are contrary, in that while it may be true that both could fail, only 
one could succeed.
Each has a variety of devices (weapons) and methods (tactics, techniques and 
procedures) that it employs against the other.
Like the notion of “dog catcher,” war also entails a great deal of background 
information to be truly comprehendible. Conventional warfare depends on the 
existence of a nation-state that provides both the impetus and the material for the 
conflict, soldiers who are drawn from that country’s population base, and an 
organized military institution that recruits, trains, equips and manages these soldiers. 
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These factors have an enormous impact on matters that might seem less central to the 
domain of warfare, such as conducting intelligence analysis. 
Traditional intelligence analysis depends primarily on detecting and 
interpreting activities associated with weapons systems; because only nation-states 
have the resources to manufacture military hardware on an appreciable level, a piece 
of equipment like a main battle tank has indicators associated with every stage of its 
production, deployment, and use. Also, because more powerful weapons systems are 
more expensive to produce, there are fewer of them, and they are generally assigned 
to higher echelons. As a result, a primary way of determining a weapon system’s 
importance, and therefore the size of the force it belongs to, is its rarity and size. 
Because these factors so heavily depend on the materiel and governing infrastructure 
of a nation state, they may not be directly applicable to other types of missions, such 
as peacekeeping, information operations, psychological operations, or 
counterterrorism.
Mappings Between Domains
The term “mapping” refers to “a correspondence between two sets that assigns 
to each element in the first a counterpart in the second,” and is taken from the field of 
mathematics (Fauconnier 1997, 1). In mapping, thinkers identify correspondences 
between the source domain, the more familiar experience and the target domain, the 
domain that the thinker wishes to understand.  They use the frame from the source to 
express the nature of concepts and relationships in the target domain. One type of 
mapping prompted by the metaphor Argument Is War might be as follows; 
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Two parties
The parties are in conflict with one 
another.
They are fighting on a piece of ground 
or terrain.
Each party seeks to destroy or defeat the 
other.
These goals are contrary, in that while it 
may be true that both could fail, only 
one could succeed.
Each has a variety of devices (weapons) 
and methods (tactics, techniques and 
procedures) that it employs against the 
other.
Two rhetors
The rhetors disagree with one another.
The rhetors argue over a common issue.
Each seeks to win by proving that his case is 
stronger than the other’s.
The rhetors have contrary or contradictory 
positions.
Each has a variety of rhetorical devices 
(evidence) and methods (lines of argument) 
that she employs to prove that her case is 
stronger and/ or that the case of her opponent 
is weaker.
Fig 1.1  Mappings Between War and Argument
 Conceptual metaphors are very productive; humans can conceive of endless 
mappings by finding different correspondences between the two frames. The 
linguistic expressions commonly referred to as metaphors are not themselves the 
cause of this phenomenon, but its effect, its manifestation in language. Language 
instead serves as a precipitating cause, prompting thinkers to construct these 
meanings, and while one can find the motivations behind a given meaning, one can’t 
necessarily predict what that meaning will be. For instance, there are numerous 
meanings possible in the single linguistic utterance, “Here comes Napoleon,” used by 
a speaker to refer to a colleague who is passing in the hallway. Depending on the 
mapping the listener creates, he could take the comment to mean that the referenced 
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person is an autocratic leader, has a complex about his physical stature, or is about to 
go into the boss’ office to embark on yet another self-destructive quarrel.
Blending Theory
Another type of analogical thought is that of conceptual blending. Conceptual 
blending, or blending, theorizes that creativity is in part explained by the human 
ability to take knowledge they have about domains of experience, called mental 
spaces, and combine them to create new relationships between the elements of these 
spaces (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 40). The difference between blending and 
metaphor is that in metaphor, one space provides the elements and the other provides 
the structure, while blending, structure and elements can come from any input space 
and combined in a number of ways. According to Turner and Fauconnier, “mental 
spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk for the purpose 
of local understanding” (2002, 40). The information or ideas in them come from 
preexisting bodies of knowledge, but they themselves are small instances of 
creativity, recruiting information to make sense of ideas and situations (Turner and 
Fauconnier 2002, 40). 
Like the domains of metaphor theory, these mental spaces can also depend 
upon frames, for instance, frames of physical action such as walking along a path. To 
use Turner and Fauconnier’s example, this frame would recruit knowledge one 
already has about walking along a path to structure a memory of hiking on Mount 
Rainier (2002, 40). A thinker can recruit the information for many purposes, such as 
reporting the past (“When we climbed Mount Rainier last year”) creating 
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counterfactual spaces (“If he had climbed Mount Rainer after his trip to Tibet”) or in 
discussing the beliefs of others (“He thinks you climbed Mount Rainier last year”) 
(Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 40). Mental spaces are only partial, since not all of the 
knowledge a person has about an event may be recruited for the local understanding; 
knowledge about the park regulations may not contribute to the blend being 
constructed.
Blends have as a minimum four mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic 
space, and the blended space itself (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 41).  They also have 
mappings between these spaces that connect elements and relationships to 
counterparts in other spaces. Source domain spaces, or input spaces, depend upon 
knowledge the thinker already has (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 40). The generic 
space is a mental space that maps out the commonalities between the input spaces 
(Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 41). Cross-space mappings, like mappings in metaphor, 
connect counterparts in and between the input spaces that are often mapped into the 
generic space (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 41). The term “vital relations” refers to 
the type of mapping that a thinker makes between elements both within a space called 
inner space relations and between spaces, or outer space relations(Turner and 
Fauconnier 2002 101).   These relations include identity, cause and effect, part/whole, 
time, and change (Turner and Fauconnier 2002 101). The blended space, or blend, 
contains elements and structure from the input spaces, as well as the structure in the 
generic space, but has more specific detail, and often has its own emergent structure 
(Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 47). As in metaphor theory, not all possible elements 
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and structure are projected; thinkers recruit based on the meaning they wish to 
express. 
In illustrations of blends, I will follow the standard set by Turner and 
Fauconnier in The Way We Think. Circles depict the different types of mental spaces, 
lines represent the cross-space mappings and relationships, and points are the 
elements in each space. The generic space represents the construction of the 
connections between two or more input spaces, while the blended space contains 
elements from all the spaces composed in a way to create emergent structure and 
relationships that don’t exist in the other spaces (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 101).  
Creativity comes from the composition of the elements in the blend as we redefine 
and change vital relations between the elements.
A popular quip from the D.C. area during the Monica Lewinsky scandal is a 
good example of blending theory. Upon hearing the sentence, “If Clinton had been 
the Titanic, the iceberg would have sunk,” thinkers create a new understanding by 
recruiting from and rearranging the elements and relationships of several mental 
spaces (Turner and Fauconnier 1998). 


























The blend has two input spaces. One input space contains knowledge about 
the Clinton scandal and its impact on his political career. In this space, the president 
is threatened by the scandal, but rather than being destroyed by it, he manages to 
survive. The vital connection between Clinton and the scandal is the potential harm 
that the affair could inflict on the President, but as we know, Clinton escapes disaster. 
The other input space contains knowledge about the Titanic and its fatal encounter 
with the iceberg, in which the harmful causal relation is actually effected, resulting in 
the destruction of the ship. In the generic space, the thinker connects Clinton with the 
doomed ship and the iceberg with the Lewinsky scandal, using the vital relation of 
identity. The creativity comes in the emergent structure of the blend, in which the 
Clinton-Titanic ship not only avoids destruction, but sinks the iceberg of political 
scandal, reversing the causal relationship between the ship and the iceberg (Turner 
and Fauconnier 2002, 222).
This creative activity, or elaboration, can go as far as the thinker wishes, 
perhaps making the vital relation between Kenneth Starr and a polar bear on the 
iceberg who is suddenly pitched into the ocean instead of the passengers aboard the 
doomed vessel. “Running the blend” allows the thinker to come up with many ways 
to create new meanings and concepts that don’t exist in any of the other mental 
spaces (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 48). Furthermore, as in metaphor theory, in 
which one linguistic prompt can spark several different mappings between the target 
and source domains, one set of prompts can trigger the creation of multiple blends; a 
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“red pencil” can be one that has red lead, is painted red, or is used to record debts, for 
instance (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 355).
Source Domains of the Army’s Theories of Mind and Communication
In trying to characterize and understand the domains of thought, 
communication, and persuasion, the Army has created its own theory of the mind, 
found in both Operations and Mission Command. Although the Army is a clearly 
defined discourse community, like any such community it shares knowledge with the 
society from which it is drawn. Therefore this theory recruits both from some 
domains common to human thinkers as a whole, and from other, more specific 
domains containing knowledge available mainly to military professionals. The more 
general domains include those of physical movement through space, causation, 
thought, and communication. The more specific are warfare and the military chain of 
command.
 Physical Movement and Causation
Physical movement is an especially rich domain because most human beings 
have direct, experiential knowledge of it. The frame of entails physical space, a body 
capable of movement, and a surface along which to move. Often, because human 
activities are goal oriented, other elements include a physical destination and a path 
on the surface along which the body moves to reach it. Because human beings share 
and experience this domain constantly, it serves as the basis for many other abstract 
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human endeavors and concepts, such as the thought process, the act of setting goals, 
and even the everyday understanding of time. 
A subdomain of physical movement is that of causality, the notion that an 
event, factor, or condition makes possible another such entity. One of the most basic 
forms of physical causation is that of an object striking against another object, making 
the second object move or break. It serves as a readily available source domain not 
only because it has deep roots in common physical experience, but because it is 
conceptually very straightforward. There is one principle force, the kinetic energy of 
the first object, one causal mechanism, the transfer of that energy from the first object 
to the second, and a clearly defined result that is the direct effect of the causal 
mechanism, the movement or destruction of the second object. Causation in the real 
world is much more complex, however. There are many frames of causation, 
including the physical, emotional, social and epistemic; as well as different means of 
causation, including contributing, precipitating, immediate, remote, direct, and 
indirect causes.  Because there can be multiple causes for a single phenomenon, 
different ways of construing the nature of each cause, as well as the degree and type 
of contribution it makes, causation can be difficult to characterize.
The Mind and Its Activities
The mind is an entity for which recourse to metaphor is inevitable, and is less 
an entity than a label attached to the aggregate of activities that cohere around 
perception, thought, and understanding, and the individual who carries them out. 
While the mind does have a closely associated physical entity, the brain, and while 
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cognitive scientists have managed to make some correlation between its physical 
activity and the unseen mental activity of the mind, it is difficult to characterize on its 
own terms. As a result, representations of the mind almost inevitably take the action 
and causation in the physical world as a source domain for metaphors of thought and 
thinking. 
Cognitive psychology has identified several functions carried out by the mind, 
which Lawrence Barsalou has described in his work Cognitive Psychology: An 
Overview for Cognitive Scientists. The first is perception: while perception itself is 
not categorized as a cognitive process, the senses and the information they provide 
give thinkers the material for processes that are attributed directly to the mind 
(Barsalou 15). The next is categorization; dividing up the thinker’s perceptions into 
classes that seem meaningful for his ability to function in the world, such as the 
ability that certain rodents have to categorize the shadows of birds as either predatory 
or nonpredatory (Barsalou 22-23). Categorization depends heavily on a third function, 
framing. As discussed above, people use frames to understand and contextualize an 
idea or perception in terms of its relationship to their experiences (Barsalou 276). 
The next mental function, that of memory, is commonly divided into working 
and long-term memory. The division depends not on how long the thinker remembers 
the information, but upon how directly it contributes to the thought process at hand. 
According to Barsalou, working memory “consists of a set of mechanisms that work 
together to perform strategic processing” (Barsalou 104). Strategic processing works 
to achieve deliberately pursued conceptual goals, but can be applied to only one such 
task at a time (Barsalou 104; 62). Working memory contains the information needed 
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for each task, and as such can only hold a limited amount of information. Thinkers 
can use new information and input from their perceptions to think, but also rely on 
information from their long-term memories. Long-term memory contains a great deal 
of information that is not necessarily immediately relevant to the task at hand 
(Barsalou 116).
Barsalou defines thought as “involv[ing] a series of transformations 
performed on the contents of working memory, where these transformations and 
contents are conscious at least to some extent,” and defines purposive thought as 
thought people perform to achieve a goal (275). He makes the distinction between 
formal thought and informal thought, the latter to which he allocates such activities as 
daydreaming and free association (275). Formal thought includes such activities as 
determining causation, solving problems, making comparisons, and inventing. 
As thinkers categorize, frame, memorize, and think, they also control the flow 
of the information. Barsalou classifies this control of processing in two ways, whether 
something is innate or learned, and whether the processing is automatic or strategic 
(61). Some phenomena thinkers seem to be predisposed to noticing and process 
immediate, such as loud noises or large movements, which indicates that such 
immediate processing may be innate, and the choice to process them and assign some 
meaning to them is automatic. It would seem that learned processing is necessarily or 
primarily deliberate, but thinkers can learn to pay attention to some things and 
process their meanings automatically. 
One interesting aspect of the above summary is that, while there are some 
functions that seem clearly prioritized in terms of temporality, such as perception, and 
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others in terms of complexity, such as thinking to solve a problem, in many instances 
it seems very difficult to determine what sort of causal, temporal, or functional 
relationships exist between these abilities. Framing, access, and categorization, for 
instance, seem tightly intermeshed, and perception can be affected by the frame or 
situation one is in. Similarly, problem solving may be hindered or assisted by the 
context in which it occurs; ways of getting people to contribute to a task in a work 
setting may be inappropriate in a more casual social environment. Any relationships 
we pose between these functions, like the language we use to speak about them, are 
as much an indication of our how we understand ourselves as they are about the 
workings of the mind itself.
Communication
Communication is a complex cooperative activity that involves conceptual as 
well as physical abilities. It is also a key input domain for information and 
psychological operations, and, as a cooperative activity, is critical to successful peace 
operations as well. How one conceives of communication depends heavily on one’s 
theory of mind.
In order for communication to take place, most models agree that several 
elements are necessary: two parties, some sort of physical contact between them, and 
a means of expressing their thoughts that is mutually intelligible to both parties. 
Sperber and Wilson, in their book Relevance, give us an expert model that depends 
on folk models of communication. In this model, one party has a thought, encodes the 
meaning into words, and then sends his thoughts to the other party by speaking them. 
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The recipient hears the words and decodes the thought they contain. The second party 
then formulates his response, encodes it into language, and sends back his reply. In 
this process, one is either encoding and speaking, or listening and decoding; each 
phase of communication is a contrary process in which one is either receiving or 
sending (Sperber and Wilson 5). This theory is based on the Conduit Metaphor, in 
which meaning is conceived of as a physical object that is “packaged” into language, 
and then “transferred” or “sent” between the parties in a conversation; and 
interpreting a message is conceived of as removing the meaning from the container of 
language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 10).
 While these models of language do capture physically salient aspects of the 
communication process, that is, the turn-by-turn nature of face-to-face conversation 
and the event of sound waves traveling through the air, like many representations, it 
fails to capture some other, equally significant features of the domain it represents. 
According to Herbert Clark in his book On Language, communication is a 
cooperative process that requires constant coordination between its participants at 
many different levels. He takes as his prototypical case the core experience of one-on-
one conversation. 
The turn-by-turn model in which one or the other of the two participants is 
active at a given time, and the other is passive, does have its basis in one aspect of the 
communication process, and that is the fact that we usually speak turn by turn, so that 
we can hear one another. However, this physical element is only one of many 
activities we carry on as we converse. According to Herbert Clark, communication is 
a joint activity in which two or more parties must both participate in order for it to 
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happen (58). Like the previous model, it too needs two people that have both physical 
contact with one another and a common means of communication, such as a spoken 
word language, as well as information each wishes to communicate. What Clark’s 
theory highlights is the myriad processes that the two people must both carry out and 
coordinate as they converse. At its most basic, people continually coordinate on both 
the meaning or content they are trying to convey and are establishing, the goals of the 
conversation, and the process of communication itself (Clark 90).
Inherent in this discussion of communication is human cognition, the large 
range of intellectual capacities that speakers use as they speak and understand, and of 
which language use itself is one example. Interpreting the utterances of others, 
conceiving of our own replies, and drawing on information and knowledge we 
already possess are just a few of the abilities we employ during the course of any
given conversation. Because thought is an individually exercised and subjectively 
experienced ability with little public presence, and because we as human thinkers do 
it constantly and well, theories of communication often fail to give it the prominence 
it actually holds.
The Army’s Theory of Communication
In Mission Command, the Army articulates its own theory of communication. 
It is careful to distinguish it from the concept of communications, which are defined 
as “means of communicating, such as telephones” (Department of the Army 2003 
paragraph 3-15).  Like communications systems, communication itself is defined in 
terms of how it furthers the goals and objectives of the command it serves.  Within 
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the Army, communication is an element of control, “the regulation of forces and 
battlefield operating systems to accomplish the mission in  accordance with the 
commander’s intent.”  (Department of the Army 2003b, 3-5).  Because control is 
achieved primarily through sharing information, communication is described as  
actions that “use any means or method to convey information of any kind from one 
person or place to another”  (Department of the Army 2003b, 3-5).   The cooperative, 
joint endeavor that Clark has laid out becomes in the Army a means of ensuring 
control within its own organization to get the mission done.  
One aspect of Clark’s expert theory that Army doctrine does reflect includes 
the importance of feedback.  Feedback, critical because it “provides the means to 
improve and confirm mutual understanding,” is more formal than Clark’s notion of 
continuous coordination, but addresses the same issue, that people who communicate 
must believe they share the same meaning (Department of the Army 2003b, 3-17).
Another is the importance of nonverbal communication, in which the writers of the 
manual include “sounds, such as sighs and grunts, as well as voice tone and 
inflection” (Department of the Army 2003c, 3-17).   They also address what they term 
“nonvocal means,” which are “such things as gestures, body language, and facial 
expressions(Department of the Army 2003c, 3-17).
The writers also explain the importance of enculturation within a given 
discourse community.  Termed “implicit communication,” people that are part of a 
given community 
. . . have formed a familiarity of shared experiences and a common 
outlook. Implicit communication is a function of an individual’s 
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personal, military, cultural, and national expectations. It consists of  
personal and organizational styles, habits, experiences, beliefs, and 
values.  Implicit communication takes place when members of a group 
internalize and  share explicitly stated standards, norms, or values. It 
also takes place  through individuals adopting the command’s styles, 
habits, experiences, and  beliefs as their own (becoming socialized) 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 3-17 through 3-18).
The Army’s theory of communication finally emphasizes the importance of face to 
face interaction, discouraging commanders from relying too heavily on emails and 
memos: “Modern word processors provide the ability to produce vast amounts of 
writing, but effective commanders avoid  this tyranny.”(Department of the Army 
2003d, 3-18).  Clark’s prototype of communication, the one-on-one conversation, 
stands as the Army’s ideal.
Given the emphasis the writers put on socialization and mutual understanding, 
the limitations they in turn put on the communication process as a whole are 
sometimes surprising.  For instance, “implicit communication” contributes to the 
mission not by fostering trust and a sense of cohesion; that is the commander’s job.  
Instead,
[s]ince such implicit communication reduces the time spent drafting 
and relaying messages, it reduces the problems of delay typically 
associated with information flow. Implicit communication helps 
maximize information content while minimizing data  flow. It makes 
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organizations less vulnerable to communication disruptions 
(Department of the Army 2003d, 3-18).
That is, it aids information management.  And because commanders in most units 
receive their soldiers only after they have undergone at least sixteen weeks of 
constant, regulated, prescribed enculturation, the amount of further socialization a 
unit must impress upon the soldier is relatively small.
The problem with the frame of this notion of communication is that as a 
means of achieving and maintaining control, and as a process in which adjustment is 
mainly one sided, it is terribly incomplete.  In all communication, both sides must 
negotiate and coordinate; what the Army describes is instead a process of conformity.  
As a result, it is less a theory of communication than one of compliance, and is too 
conceptually limited to support the challenges of psychological, information, stability 
and support operations.
Warfare and the Military Institution as Source Domains
The domains of physical movement, causation, thought, and communication 
are readily accessible for most human thinkers. In many societies, there also exists a 
shared cultural knowledge of warfare, derived from immediate experience or, in 
American society, from reports, fictional accounts, and other indirect sources. Even 
direct civilian experience of warfare, however, is not the same as the military’s 
understanding of it. The United States Army’s knowledge of warfare is a highly 
developed, extremely detailed domain that includes every possible operation on or off 
the battlefield that contributes to military victory, as well as the connections between 
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those operations and the national institutions that support them. This level of detail 
and development make it a ready source domain for many metaphors and blends.
There are three levels of warfare: the tactical, the operational, and the 
strategic. Tactical warfare is the level at which battles and engagements are fought, 
operational is the coordination of those actions to achieve operational and strategic 
goals, and strategic is the level at which military and national goals and actions are 
coordinated (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)). Of 
the three, the tactical domain serves as the richest source domain for concepts of other 
military action because that is where the most physical activity occurs; the other 
levels, while important and complex in their own right, focus on coordinating the 
resources to carry out these combat actions.  The tactical level is also the basis of 
shared knowledge in the military; because all soldiers are trained in and expected to 
master basic tactical tasks, such as firing a weapon and moving to find cover and 
concealment, even the highest-ranking officers can speak in common terms with 
newly trained soldiers. 
One reason the Army’s knowledge base is so highly developed is that it does 
not prepare to merely fight wars, it prepares to win them. Although its mission focus, 
and now its force structure, are evolving, its perspective on what constitutes success 
has not changed. As FM 3.0 states, “Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the 
foundation of Army service—the Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American 
people and its enduring obligation to the nation” (Department of the Army 2001a, 1-
2). Of the two major types of tactical operations, offensive and defensive, only the 
offensive wins wars. It is therefore the preferred form of warfare.
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The Basic Structure of a Battle
The prototypical offensive operation is a deliberate attack against an objective 
on the ground. In the scenario depicted below, army forces are attacking Objective 
Rabbit, which is the hub of a road network. The attacking forces have split into two, 
with one conducting a frontal attack to engage and pin down the enemy’s strongest 
forces, and the other conducting a flank attack to pit its strength against the enemy’s 
weakness. Both prongs of the attack move swiftly so that the defenders cannot lay 
down a base of suppressive fire or commit their reserve, either of which would slow 
the attack and endanger its success. The operation ends with the attacking forces 
seizing and holding the objective with enough combat power remaining to repel 


















Offense presupposes a defense, and a successful defensive operation thwarts 
enemy attacks. Although they are less complex than attacks, as the definition below 
explains, they is not the preferred form of operations: 
Army forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. 
Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize 
forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. 
Alone, defensive operations normally cannot achieve a decision. Their 
purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army 
forces to regain the initiative (Department of the Army 2001a, 8-1). 
Defensive operations seek not to change the relationship between the two
sides but to maintain the current conditions until attack can be resumed. Unlike 
attackers, defenders don’t normally move forward. Like the offense, defeating the 
enemy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for defenders to keep the terrain; the 
defenders might achieve that goal, but in the process reduce their own combat power 
to the point that they could not hold the terrain against a subsequent attack. 
One important aspect of conventional operations is that the domains of 
offense and defense have tight vital relations both within their own domains and to 
one another. In terms of outer space vital relations, offense and defense entail one 
another; one only defends in anticipation of an attack, and one usually attacks a force 
that is defending. As unlikely as it may seem, in some ways warfare is a cooperative 
activity in much the same way that communication is; both parties must participate in 
order for the activity to happen. When one party can no longer fight, combat 
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operations end. Together, offense and defense make up the overall frame of 
conventional warfare.
In terms of inner space relations, offense can be construed as maneuver 
combined with firepower, while defense is firepower combined with the ability to 
hold terrain. While each of these three operations, movement, firing, and standing 
still, is a distinct activity, within each domain they are inextricably linked. In the 
offense, one fires to maneuver, destroying an enemy occupying an objective, which 
enables the attacker to move forward and take the terrain made available by his 
destruction. Defense is firing and standing fast, destroying the enemy to prevent him 
from taking the terrain one holds. In both cases, destroying the enemy’s ability to act 
through firepower is inextricably linked to one’s ability to carry out one’s own 
mission. Also, within each type of operation, impairing the enemy’s ability to act 
enables one’s own ability to act. Therefore, destroying a force’s ability to move or 
hold terrain destroys his ability to fire, and destroying its ability to fire contributes to 
the ability to conduct one’s own mission; it changes the relative combat power 
between the two forces.
The Military Hierarchy
Warfare is by nature an illogical, dangerous activity. Most people do not 
willingly put themselves directly in harm’s way, or wish to harm one another. When 
they are in danger, their first instinct is to avoid harm. Because the military conducts 
hazardous operations at an enormous scale, they have trained their soldiers to operate 
under several forms of control that help them function both individually and 
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collectively on the battlefield. One of the most elementary of those is the military 
hierarchy.
The structure of the hierarchy is imposed on a soldier from the minute she 
enters the military, so that by the time she completes her training and must implement 
it, she is accustomed to having her actions regulated by both internal conditioning and 
external authority. That authority, known as the chain of command, is a hierarchy 
within which every soldier’s importance, responsibility, and function can be mapped 
in the military.
Though technically referring exclusively to commissioned officers, for most 
soldiers, the chain of command begins with the noncommissioned officer (NCO) in 
charge of the smallest unit to which he belongs, often the squad leader, and continues 
up through the platoon sergeant and platoon leader, to the company leadership up 
through each successive echelon until the Commander in Chief, the President of the 
United States. Each echelon has command responsibility for the echelons below it, 
and has the duty to implement the orders of the echelons above it. The figure below, 
called a line and block chart, illustrates the hierarchical structure of a Stryker 
battalion, a unit whose major weapon system is an eight-wheeled armored fighting 
vehicle. 
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Fig 1.4  Stryker Battalion (Department of the Army 2003c, paragraph 1-2)
At the top of each rectangle is a small symbol indicating the unit’s level; one 
dot is a team, two a squad, and three a platoon (Department of the Army 1997, page 
4-5).  A company, composed of platoons, is one line, while the battalion itself is two 
(Department of the Army 1997, page 4-5).  The smaller, subordinate units are at the 
bottom, while the larger commands are higher in the chart. Notice the lines that link 
the units to one another; they run from lower to higher, and vice versa, but do not 
connect same-sized units; the horizontal line below the battalion indicates the breadth 
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of control that this higher echelon maintains, not the connections between 
subordinates of the same level. Also, the lower echelon units at once support and 
comprise the higher level ones, indicating the higher level’s dependence on them for 
existence, while the lower level ones depend on their connection to higher echelon 
ones for their place in the structure. Notice, too, that each unit, while comprised of the 
echelons below it, is self-contained, which emphasizes its autonomy from higher and 
lower as well as adjacent units. 
Some of the entailments of this source domain are that the higher a unit is 
located in the hierarchy, the more units it controls, the more subordinates its decisions 
impact, and the wider its scope of responsibility is in terms of the mission. The 
subordinate units, in turn, have a smaller scope of responsibility, and the sum of their 
efforts comprises the efforts of the larger units, that is, the next higher unit divides its 
mission among and coordinates the efforts of its own subordinates. The commanding 
unit should have knowledge of all its subordinates’ activities, and therefore should 
know more about the overall situation than they do individually. While adjacent units 
should and do coordinate with one another, their first responsibility is fulfilling the 
mission their higher headquarters gives them.
The military hierarchy clearly establishes the relationships between member 
units; moving outside this structure by, for instance, reporting directly to an echelon 
two levels up, weakens the hierarchy control by overstepping intermediate levels and 
interfering with unit’s links to their subordinates. Within it, the role of the 
commander holds a unique position that probably has no real analogue in the civilian 
world. The power that he wields over his soldiers is more far-reaching than any his 
33
civilian counterparts hold over their employees, but so is the responsibility he bears. 
“Command” is both a position and a legally binding responsibility, and is defined as
 the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises 
over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes 
the authority and responsibility for effectively using available 
resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment 
of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, morale, 
and discipline of assigned personnel (Director for Operational Plans 
and Joint Force Development (J-7)).
While a civilian manager might be charged with some of these duties, should 
he fail to meet them, he would most likely be demoted or fired; only in 
extreme circumstances might he be legally liable for failing to fulfill them. 
Also, unless it directly involved the company, it is unlikely he would be 
responsible for his employees’ personal lives.
The military hierarchy and the concept of command upon which it 
depends delineates a network of relationships between individuals and 
organizations that is highly formal, very rigid, and linear in nature. It is also 
very centralized, and unidirectional in authority; control emanates from the 
top. While every element in the chain of command has a responsibility to 
every other element, the nature of that responsibility depends on the 
relationship between them; higher levels shape the mission of lower echelons, 
while lower level units are compelled to execute it. Every unit’s mission 
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ideally makes a clear and direct contribution to that of its superior. This 
structure helps ensure cohesive action in the face of danger.
The Army’s Theory of Mind
Warfare is a complex activity that depends on both brute force and keen 
intellect.  It takes the combined efforts of thousands of minds to plan and execute 
operations at every level in a major campaign.  It also presupposes that the only 
interactions one would have with the enemy’s mind involve surreptitiously 
eavesdropping on him, deliberately deceiving him, and breaking his will.  However, 
the changes in its mission have forced the Army to consider the nature of thought and 
communication, and therefore formulate its own theory of mind. It documents this 
theory in two key manuals, Operations, in a discussion of “relevant information,” and 
in Mission Command, through a heuristic called “the cognitive hierarchy” that further 
develops that concept.
While the Army only recently came up with a formal theory of mind, 
philosophers have debated the nature of thought and the mind for centuries, and the 
discipline of cognitive science has made this study an interdisciplinary pursuit. In a 
sense, the Army’s theory of mind is interdisciplinary as well, in that it draws heavily 
on the domain of its own military culture to explain the workings of thought. The 
Army’s attempts are motivated by the proliferation of the new entity called 
“information” in its operations. In characterizing the nature of thought and 
information, the Army relies heavily on metaphors of causation and orientation 
derived from its own domain of experience, and does so in ways that make the link 
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between thought and action seem both predictable and controllable. However, this 
dependence is so excessive that it purges the domain of thought of the very aspects 
that make it both difficult to define and powerful. 
Common Western Metaphors of the Mind
As the previous discussion of cognitive functions illustrates, it is difficult to 
discuss the mind without recourse to metaphor. Memory is conceived of as a form of 
physical storage, and contextualizing information is conceived in terms of affixing an 
object within the boundaries of a frame to enable the thinker to “get the whole 
picture.” In Philosophy and the Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson discuss several metaphors 
of cognition, in which the target domains of the mind and thought are conceived of 
through the source domain of a physical body moving through space (235-236). 
These metaphors set up causal, temporal, and part-whole relationships between 
different aspects of thought that cognitive psychologists may not find accurate. But, 
because all human thinkers have constant, experiential knowledge of the source 
domain, these analogical relationships have great explanatory power.
The United States Army is a distinct discourse community from that of the 
nation it serves, but it is not wholly isolated from it. It comes as no surprise that the 
blends of “relevant information” and “the cognitive hierarchy” bear striking 
resemblances to common metaphors of thought. When the blends are examined in 
detail, they may seem like bizarre oversimplifications of the nature of thought. 
However, they are strongly motivated by the very productive mappings between 
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cognition and physical movement already entrenched in Western culture. Examining 
these metaphors can help illustrate that motivation. 
The common metaphors of the mind that Lakoff and Johnson report are:
Thinking Is Physical Functioning. 
Ideas Are Entities With An Independent Existence.
Thinking Of An Idea Is Functioning Physically With Respect To An 
Independently Existing Entity (2000, 235-236). 
Lakoff and Johnson cite four major kinds of physical functioning that provide the 
basis for four special cases of the metaphor, which include moving, manipulating 
objects, perceiving, and eating (2000, 236). The two that most strongly inform the 
Army’s theory of mind are those of physical motion and object manipulation.
In the Thinking Is Moving metaphor, the mind is a body, and ideas are 
locations towards which it moves, as in the expression, “He’ll get to the main point 
eventually” (Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 236). The mind-as-body can think about these 
ideas, which thinkers represent as movement around the locations. Within this frame, 
reason is a force that causes thought, (“I was driven to the conclusion…”) and 
rational thought is motion that is direct, deliberate, step-by-step, and in accord with 
the force of reason (“She took the most straightforward approach to the problem”) 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 236). Conversely, being unable to think is being unable to 
move, and thinking irrationally or illogically is moving erratically (“His ideas are all 
over the map”) (Lakoff and Johnson 2000 236). A line of thought is a path along 
which the mind moves, and a person that communicates his ideas to his friend guides 
her along that path. If she understands his thought, she follows him, and if she 
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reconsiders the ideas, she is going over the path again (Lakoff and Johnson 2000 236-
238).
These mappings are motivated by the vital relation of change that holds 
together the frames of both the target and source domain. In the target domain of 
thought, a thinker’s mind “changes” in that, through the act of thinking, he discovers 
the relationships between new information and knowledge he already has, or 
understands new relationships between previously held concepts. Gaining new insight 
and understanding is normally conceived of as a kind of intellectual progress. The 
source domain of physical movement also entails the vital relations of change, but in 
terms of physical location and cause and effect.  Movement changes the body’s 
location in space, and takes place during a change in time. Also, each movement 
contributes both to the nature of subsequent movements and to the overall process of 
the journey as a whole. 
The locational and causal changes of physical movement readily map onto the 
intellectual changes of thought, but their easy correspondence obscures an important 
disjunction between the two domains. In movement, the relations are linear and 
unidirectional; a step at the beginning of the journey makes a contributing cause to 
steps at the end of it, but the relationship cannot be reciprocal. However, in cognition, 
the functions are not as clearly distinguishable as steps are from one another, and 
events in one function can change or even negate conclusions reached through 
another function; if a person sees a tag attached to a dog’s cage that gives its price in 
terms of its weight, his frame for the animal shifts from that of domestic pet to 
livestock, for instance. 
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Another common metaphor from which the Army representation of the mind 
inherits many of its entailments is Thinking Is Object Manipulation (Lakoff and 
Johnson 2000, 240). The mind as body manipulates ideas, which are represented as 
discrete physical objects. A particularly complex idea, for instance, can be “grappled 
with.” When a person understands an idea, she “grasps” it, and when she cannot, she 
“loses her grip.” Once she can “handle” them she “stores” these ideas in the 
“warehouse” of memory from which she “retrieves” them. She can also conceive of 
ideas not as discrete, solid objects, but complex structures that she analyze by taking 
them apart, as when we “build,” “dissect,” or “reconstruct” a theory (Lakoff and 
Johnson 2000, 240-241). A related metaphor, The Mind Is A Machine, represents the 
mind as a factory, ideas as products of its workings, thinking as an activity that 
proceeds assembly-line fashion, step by step and automated, and the thought process 
as the operation of a machine, subject to working smoothly, that is, thinking 
normally, or succumbing to various forms of disfunction (Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 
247).
Thinking As Object Manipulation and The Mind Is A Machine both have 
some of the same vital relations of time and causation as in Thinking Is Moving. In 
addition, these metaphors highlight the vital relation of part-whole, in terms of both
the composition of the thoughts, and the act of thinking of the thoughts themselves. 
Complex thoughts often involve integration of two or more ideas, and thinking about 
and integrating the ideas can be thought of as smaller actions that are part of the 
whole conceptual process. Like Thinking Is Moving, the ease with which object 
manipulation is mapped onto thought hides important disparities between the two 
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domains. Thoughts and ideas may cause thinkers to perform acts that in turn cause 
objects to exist independently in the world, but they themselves have no independent 
existence without a thinker.
Each of the above metaphors, if followed according to the logic laid out by the 
source domains, has a set of additional, more general entailments. Some of the 
entailments of the metaphors as laid out by Lakoff and Johnson in Philosophy In The 
Flesh are as follows:
Mind as Body
Thoughts have a public, objective existence independent of the thinker (248).
Thoughts correspond to things in the world (248).
Thought As Motion
Rational thought is direct, deliberate, and step-by- step (249).
Thought As Object Manipulation
Thinking is object manipulation (249).
Thoughts are objective. Hence they are the same for everyone; that is, they are 
universal (249).
The Mind As Machine.
Each complex thought has a structure imposed by mechanically putting 
together simple thoughts in a regular, describable step-by step fashion (249). 
In many ways these entailments contradict the actual experience of thinking. 
Thoughts are subjectively experienced and often privately held, and even 
when communicated, those with whom one communicates must come to their own 
understanding of those ideas. Thoughts often don’t correspond to things in the 
40
worlds; if this were a necessary feature of ideas, it would be difficult to speculate 
about the future, imagine alternate worlds, or invent new concepts. Also, thought 
processes are not necessarily step-by- step, nor do they always result in complex ideas 
whose complexity can be explained through the aggregation simpler ideas. However, 
the subjective, individual nature of thinking and thoughts directly contradicts a major 
feature of military culture, that a group as a whole must collectively share and 
understand a given idea (i.e., a plan of operations) in order for it to act 
The Army has a good reason for relying on the notion that ideas have a public, 
independent existence that relates to real things in the world and that they are 
objective entities that can be “assembled” in a methodical, step-by- step manner. As 
an institution, one of its major goals is to train large numbers of people in demanding 
tasks carried out under dangerous conditions. The Army needs ideas and methods that 
are easily communicated, retained, and implemented under the extreme stress of 
combat. And, because people often are incapacitated or killed, but the mission must 
continue, those who replace them must have the same concepts in mind to carry out 
the mission successfully. Hence, the Army’s concept of cognition as embodied in 
both the concept of “relevant information” and the cognitive hierarchy recruits from 
and develops the Mind as Body and Mind as Machine metaphors, focusing on the 
manipulation of something called “information.”
The Army’s theory of mind is a blend that recruits from the source domains of 
physical action and the nature of cognition itself, but each of the two portrayals has 
another major source domain. The definition of “relevant information” recruits 
heavily from the frame of physical causation, specifically, that of change and 
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creation.  The construct of the cognitive hierarchy also draws from this domain, but 
derives much of its structure from the source domain of the military chain of 
command.
Both the frame of physical causation and the military hierarchy share common 
traits. They have a public, objective existence that all thinkers can experience in the 
same way, that is, they are universal. There are clear, necessary relationships between 
the elements, and they exist independently of the actors involved. Thoughts, which 
necessarily depend on the people who think them, are too subjective and individual 
for an institution that relies more on the role a person plays in its organization than 
the individual human value that fills it. The Army, therefore, deals not with thoughts, 
but with “information.”
The Nature of “Information”
Both the Army’s theory of mind and Western metaphors of thought depend 
heavily on the concept of “information,” one so pervasive in today’s world that, like 
the notion of Enlightenment, an entire era has been named after it. Also like 
“enlightenment,” it has developed to the extent that events and entities that seem to 
have little to do with the core concept have adopted the term as its label.  Just as the 
storming of the Bastille, a brutal and violent event, is often hailed as a triumph of the 
age of Enlightenment, “information,” whose most critical elements are human beings 
and the acts of thought and communication they carry out, often refers to 
electromagnetically recorded media that is indecipherable without a great deal of 
cultural knowledge and physical infrastructure. 
42
When referring to “information” and where it comes from, one often says 
things like, “The information is in that book,” or “on my hard drive,” or even “hidden 
in the song.” “Information” seems to refer some sort of physical object. However, it 
has little independent existence outside the process of thought and the person who is 
actually thinking. In the course of a conversation, a friend might express an intriguing 
idea, which you later type into your computer. You would say the information is “in 
your laptop.” If someone were to be reading over your shoulder as you typed, she 
might say, “Where did you get that information?”, and you would reply, “From 
Rick.” You conceive of information as being contained “in” Rick’s words, or “in” the 
computer.
 But actually happened is that you communicated with Rick, understood his 
ideas, and “placed” them in your own working memory. When you “type his idea” 
into the computer, you activate your long term memory, bringing your recollection of 
the conversation into your working memory, translating it into verbal form and 
creating a representation of the memory using your computer. The “information” 
“resides” in your memory as well as “on” the hard drive of the machine. So all those 
entities commonly characterized as “information” are really the representations of the 
contents of the working memory, that is, they are the public, independently existing 
records of thoughts that are metonymically conceived of as the thoughts themselves.
The tangibility of the record fulfills our expectation of the source domain of 
Thinking Is Object Manipulation. The association of thoughts with the media that 
records and transfers them also conforms to our expectation that thoughts, like 
language, have an independent public existence. In this form, the range and scope of 
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impact on other people, their actions, and their thoughts can be more easily traced, 
explained and accounted for by determining who had physical possession of the 
record. This abstraction also lays the foundation for the Army’s theory of mind.
Information, Action, and Gradatio
The first explanation of the Army’s theory of mind, the definition of “relevant 
information,” is found in Chapter 11 of Operations (Department of the Army 2001a, 
11-11 through 11-12). This chapter, titled “Information Superiority,” explains how to 
gain “the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an 
adversary’s ability to do the same” (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-11 through 
11-12). “Relevant information” is conceived of as a major contributing cause towards 
this advantage. The manner in which it enables a unit to accomplish its mission would 
be difficult to explain if it were conceived of as the subjectively experienced process 
of individual thought, especially since military missions are primarily physical in 
nature. The concept of “relevant information” aids this endeavor by making thought 
not only an independently existing entity, but one with its own agency capable of 
acting in its own right. This particular theory of mind makes a direct link between 
action and thought by making thought an actor.
The Category of “Relevant Information”
Given the number of people and events on the battlefield, there is bound to be 
a great deal of information available, including plenty that is too detailed, misleading, 
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or simply false. The sheer volume of reports flooding in from all directions in the 
course of an operation could easily overwhelm staffs and commanders. “Relevant 
information,” however, seems to be a scarce resource. Because so much information 
can seem important, the writers of Army doctrine had to differentiate “relevant 
information” from other types. It is therefore defined as 
all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise 
of command and control. To be relevant, information must be 
accurate, timely, usable, complete, precise, and reliable. Relevant 
information provides the answers commanders and staffs need to 
successfully conduct operations, that is, all elements necessary to 
address the factors of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, time, 
troops, and civil considerations) (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-
11 through 11-12). 
“Relevant information” gives the commander and his staff the ability to 
manage the actions of their units so that they can achieve a mission. It must 
give a portrait of the situation that accurately and succinctly reflects reality, 
and provide that picture in time for the unit to act on it.1 The goal of relevance 
is action.
“Relevant Information” as Agent of Action
The preceding paragraph explains the fact that information’s value is 
determined by how well it contributes to a mission, but not the manner in which it 
1 The acronym (METT-TC), drawn from the context of conventional warfare, not only puts the desired 
actions of the military force, the mission, first, and places the civilian population last, but assumes a 
division between the two. 
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does so. The role of “relevant information” to action is explained in the paragraph 
that follows it. It details this process using the ancient rhetorical figure gradatio, 
which repeats elements in a regular fashion to create a syntactical link between them. 
This passage outlines the transformation of “relevant information” from object to 
actor.
Relevant information results from assigning meaning to data to assist 
understanding. Processing changes raw data into information by 
assigning meaning to it. Analysis and evaluation transform 
information into knowledge, which is presented to commanders as 
relevant information. When commanders apply judgment to 
knowledge, it becomes understanding. Understanding enables making 
informed decisions with less-than-perfect data. Combined with will, 
understanding generates effective action (Department of the Army 
2001a, 11-12). 
This paragraph, which blithely answers questions that philosophers have 
pondered for centuries, makes the case that thought is a methodical, step-by step 
process that will result in effective action if the steps are followed in the order and 
manner described. It fulfills expectations for the metaphor Thinking Is Moving 
through both its meaning and form.  By duplicating the elements at the beginnings 
and endings of each sentence and forging these links in the structure of the passage, 
the author of Operations implies that the elements also have a link in reality to one 
another.  It creates a necessary connection between information and action, 
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“present[ing] a continuum where there were once divisions” (Fahnestock 97). The 
first sentence, “Relevant information results from assigning meaning to data to assist 
understanding,” sets up a causal relationship between “relevant information,” 
“analysis,” and “understanding” in which “analysis” changes “data” into “relevant 
information,” and “understanding” is the goal of this transformation (Department of 
the Army 2001a, 11-12). The remainder of the paragraph, following the pattern of 
topic/comment, proceeds to elaborate on links of this causal chain.
This paragraph as a blend recruits from several source domains. From the 
domain of “information” the blend recruits the thinker, the information itself, the act 
of cognition, and the resultant new thoughts.  The domain of physical movement 
along a path provides the structure for the blend, which also recruits from the domain 
of physical causation.
However, the military contributes from yet another aspect of its domain, and 
that is the notion of corporate activity and the division of labor that supports it.  Like 
any large organization with a complex mission, the Army also has layers of 
management that coordinate every aspect of an operation from originator to provider. 
A single supply request, such as requisitioning ammunition, which takes one person 
at the company level, might involve a total of three or more at each higher 
headquarters. The soldier who receives the ammunition is only the final link in a 
supply system that stretches up through his higher headquarters to the theatre and 
back to depots in the United States.
With a total of at least three source domains, the generic space of this blend, 
which draws together common elements from all spaces, bears the most resemblance 
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to the frame of causation. It contains an agent, a patient, an act, a means, a manner in 
which the patient and means interact, and the resultant state of the patient. While 
there are clear correspondences between this space and the source domains of 
movement and thought, one interesting vital relation is the decompression of the 
agent of causation in the generic space into the multiple agents of a military 
organization. That division of labor is key to the cognitive process as it is depicted 
both in the discussion of relevant information from Operations and the cognitive 
hierarchy in Mission Command.
As a blend, the passage from Operations not only recruits from multiple 
source domains, but also generates structure that does not exist in any of them. That 
structure can be found by analyzing each sentence in the passage in terms of the 
generic space.  The generic space, structured by the causal frame of transformation, 
contains the elements of the agent and the patient, who are linked by the change the 
agent effects on the patient.  It also contains the manner in which the patient is 
changed, and the end state of the patient. This causal chain helps knit thought and 
action in several respects.
The first sentence, as discussed before, is a topic sentence that summarizes the 
process discussed in the remainder of the paragraph. The discussion of the process as 
it is broken down begins with the second sentence; “Processing changes raw data into 
information by assigning meaning to it” (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-12). 
The agent of this sentence is the gerund “processing,” which is the 
nominalization of the verb “process.” “Processing,” according to Mission Command, 
“includes filtering, fusing, formatting, organizing, collating, correlating, plotting, 
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translating, categorizing, and arranging,” that is, classifying the data provided by the 
collectors (Department of the Army 2003d, B-1). “Processing” in this context 
primarily means categorizing, which is the first cognitive functions discussed. The 
patient “data” is not substantively changed, only sorted. 
As the most basic cognitive function, the agent “processing” performs the act 
of “changing” on the direct object of “data” into the indirect object of “information,” 
the result of the action. “Data” is defined as 
the lowest level of information on the cognitive hierarchy. Data consist 
of unprocessed signals communicated between any nodes in an 
information system, or sensings from the environment detected by a 
collector of any kind (human, mechanical, or electronic) (Department 
of the Army 2003d, Glossary-5)
The “collectors of any kind,” be they human observers such as scouts, 
electronic sensors such as seismic monitors, detectors of electromagnetic emanations 
like radars or signals from communications themselves, are themselves amassed into 
one large group, which does not distinguish between any of them in terms of 
importance or type. The equation of the human with the various types of machines is 
not accidental, since the critical distinguishing point would not be what was used to 
gather the “data,” but how relevant, timely and accurate it is. The key difference is 
that human beings “collect” by experiencing and remembering their perceptions, and 
have self-awareness of the acts of both perceiving and memory. By grouping humans 
as the first in a series of machines, the sentences emphasize the public, objective 
nature of the information gathered, eliding the human agency not only of those who 
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actually experience the perceptions, but those who plan and conduct the placement 
and operation of those instruments.
“Change,” the act performed by “processing” on “data,” is a very general verb 
because while it indicates that a change has taken place, it does not elaborate by what 
means it takes place (cutting or moving, for instance) or indicate what the change is 
(in terms of size, shape, or position). This could indicate that a variety of types of 
changes are taking place, but more probably points to the mystery of the mechanisms 
of cognition itself. The sentence does explicitly state how change happens in an 
adverbial phrase, “assigning meaning.” To assign something is to give someone a 
task, or to designate a permanent association between two or more entities, as when a 
student is assigned to a class. In both cases there is a sense of addition, and in the 
latter, contextualization. In other words, to give “meaning” to “data” is also to give it 
a frame, which is actually how the cognitive function of framing relates to 
categorization. In the context of military doctrine, “data” is considered in terms of the 
mission, and so “data” is assigned a subframe within the larger frame of the military 
operation for which it is collected. The resultant state of the “data,” “information,” 
becomes the direct object of the third sentence.
The third sentence has both a main and subordinate clause, so each will be 
taken in turn. The main clause, “Analysis and evaluation transform information into 
knowledge,” has as its agents “analysis” and “evaluation” (Department of the Army 
2001a, 11-12). These agents are types of goal-oriented thought, mental activities 
performed deliberately and methodically to make a decision or reach an objective. 
Here, even before their contribution to action in and of itself is explained, the two 
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concepts are nominalized and made into metaphoric agents, as “processing” was in 
the first sentence. This practice of nominalizing cognitive functions that are 
subjectively experienced by individuals and conferring to them the agency they 
normally serve, which continues through the remainder of the paragraph, removes the 
individual thinker from thought, and further defines their status as separate entities 
with a public existence.
“Analysis” and “evaluation” make their contribution to this action by 
“transforming” “information.” The verb “transform,” like the predicate of sentence 
two, is also a ditransitive verb of change, but one that specifies the type of change that 
takes place, that is, a substantive or qualitative change. “Information,” the patient of 
this act, is defined as “(1) in the general sense, the meaning humans assign to data. (2) 
in the context of the cognitive hierarchy, data that have been processed to provide 
further meaning” (Department of the Army 2003d, Glossary-9). Although the 
categorization that takes place in sentence two does not seem like it would add much 
meaning, any “data” that makes it through that sorting process has been assigned a 
certain value of truth, making it eligible for further consideration.
 In terms of the agents, to “analyze” is to look at something for its 
implications, and to “evaluate” is to think about it in terms of a larger frame, usually 
judging the value of it in relation to others in its class. The means by which the 
change is effected is inherent in the nature of these agents. So “information” becomes 
“knowledge” when the thinker makes connections between the information and his 
own previous ideas and memories, and assesses the information’s value. And, in fact, 
“knowledge” is defined as “in the context of the cognitive hierarchy, information 
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analyzed to provide meaning and value or evaluated as to implications for the 
operation,” that is, it is the first step towards direct applicability to the mission 
(Department of the Army 2003d, Glossary-9).
The nature of this new entity “knowledge” is further explained in the 
subordinate clause of the third sentence, “which is presented to commanders as 
relevant information,” wherein “knowledge” is the antecedent for the pronoun 
“which” (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-12). While no actual cognitive activity 
takes place in this clause, “knowledge” becomes the patient of the act of “present.” 
Presenting is a kind of giving or transfer of possession, but one with some formality 
and ceremony that reflects its importance. The nature of the indirect object, the 
recipient of the object, “the commander” explains the reason for the formality of the 
transfer. A commander should only receive information necessary for him to make 
decisions, and its very presentation to him indicates its importance. 
One interesting point of this last structure is the adverbial phrase, “as relevant 
information,” which specifies not the manner of the verb, but the status of the 
transferred entity. It seems to imply that the act of presenting has some causal 
connection with the change. To consider what that role is, we should first look at the 
relationship between “knowledge” and “relevant information.” “Knowledge” is 
defined in doctrine as “information analyzed to provide meaning and value or 
evaluated to implications of operations,” while “relevant information” is that 
information “of importance to commanders and staff in exercising command and 
control” (Department of the Army 2003d, B-1 and 3-5). The progression seems to be 
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that of placing the information more firmly in terms of the mission’s frame. “Relevant 
information” continues the change undergone by “knowledge.”
This methodical process of affixing information more deeply into the frame of 
operations continues through the rest of the passage, but with a notable shift at the 
fourth sentence, “When commanders apply judgment to knowledge, it becomes 
understanding” (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-12). Instead of some abstraction 
of human mental capacity effecting an action, a human agent, the commander, takes 
charge of knowledge. However, this shift avoids the subjectiveness of individual 
thought because “the commander” does not refer to an actual human being.  It 
denotes a role. As a role considered independent of a possible value, that is, an actual 
person who could fill it, the nature of his agency differs from previous agents only in 
degree of abstractness, not necessarily in kind. The role has the advantages of human 
agency with none of its disadvantages.
Just as the nature of the agent has changed, so has his action. Rather than 
effecting change in a relatively inspecific manner, the commander “applies judgment 
to knowledge” (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-12). The verb “apply” in the 
physical domain means to place a thinner, less substantial object onto a larger, more 
solid one. Here, “judgment” is yet another nominalization of a human cognitive 
capacity, but one that is noticeably more subjective in nature than abstractions of 
cognition that have formed the major links in this causal chain. When one “applies” 
something in the physical domain, such as paint to a wall, its appearance may change, 
but its substance does not. Similarly, while the commander’s perception of 
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knowledge may have changed, as he recognizes its relevance to the mission, 
“knowledge” itself as an independently existing entity has not. 
“Understanding” as the result of applying “judgment” to “knowledge,” and as 
the agent of the last two sentences, deserves closer attention. It is defined as 
“knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to it in a specific 
situation to comprehend the situation’s inner relationships” (Department of the Army 
2003d, B-2). Defined as the highest level of conceptual activity in the cognitive 
hierarchy, “understanding” is not so much an activity as a state of mind, an awareness 
of the complex possibilities and implications of some knowledge.  It is one of the 
most subjective cognitive functions. At the same time, the more thoroughly one 
understands an idea or situation, the more thoroughly one has integrated it into one’s 
own thoughts and memories, and the more effectively one can act in relation to it. 
This subjectivness is at once troubling and necessary; it threatens the metaphoric 
status of thought as an independent publicly existent agent, but it is absolutely 
necessary for the manner in which thought is finally tied to action.
The writers of Operations respond to this dilemma by yoking 
“understanding” to both decisionmaking, an act of “will,” and to “will” itself. 
In the fifth sentence of the paragraph, “Understanding enables making 
informed decisions with less-than-perfect data,” the agent “understanding” 
facilitates decisionmaking, one of the most important acts in the Army 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 11-12). This action is a break with the 
previous pattern; rather than effecting the change of one form of cognition 
into another, “understanding” assists the power to decide. In the sixth 
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sentence, “understanding” again makes change, but not independently; 
“Combined with will, understanding generates effective action” (Department 
of the Army 2001a, 11-12). In both instances, by helping create it, 
“understanding” makes a necessary but not sufficient contribution to action. 
“Will,” the ability to make decisions and the power to carry them out, hovers 
between thought and action. “Understanding” as the final stage of thought assists it in 
two ways – assisting it in general, and assisting it to create the end product of the 
cognitive process and the standard for successful operations, effective action. While 
the repetition of the agent is obvious, the repetition of the factor of “will” is less 
obvious, since it appears first a capacity of “will,”  i.e., “decisionmaking,” that is the 
beneficiary of understanding’s assistance, and then as itself, buried in an adjectival 
phrase that deemphasizes its necessary role in generating action. 
One thing to note about cognition as explained in terms of “relevant 
information” is that while thought is doubly linked to action in terms of sharing the 
common characteristic of causation, and in terms of being a contributing cause, the 
manner in which it effects that cause is markedly different from the type of action 
central to military operations, war (Fahnestock 87). War relies on kinesthetic action, 
mainly striking and moving, to destroy and possess. It eliminates and displaces other 
objects. 
However, if this same vital relation of cause were recruited directly into the 
blended space unaltered, it would be incompatible with the act of cognition, since 
destruction would result in ignorance, the opposite of cognition’s goal. The various 
gerunds of cognition, “processing,” “analysis,” “evaluation,” “judgment” and 
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“understanding” instead, “assign,” “change,” and “transform” and then, in 
conjunction with will, “enable” and “generate” action. The emergent structure of this 
blend is the transformation of “information” into an agent, and of the vital relation of 
cause and effect from damage and destruction, to transformation, and, eventually, 
creation.
The Cognitive Hierarchy
By making “information” an agent, the writers of Operations both yoke it to 
action and conceptually free it of its ties to the individual thinker. The concept of the 
“cognitive hierarchy” further ties the mind to the uses of military action by not only 
transforming thought into a corporate activity, but making “information” a means of 
control. “Control” is defined as 
within command and control, the regulation of forces and battlefield 
operating systems to accomplish the mission in accordance with the 
commander’s intent. It includes collecting, processing, displaying, 
storing, and disseminating relevant information for creating the 
common operational picture, and using information, primarily by the 
staff, during the operations process (Department of the Army 2003d, 
Glossary-4).
Mission Command lists three elements essential to the art of control; 
information, communication, and structure (3-4). “Information” has already been 
defined, and “communication,” the ability to communicate, is defined as “to use any 
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means or method to convey information of any kind from one person or place to 
another” (Department of the Army 2003d, Glossary-4). “Structure” is defined as “an 
element of control: a defined organization that establishes relationships among its 
elements or a procedure that establishes relationships among its activities” 
(Department of the Army 2003d, Glossary-13). 
Because “information” inherently involves the individually performed and 
subjectively experienced act of thinking, not only is it difficult to link it to public, 
objectively existing action, it is also difficult to control; people can come to their own 
conclusions about a given piece of information, and, because thought leads to action, 
could act in ways that do not further mission accomplishment. It is not enough, 
therefore, to tie cognition to action, as the discussion of “relevant information” does 
through the figure of gradatio. The Army constrains the thought process in another 
way, through the third means of control, “structure.” In the military, the most 
pervasive type of structure is the hierarchy.
The thought process as conceived of by the Army is flanked by not one but 
two hierarchies. The first is the military hierarchy, which is not only far more formal 
and rigid than almost any comparable civilian organization, but is enforced by the 
rule of law. Serious violations of the chain of command, such as fraternizing with a 
subordinate or flouting the authority of a superior, are punishable through the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice.  It fosters obedience to the roles that each soldier 
fills in the organization, not to the person. In the figure depicting the cognitive 
hierarchy, the chain of command is on the right, with the lowest level being the 
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soldiers who collect and process data, and the highest level being the commander, the 
conceptual basis of the chain of command.
Fig1.5  The Cognitive Hierarchy (Department of the Army 2003d, 3-3)
The second is the hierarchy of the outcome of each successive thought 
process, beginning with filtered and organized information, progressing to estimates 
upon which the COP, or common operational picture, is created, leading then to 
situational understanding on the part of the commander, and culminating in the 
commander’s visualization of the operation. Each level on the left is visually tied to 
the rank of the group on the right. 
The pyramid is divided into multiple levels, each of which represents a 
different cognitive function. At the base are the collectors or sources of data.  These 
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include higher headquarters, assets not organic to the unit but assigned to support it, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, or ISR, subordinate units, 
supported units, combat support units such as signal, adjacent units, and combat 
service support, or CSS. The sources are listed from top to bottom, and then left to 
right, according to how much and what type of information they can provide.
The next four levels are different forms of information, respectively “data,” 
“information,” “knowledge” and “understanding,” each of which is linked to the one 
above by a cognitive function. The structure is supported on the right by the agents 
who perform each function, and on the left by the information products that come out 
of the various processes. At the top of each hierarchy is the commander, who 
visualizes, has understanding, and makes decisions. 
The depiction, like its source domain of the hierarchy, relies heavily on 
orientational metaphors, most obviously “Good Is Up” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 
18). The term “good” means that it helps commanders and staffs make decisions and 
run an operation, as the definition of “relevant information” shows. The illustration 
also draws heavily on metaphors of size, but not from the most common metaphor of 
Size Is Importance; if that were true, the pyramid would be inverted (Lakoff, Master 
Metaphor List). Instead, smaller size indicates rarity, which in turn corresponds to 
importance. Therefore, the commander as the apex of the pyramid is the most 
important entity in the cognitive hierarchy. While his knowledge may not be as 
detailed as that of his subordinates, it is cumulatively greater, and, through the 
decisions he makes, has a correspondingly greater impact on the unit.
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Such representations depicting the most authoritative element atop its 
subordinate units are not uncommon, as the line-and-block chart of the infantry unit 
illustrates. However, there is a notable difference between the cognitive hierarchy and 
a line and block chart. While both emphasize height and subordination, in the line and 
block chart, higher echelons are connected to but do not rest upon their subordinate 
elements; there is no visual dependence of higher levels on lower levels. Together, 
the units constitute the whole, but each is discrete. In contrast, each level of the 
pyramid shares a surface with the next, which at once separates it from and connects 
it to other levels, emphasizing the dependence of each echelon of information upon 
the lower levels.  The levels share common boundaries and depend explicitly on one 
another for composition and position within the hierarchy. 
It would be quite easy to disprove the implied notion that each level of 
personnel performed only certain cognitive functions; for instance, the person who 
emplaces a collection asset must obviously have an understanding of the mission and 
use judgment as she allocates them. The blend has more interesting emergent 
structure, however.
One of these is the divisions themselves. In most cases, the lines separating 
the levels do not cut across all three interdependent hierarchies. There are, however, 
two absolute barriers that cut across all three structures; information requirements, or 
IR, which separate the cognitive process from the information environment, and the 
commander’s critical information requirements, or CCIR, which separate the 
commander from his staff. Information requirements are defined as “all information 
elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations; that is, 
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all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC” (Department of the Army 
2003d, B-15). 
The positioning of IRs in the diagram has some interesting entailments. First, 
this separation of the thought process from the environment conveys a semblance of 
objectivity, with the entailment that the force collects information from but is not 
affected by the environment. Secondly, because IRs are driven by mission 
requirements, information that does not relate to the mission will not even make it 
into the cognitive hierarchy. While framing is a basic cognitive function, the frame 
provided by METT-TC is part of the challenge to today’s Army, where “civil 
considerations” may not only outweigh the mission, but in many instances have 
become the mission.
The second barrier is the distinction between the commander and the rest of 
the cognitive process, the CCIR. These are PIR, priority intelligence requirements, 
“those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated 
priority in his takes of planning and decisionmaking” and FFIR, “information the 
commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation” (JP 1-02; 
Department of the Army 2003d, B-15). PIRs are tied to actions of the enemy; for 
instance, should the enemy’s artillery assets arrive at a particular point in time and 
space, the attack helicopters will take the target, whereas if they arrive fifteen 
kilometers to the west, multiple rocket launcher assets requested from higher will take 
it out. In contrast, FFIR are centered on the unit’s own forces. FFIR are about 
“mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces,” such 
as the status of the aforementioned attack assets (Department of the Army 2003d, B-
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15). PIRs and FFIRs are both subsets of IRs, but they are unique in that the 
commander personally approves them.  In other words, the commander determines 
what is most relevant for him to know, giving him an additional barrier from the 
“information environment” and imbuing him with further objectivity.
The cognitive hierarchy, in both its explanation in terms of “relevant 
information” and its depiction in Mission Command, fulfills the expectations of the 
source domain of military culture. It transforms the thought process into a centrally 
controlled, corporate activity whose success depends on the division of labor between 
numerous individuals, and whose results are measured by the sum of the soldiers’ 
collective efforts. Similarly, while the common understanding of war focuses on the 
individual soldier in the setting of close combat, warfare in reality depends on the 
combined labor of thousands of soldiers in noncombat military occupational 
specialties, troops who provide materiel, maintenance, communication, and 
intelligence support that makes that individual infantryman’s efforts both possible and 
effective.
While close combat serves as a general organizing principle for a unit’s 
collective efforts, the commander and his supporting chain of command provide both 
the concrete goal in terms of the specific mission and its execution, and the leadership 
and authority that get that mission accomplished. The line and block chart as a 
representation of military organization highlighted one aspect of that structure, the 
cohesiveness of each individual unit and the authority each commander has over it. A 
commander may give a mission to his subordinate units, but not direct how they 
accomplish it, reflected in the leadership maxim, “Tell me what to do, not how to do 
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it.” Each unit is a model miniature of the one above it in terms of structure and 
authority, if not in terms of function. 
The pyramid of the cognitive hierarchy represents a different, complementary 
aspect of that organization, the interdependence of the units’ efforts, both vertically in 
terms of the overall mission, and horizontally in terms of enabling their counterparts 
to function effectively. If one unit in combat is the main effort in an attack, its ability 
to move forward, take terrain, and destroy the enemy depends on its counterpart’s 
success in fixing the enemy forces and thereby protecting its own flanks.  Similarly, 
the ability of analysts tracking the main effort of the enemy’s operations depends on 
other analysts who trace indicators that confirm or deny possible alternative courses 
of action.
The blend of the cognitive hierarchy also has emergent structure not predicted 
by its inputs, in that it characterizes the thought process as one of continually sorting 
data, with the information moving up the pyramid and being slowly narrowed by a 
succession of increasingly stringent criteria. While this type of physical metaphor for 
thought actually comes from the domain of cognitive functions, specifically that of 
categorization, categorizing is only one of numerous other conceptual activities. Its 
emergence in the cognitive hierarchy as a paradigm for all thought processes is 
motivated by several factors.
The first comes from the domain of thought itself. As the bridge between 
perception and thought, it is both a necessary and contributing cause to all the other 
mental activities. The second is the simplicity of the principle itself. Based on a 
physical activity of which most human thinkers have deep experiential knowledge, 
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categorization as a ready model for thought as a whole comes easily to most 
audiences. Thinkers can make direct and easy correlations between placing like 
physical objects into groups according to a predetermined principle, and associating 
like bits of information with one another through a perceived similarity.
But one of the strongest motivations comes from the nature of staff work 
itself. During the course of any military operation, a staff can be inundated with 
information from both higher and subordinate units, a flood made possible by the 
proliferation of tracking and communication technologies on the battlefield. The 
sighting of a single enemy weapons system can be reported by several different 
sources, while reports spawned by the activities of a single unit can number in the 
dozens, increasing with every event. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that 
certain redundancies are built into any reporting system to ensure both the availability 
and reliability of information.  Reducing the data is the only way to gain a clear 
perspective on an already complicated and everchanging situation. 
Blends and metaphors are created constantly, but only those that seem to 
enhance understanding have staying power. The pyramid of the cognitive hierarchy 
gains from “relevant information” the necessary links of information to action, and 
from the chain of command hierarchy the orientational and physical metaphors and 
their entailments. While its power does come from fulfilling our expectations of 
common metaphors of mind and thought, what makes the cognitive hierarchy 
particularly persuasive is its reliance on action, both as its mode and objective, and on 
the chain of command. 
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Problems With The Army’s Theory of Mind In The Real World
While the blend of the cognitive hierarchy seems to enhance the Army’s 
understanding of thought processes, it actually serves to reinforce previously held 
knowledge rather than to explain the functions of the mind. Its heavy reliance on 
key aspects of military culture it elides critical aspects of the thought process.
One aspect frequently mentioned above is the individual, subjective nature of 
the experience of thinking itself. While the notion of “relevant information” does this 
by substituting cognitive functions for human agents, the blend of the cognitive 
hierarchy further develops this technique by recruiting from the source domain of a 
common metaphor used in many frames both in and outside the military, An 
Institution Is A Person (Lakoff, Master Metaphor List). Using the conceptual tool of 
compression, thinkers simultaneously condense the individual members of an 
institution and map the activities of certain individuals or groups within the institution 
onto those of a single human being (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 116). It underlies 
such expressions as “That office is the brain of the company,” “A strong laity is the 
heartbeat of every parish,” or, in the Army, “The scouts are the eyes and ears of the 
unit.” 
Instead of compressing the members of a corporation into an individual, 
however, the cognitive hierarchy reverses that process, decompressing the cognitive 
activities of a single individual and mapping them onto the functions of an institution. 
The unity of an individual human being’s subjectivity is replaced by the unity of 
common ground, in terms of both the mission and how to achieve it. The Army, 
65
unlike other organizations, can actually count on its members sharing that common 
ground because it formally trains its soldiers in that knowledge as soon as they enter 
the military. 
Another aspect of the thought process that the cognitive hierarchy distorts is 
the nature of the relationships between those functions. As Barsalou explains in his 
work, the functions can impact one another reciprocally. A change in frame can effect 
a change in category, and an unfamiliar concept may task the long-term memory. 
Such reciprocity cannot exist in the Army’s concept of mind because it would disrupt 
the integrity of the hierarchy, violating the chain of command and undermining the 
authority upon which it rests. The stability of the cognitive hierarchy, visually 
reinforced by the image of the pyramid, provides a sense of predictability and 
permanence in the tumultuous activities of both thought and warfare. It does so, 
however, at the cost of the originality and fresh perspective associated with 
independent thought.
But one of the most significant misrepresentations that this model effects is 
how the mind relates to the world. In the cognitive hierarchy, the first separation 
made is between the hierarchy itself and the environment. The mind understands the 
environment by collecting huge amounts of data and processing it, but does so 
without entering the environment itself.  In other words, not only does one not need 
direct contact with the world, one can’t have objective knowledge about it unless one 
is separated from it.
Another important disparity is how the cognitive hierarchy portrays the 
processing of information.  It does so simultaneously in two different ways. First it 
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characterizes the process as a kind of a formal, step-by step purification, in which 
“relevant information” is gradually extracted from the impure, redundant, or 
irrelevant information in which it is mired. In the same sentences, however, it also 
characterizes the activity as “giving meaning” to information to make it more 
relevant. This view has two interesting, but conflicting entailments. The first is that of 
the metaphor of extraction itself, which implies that there is a separate, objective 
reality about which the thinker can have direct knowledge when she separates it from 
impure data.  The other is that meaning is something that thinkers “add” or “give” to 
information to make it better and more useful.
Their contradiction lies in the fact that if one seeks to “purify” a substance, 
one doesn’t add anything to it, unless it is a catalyst that effects further purification. 
The entailment they both share is that the ability to think about and find meaning in 
the world can be separated from the nature of the thinker himself, and that the ways 
of getting that direct knowledge are as straightforward as the physical processes of 
smelting and assembly. This blend fulfills the expectation of common metaphors of 
thought.  However, as the previous review of theories by Lakoff and Johnson, Turner 
and Fauconnier, and Clark have demonstrated, thought and communication are vastly 
more complicated that these activities.
Just because an assumption is inaccurate does not mean that it is not 
influential. This conceptual blend might suffice as a heuristic about the way the Army 
conceives of information management within its own institution. However, the Army 
created this theory of mind not because it wanted an introspective examination of 
how it communicates with its own members, but because the radically changed 
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environment of international security has forced it to deal with audiences it had never 
considered in ways it had never imagined. This concept of thought, a centrally 
controlled process of elimination that handles only data, and of mind, a corporate 
entity stripped of the individuality that makes possible original thought, severely 
limits the understanding of and effectiveness in the fields of information operations, 
psychological operations, and stability and support operations.
The Mind and Communication.
The very concept of Mind as an entity underlies Western philosophy. It 
conceives of the mind, the spirit, and the physical self as independent components of 
one’s personhood that can act and be acted upon separately. A famous heuristic that 
depends on this construct is that of Aristotle’s three rhetorical appeals, ethos, or 
credibility, logos, or reason, and pathos, or emotion. Each has a counterpart in this 
tripartite concept of the self, ethos in the person, logos in the mind, and pathos in the 
spirit or heart. It’s such a common heuristic among students of language that it’s often 
hard to see the way it which it cripples the Western approach to the nature of thought; 
by separating thought and emotion, it makes the implicit claim that emotions are not 
logical.
That separation, as damaging as it is, at least presupposes that one can look at 
the world other than through the lens of logos. The Army’s concept of mind extends 
the reach of that damage by focusing almost exclusively on a theory of mind. It seems 
natural for a military organization to rely on thought and ignore emotion, because the 
West conceives of thinking as something one does, and emotions as something one 
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experiences.  By concentrating on the rhetorical appeal that highlights its own agency, 
the Army fails to explicitly examine its own notions of credibility, or to understand 
the ways in which emotion impacts its own decisions.
A good example is the now notorious instance in which the Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld was confronted very publicly by a soldier during a news 
interview. Specialist Thomas Wilson asked the Secretary why troops were forced to 
scrounge scrap metal from junkyards to uparmor their vehicles (Sherman 2004b). The 
confrontation received widespread media coverage in the United States. Within the 
Army itself, it sparked questions about the production rate of armor; the Army Times
soon revealed that the contractor’s factories were running at only 80 percent of 
capacity despite the fact that 85 percent of all trucks were underprotected (Sherman 
2004a).
While the Army Times would probably have characterized both the incident 
and its response to it in terms of logos, it is easy to see how the military’s unexamined 
notions of credibility and emotional impact have influenced the debate. The soldier 
had far more credibility not despite the fact that Rumsfeld vastly outranked him, but 
because of it; as a lower enlisted soldier, it was assumed that he would have far better 
direct knowledge of the situation “on the ground” than would the Secretary. His rank 
also underpinned the emotional appeal of the story. American soldiers often side with 
the underdog in a fight, and combined with the notion that every soldier deserves the 
best equipment that America can provide, the specialist’s bravado tipped the 
sympathy scales vastly in his favor. Yet none of these factors have been brought to 
the forefront in discussions of the incident.
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The inability to examine the realms of emotion and credibility has an even 
deeper impact in the current environment, in which the Army must constantly 
communicate with other audiences on the world stage of international media. In terms 
of concrete instances of rhetorical appeal, this means that factors of credibility that we 
as American soldiers take as given, such as formal rank and combat experience, may 
count for little to many audiences in the world. In terms of overall approach to the 
problem of communication, it means that we will try to communicate using a logos-
based approach to audiences for whom this division between the heart and the mind 
may not exist.
The Dissertation Structure
 In the chapters that follow, I will trace the impact of this theory of mind on 
the Army’s approach to thought, communication and persuasion. Although much of 
the doctrine examined has been updated, changed, or created recently, it is not 
necessarily groundbreaking or new. In fact, Mission Command itself is one of the 
later creations. As its explicit link to the earlier manual Operations demonstrates, 
Army doctrine is not an innovative corpus. It records the evolution of Army thought; 
it does not lead it.
All the documents I will examine have attempted to deal with the introduction 
of the new entity of “information” in terms of the disciplines they represent. Because 
they all rely on the model of the mind and thought laid out in the cognitive hierarchy, 
all of them fail in ways that pose significant risk to the Army’s soldiers and to the 
success of its operations.
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Chapter Two examines a foundational conceptual approach to warfare, the 
elements of combat power.  It incorporates “information” by making it the fifth 
element of combat power, placing it beside “maneuver,” “firepower,” “leadership,” 
and “protection.” However, it does so by relying on the notion of thought as 
something one “does,” which makes it difficult to understand how it can be so 
powerful in the hands of noncombatants, civilian news agencies, and refugees, those 
who can “do” so little. Adding “information” to the confines of the theory of mind as 
it is laid out here restricts the concept of thought to processing of data and leaves the 
readers without an understanding of how others think.  Combined with the 
vulnerability that a robust communications infrastructure presents, the fifth element 
of combat power remains confined to mainly an enabling, defensive role. 
Chapter Three analyzes the new discipline of “information operations,” (IO), 
one invented specifically to confront the challenges of thought, communication, and 
persuasion in the “information environment.” It obviously relies heavily on many 
aspects of conventional operations, both in the way it categorizes different of 
functions of IO, which is modeled on the battlefield operating systems (BOS), and its 
division of IO effects into “offensive” and “defensive.”  Like the Army’s concept of 
the mind, it reverts to the safe ground of action, and the type of action that the Army 
is best at is warfare. By conceiving of “information” explicitly in terms of warfare, 
the discipline of IO emphasizes activities that are peripheral or even damaging to 
successful communication and persuasion.
Chapter Four examines one of the most deliberate and detrimental uses of the 
source domain of warfare. In the manual Psychological Operations, the writers 
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promote the use of the four-step targeting model as a heuristic for understanding the 
arts of communication and persuasion. The model comes from the discipline of field 
artillery, in which it is used to plan ways to find and destroy the enemy. While it 
relies on the common conceptual metaphor Communication Is Sending, the extension 
of that metaphor into the realm of artillery leads the thinker to conceive of persuasion 
as firing a weapon at an audience. A major goal of persuasion is to get an audience to 
act, and conceiving of them as a physical target to destroy clearly eliminates that 
possibility.
The final chapter examines characteristics of peace operations as laid out in 
Stability Operations and Support Operations. The ultimate goal of peace operations is 
for the local nationals who are initially controlled by the peacekeepers to gain in 
strength, stability, and agency so that they can take charge of their own country, 
allowing peacekeepers to leave. The manual itself is a well-written, carefully 
considered examination of the complex nature of these operations. Its major issue is 
that it finds it difficult to clearly characterize the conditions for success in peace ops. 
Common metaphors of success include moving forward, moving upwards, and taking 
possession. Successful peace ops contradict these notions in that the peacekeeping 
force moves backwards, reduces in size, relinquishes control, and eventually leaves. 
That is, the physical event shape of success in peace operations conflicts with the 
common conceptualization of success in general.
In examining these documents, I want to challenge the Army’s concept of 
what it means to “change the way we do business.”  That usually means training 
harder, training more, issuing new equipment, and writing new doctrine. These 
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changes are only skin deep. Not only do they rely on concepts of thought, action, and 
communication that underpin traditional doctrine, they expand upon and promulgate 
them. In order to make “new” thinking truly “new,” one must first understand what 
“old” is. This dissertation is a step in that direction.
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CHAPTER 2 - The Elements of Combat Power
Introduction
One of the most notable impacts that “information” has had on Army is on the 
concept of the battlefield itself.  In its discussion of the “battlespace,” the authors of 
the manual Operations seem to signal a significant change in the frame of warfare. 
Just as the notion of the cognitive hierarchy indicated that the military now had to 
explicitly consider aspects of human abilities that it had previously taken for granted, 
so its discussion of the “information environment,” and the inclusion of “information” 
as an element of combat power denote a new approach to battle.  Upon deeper 
examination, however, this appears to be a very uneven expansion.  While the 
numbers and types of agents that can impact military operations has multiplied, and 
the manner in which those agents can influence them has also increased, the ways in 
which the military can respond seem to have actually diminished.  An awareness of 
the potential of “information” in all its meanings has at once increased the Army’s 
responsibilities while reducing its freedom of action.
The elements of combat power comprise a radial category, that is, a set of 
concepts that share the common feature of being ways the Army conceives of its 
capability to destroy the enemy, but each represents a different way of doing so.  In 
the 1993 edition of Operations, the four elements, “firepower,” “maneuver,” 
“protection,” and “leadership,” shared tight conceptual links framed by a clearly 
defined concept of the battlefield, one whose physical and conceptual boundaries 
were marked by the maximum effective range of a unit’s most powerful weapon 
system.  That is, it was based on a unit’s ability to apply physical destructive power.  
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The “battlespace” and the “information environment,” tied to human thought and 
communication, have undermined brute force and sheer willpower as the basis for 
success in war, thereby forcing a reconstruction of the category of “combat power.”
Category Theory
Because classical category theory contends that the characteristics defining a 
category determine its membership, a logical outcome of this premise is that 
categories should not change; if something appears that does not fit into current 
classification systems, the thing would constitute a new category, rather than 
necessitating a change to the old ones, and categories should remain stable no matter 
in what context they are considered (Lakoff and Johnson 1987, 6). However, we do 
modify or negotiate category systems when we find things that don’t fit current 
criteria; the scientific community did with the discovery of the platypus, a warm-
blooded creature that lays eggs instead of bearing live young. Categories can also 
change based on the frame from which one views a potential member; the domestic 
dog, for instance, is considered in many parts of the west a household pet, while in 
Asia some cultures view it as a form of livestock and a source of food.
As Lakoff and Johnson have demonstrated, categories are far more complex 
constructions than many had believed. Classical category theory holds that members 
of a given category are grouped together based on a shared list of common 
characteristics, such as mammals, who are defined as being warm blooded and 
producing live young (Lakoff and Johnson 1987, 6). Lakoff and Johnson show that 
instead categories are radial, that is, while there may be members that are more or less 
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central to a given group, the rest of the items may be included because they share one 
or more of the features of that central concept, but not all members may share a 
common set of traits (1987, 91).
Sometimes, however, these two motives for category negotiation can be 
related. Such is the case with the elements of combat power. In the 1993 edition of 
Operations, FM 100-5, there were four: “maneuver,” “firepower,” “protection,” and 
“leadership” (Department of the Army 1993, 2-10). In the 2001 version, FM 3.0, 
there are five: “maneuver,” “firepower,” “leadership,” “protection,” and 
“information” (Department of the Army 2001a,  4-3)2. The three major changes in 
this heuristic are the marked expansion of “protection,” the addition of “information,” 
and the change in the position of “leadership” in the list’s order. These modifications 
in content and organization result from the expansion of the battlespace to include the 
“information environment.”
However, the incorporation of a new member does not mean that it can be 
completely homogenized into the rest of the category. Each of the elements of combat 
power is expanded from a core definition, comprising individual radial categories of 
their own. The differences between the elements manifest themselves in the various 
ways the individual subcategories develop. The four original elements, which are 
firmly based in a physical frame, retain those core frames as the motivating factors in 
the explication and organization of their respective subcategories, while the new 
element, “information,” spends most of its time trying to establish that it does have a 
tangible relationship to the other members. This paper examines how, in their 
attempts to retain the surety of physical action that once served as the foundation for 
2 In this chapter, 100-5 will refer to the 1993 edition, and 3.0 to the 2001 edition.
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that category, the writers diminish the concept of “information” as a force in the 
battlespace.
The Evolving Notion of the Battlespace
Conventional warfare has been the foundation of all U.S. Army operations, 
presupposing the existence of at least two technologically sophisticated armies of 
opposing nations that meet in combat, and whose primary target for their destructive 
energies is one another. Victory means that one army has physical possession or 
control of terrain that both nations desire, and that the other army is rendered 
physically incapable of further combat operations, or surrenders. This is the frame 
within which the original four elements of combat power was constructed.
Warfare has never been easy, but the concept of the battlespace in 100-5 
Operations seemed much simpler than that of 3.0. The term “battlespace,” which 
includes not only the physical dimension of the air, but the addition of time to the 
older, more terrain-based concept of “battlefield,” is defined in 100-5 in this manner:
components determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to 
acquire and dominate the enemy; includes areas beyond the AO; it 
varies over time according to how the commander positions his assets 
(Department of the Army 1993, Glossary-1).
The AO is the area of operations, that is, “a geographic area assigned to an 
Army commander by a higher commander – an AO has lateral and rear boundaries 
which usually define it within a larger joint geographical area” (Department of the 
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Army 1993, Glossary-1). A unit’s own capabilities define its area of operations. 
Larger units by design will usually have collection assets and weapons with longer 
ranges; a division will have both LRS (long range surveillance soldiers who are 
inserted deep into enemy rear areas to observe key targets) and attack helicopters, 
while a battalion will have scouts, whose range is determined by what kind of 
platform they are assigned (dismounted or HMMWV) and mortars. The assumption 
underlying the definitions of battlespace and AO as laid out in the 1993 edition is that 
the scope of a unit’s responsibilities and mission directly corresponds to the distances 
it can see and kill. 
The Interlocking Frames of the Original Four Elements of Combat Power
“Maneuver,” “firepower,” “protection,” and “leadership” as defined in 100-5 
were conceived of within this framework, one in which taking terrain while retaining 
the ability to continue to take more terrain was the measure of success in warfare. 
This 1993 edition emphasized the importance of their coordinated employment, 
which would “decide the outcome of campaigns, major operations, battles, and 
engagements. Leaders integrate maneuver, firepower, and protection capabilities in a 
variety of combinations appropriate to the situation”(Department of the Army 1993, 
2-10). The primary frame for their employment was the battlefield, and the primary 
agent who ensured their skillful application was the leader. The four were defined as 
follows:
Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, 
usually in order to deliver – or threaten to delivery of – direct and indirect 
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fires. Maneuver is the means of positioning forces at decisive points to 
achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effect, 
and moral dominance over the enemy, rendering his reactions ineffective, and 
eventually leading to his defeat (Department of the Army 1993, 2-10).
Firepower provides destructive force; it is essential in defeating the enemy’s 
ability and will to fight. It is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a 
position, unit, or weapon system. Firepower may be either direct or indirect, 
(Department of the Army 1993, 2-10). 
Protection. Protection conserves the fighting potential of a force so that the 
commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. (Department of the 
Army 1993, 2-10)
Leadership. The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and 
confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Leaders inspire 
soldiers with the will to win. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation 
in combat. Leaders determine how maneuver, firepower, and protection are 
used, ensuring these elements are effectively employed against the enemy 
(Department of the Army 1993, 2-11). 
Each of these elements is based on a physical scene that is an important 
subframe of the larger frame of conventional warfare.  They are embodied in the brief 
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tactical scenario described in Chapter 1.  In both 100-5 and 3.0, the elements of 
“maneuver” and “firepower” are discussed together because successful maneuver 
exploits the effects of firepower, and vice versa. That is, damaging and destroying 
enemy forces is a necessary condition of movement, and movement enables firepower 
assets to get closer to enemy forces and thereby deliver fires throughout the depth of 
those formations. However, as I discuss the elements, I will pair them together in a 
slightly different way so that I can illustrate how their frames interlock.
The first element of combat power is “maneuver.” It is based on the physical 
scene of a person moving through space towards a goal while avoiding obstacles in 
his path. In military terms, “maneuver” usually refers to movement conducted by a 
unit of soldiers towards an objective on the ground that is occupied by enemy forces 
they must destroy or pursue. As in the more general understanding of the concept, the 
soldiers do not move directly towards the objective, but make diversions in their route 
to evade detection by the enemy and enable them to approach him from a direction 
that will put him at a disadvantage.
No military unit exists without a leader; if only two soldiers survived out of a 
battalion, the more senior of the pair would take charge of the mission and be 
responsible for the mission and well-being of this one remaining soldier. 
“Leadership,” the second element, does not exist in a vacuum; a leader needs 
followers, and a goal towards which to lead them. In the core physical scene of 
leading, the commander moves towards the objective in front of his unit. With the 
advent of more sophisticated communications technology, a leader no longer need be 
physically in front of his unit to direct them; he can move behind the formation, 
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maneuver through it, or even fly above it and still be intellectually and conceptually 
“out front.” Even if he is “leading” them in their work repairing aircraft in a rear area 
maintenance facility, he shares the elements of soldiers and an objective with the 
element of combat power, maneuver. 
The next two elements of combat power, “firepower” and “protection,” are 
similarly related. Firepower is based on the physical scene of firing a weapon at a 
target, and in war that target is usually an enemy soldier or piece of equipment that is 
occupying the objective towards which the friendly unit and their leader is 
maneuvering. The most important element in the frame of firing is not the target, or 
even the weapon; it is the projectile that injures or destroys.
Of course, the ability to lead, maneuver and fire are to no avail if the unit 
constantly accrues casualties. “Protection,” the fourth element of combat power, has 
as its core scene a soldier being fired at as he hunkers down in a foxhole, often with 
overhead cover, behind sandbags or logs that absorb the impact of the rounds, 
protecting him from the effects of firepower. The salient elements of the frame are the 
projectile, the barrier, and the soldier that needs protection. Many times, that soldier’s 
position sits atop a desirable piece of terrain, one that is usually the objective for the 
enemy soldiers that are firing at him. 
The original four elements of combat power are tightly connected both 
conceptually and temporally through shared elements in their overlapping frames, all 
of which cohere around the objective. The four elements are so cohesive a unit that 
they can be metaphorically conceived of as a single soldier.
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Input space 1 is the soldier himself, and his component parts, the parts having 
a synecdochal relationship to the soldier. Input space 2 is the four original (and still 
doctrinal) elements of combat power. Input 1 provides not only the overall structure 
for the blended space, but direct material anchors for the concepts of space 2. In the 
blend, “maneuver” is the soldier’s legs, “firepower” is his weapon, “protection” is his 
body armor and helmet, and “leadership” is his head, which metonymically stands for 
the conceptual and decision-making capabilities of his mind. 
By describing the respective parts of the soldiers metaphorically as elements 
of combat power, the inner space vital relations of the parts of the soldier to the 
soldier are no longer just synechdochal, but cause and effect (Turner 82). This 
entrenched material anchor is so powerful that the actions of enormous units, such as 
divisions of thousands. 
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of soldiers and hundreds of weapons systems, can be compressed to human scale and 
described in bodily-kinesthetic terms. For instance, one way to conceive of an ideal 
offensive, combining the principles of war of “offensive,” “mass,” “maneuver,” and 
“surprise,” is to portray it in terms of a fist fight: “‘Hit the other fellow as quick as 
you can, as hard as you can, where it hurts the most, when he isn’t looking’” 
(Department of the Army 1993, 7-0). This compression is a powerful and highly 
productive tool of imagination, analysis, and planning that allows military leaders, 
and indeed any planner, to grasp the whole of a vast and complex operation while 
relating the impact of crucial details, such as the resupply of specific types of 
ammunition or fuel, to the success of the operation as a whole.
Besides bringing the vast scale of a military campaign down to human 
proportions, the blend has another conceptual advantage.  It conforms to the 
expectations that thinkers have of the common metaphor, An Institution Is A Person, 
lending the unity of purpose we associate with a single human being to a corporate 
entity.  It also parallels the compression and blend created in the Army’s theory of 
mind, in which thought becomes a corporate activity.  Given the complexity of 
current military action, unity is no longer only a conceptual metaphor, it is also an 
ideal towards which the Army strives:
Unified action links subordinates to the combatant commander under 
combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). Multinational, 
interagency, and nonmilitary forces work with the combatant 
commander through cooperation and coordination. Regardless of the 
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task or the nature of the threat, combatant commanders employ air, 
land, sea, space, and special operations forces, and coordinate with 
multinational and interagency partners, to achieve strategic and 
operational objectives. They formulate theater strategies and 
campaigns, organize joint forces, designate operational areas, and 
provide strategic guidance and operational focus to subordinates. The 
aim is to achieve unity of effort among many diverse agencies in a 
complex environment (Department of the Army 2001a, 2-1).
Conceiving of a force as a single human being allows military thinkers to 
unify their actions across the boundaries of echelon, military service, 
nationality, physical location, operational type, and conceptual strategy. 
The Information Environment 
The powerful core scenes of the original four elements and their shared frame 
of warfare make them ready source domains for both compression and metaphor. In 
the most recent edition of Operations, the discussion of each of these four elements 
retains these core meanings while being markedly expanded. The elaborations all 
seem intuitively sound, despite the fact that some of them seem to bear little 
resemblance to their originals. The ease and productivity with which these concepts 
are applied to other domains of human endeavor demonstrates how fundamental they 
are to human thought, and in turn serve the principle aim of doctrine: “to provide a 
common language and common understanding of how Army forces conduct 
operations” (Department of the Army 2001a, 1-14). 
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Doctrine, like any type of procedural discourse, is useful only if it can be read 
and understood by the members of its target audience, and give them enough 
information to carry out an act with particular results. The manual Operations is 
particularly crucial within the larger body of Army doctrine because as a keystone 
manual it lays down the principles according to which all other activities in the 
institution must operate (Department of the Army 2001a, 1-14). And, since the 
Army’s mindset is predicated on success in combat, the conduct of all other 
operations conforms to or supports the principles of war and the elements of combat 
power. 
As kinetically based as combat is, however, soldiers do actually think and 
communicate while they are fighting.  Thought and communication are essential to 
warfare, in that soldiers must plan and coordinate battles and their supporting 
operations at every echelon, and must respond to the enemy’s actions.  The sheer 
volume of written material used to train for, plan, and execute warfare, as well as the 
sophisticated communication infrastructure that supports it, should be ample proof of 
this.  Yet these conceptual activities remain backgrounded in this frame not because 
they are insignificant, but because the type of information needed and exchanged 
within a given force is, in many ways, conceptually homogenous in the same way that 
the elements of combat power themselves were.  Just as those elements were bound 
by the common concept of destroying the enemy, so most information requirements 
concern the enemy’s activities and what the friendly force must do to kill him. 
Combined with the facts that members of a given armed force normally 
communicated only amongst themselves, that they shared a deeply ingrained common 
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background, and were once able to exercise some control over what information 
reached the outside world, it is easy to understand why the activities of thought and 
communication have been taken for granted.
Military operations are no longer closed to the viewing public. In its 
discussion of the “information environment,” the Army describes a frame of elements 
and relationships that hampers its ability to operate, but that it simply cannot address 
in the same way it would a physical threat.  The defensive tone of this description sets 
the conditions for a transformation of the battlespace from an arena of action to a 
fishbowl, in which the elements of combat power can do more lasting harm to the 
force that wields them than the one that sustains the blow. 3.0 describes the 
“information environment” in this way:
All military operations take place within an information environment 
that is largely outside the control of military forces. The information 
environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate 
information; also included is the information itself (see JP 3-13; FM 3-
13). National, international, and nonstate actors use this environment 
to collect, process, and disseminate information. The media’s use of 
real-time technology affects public opinion, both in the U.S. and 
abroad, and alters the conduct and perceived legitimacy of military 
operations. Now, more than ever, every soldier represents America—
potentially to a global audience (Department of the Army 2001a, 1-
12). 
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This paragraph struggles to reconcile the disparity between the kinetic 
power of conventional warfare and the rhetorical power that charges the 
“information environment,” which is the source of the tension underlying the 
topic sentence.  The rest of the paragraph attempts to explain the reason for 
this discrepancy, but succeeds only in describing the elements of the 
environment and the impact they have without being able to detail how they 
achieve it.  By focusing on identifiable entities, that is, the infrastructure of 
information technology, the large number of actors in this sphere, and the 
recognizable impact that their opinions have, the writers of the paragraph can 
at least appeal to sheer volume as a partial explanation.  But, as the semicolon 
that separates the “information environment” from the “information” 
demonstrates, the systems and the data are not the same; the infrastructure 
facilitates the activities of the mind and the cooperative activity of 
communication and persuasion, but it does not replace them. 
The recognition of the “information environment” and its impact on 
war has also changed the concept of the battlespace.  From a physical space 
dominated by kinetic power, the term now applies to 
the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to 
successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the 
mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space and the included enemy 
and friendly forces; facilities, weather; terrain; the electromagnetic 
spectrum, and the information environment within the operation areas 
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and areas of interest (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development (J-7)).
Here, the definition is more conceptual than physical, since the battlespace 
must be understood rather than dominated. Commanders and their staffs must now 
devote resources to addressing factors not of their own making, out of their control, 
and well beyond the physical boundaries of their AO.
The Impact of the New Battlespace on Combat Power 
Despite this major shift in the definition of the battlespace, the four elements 
of combat power were retained, modified, and augmented, not wholly replaced. This 
is of course because traditional combat can and still does happen.  The retention of 
these terms provides a useful opportunity for analogical thinking; it is an effective 
means of both explaining the further development of the elements and the impact 
these expansions have on the mission of today’s forces. Their descriptions from FM 
3.0 are listed below:
Maneuver is the employment of forces, through movement combined 
with fire or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage with 
respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the 
means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve 
surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance. (Department of the Army 
2001a, 4-4).
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Firepower is the amount of fires that a position, unit or weapons system can 
deliver. Fires are the effects of lethal and nonlethal weapons (Department of 
the Army 2001a, 4-6).
Leadership. Because it deals directly with soldiers, leadership is the most 
dynamic element of combat power. Confident, audacious, and competent 
leadership focuses the other elements of combat power and serves as the 
catalyst that creates conditions for success. (Department of the Army 2001a, 
4-7).
Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of the force so that the 
commander can apply maximum force at the decisive point and time 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 4-8).
Information enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, 
firepower, and protection (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-10).
The “information environment” has not only added “information” as a force to 
be reckoned with, it has also physically and conceptually expanded each of the other 
four members of the category.  Each element has become a small radial category in 
and of itself, with a core concept grounded in its previous definition in 100-5. While 
the first four have conceptually expanded, it does not mean that each has become 
necessarily more powerful, but rather that their use within the context of the 
information environment must be more carefully considered. However, this 
expansion does mean that the direct and concrete relationships between the elements 
may no longer hold as they did in the frame of the conventional battlefield.
89
This caution even affects the element that spurred the transformation 
of the battlespace.  Although “information” seems a potent weapon that other 
agents can wield against U.S. military forces, the Army itself relegates it to 
the status of an “enabler,” something that augments the capabilities of the 
other elements by helping them coordinate more effectively, but that in and of 
itself is not a form of power (Director for Operational Plans and Join Force 
Development (J-7)).  The entire construct of combat power, instead of racing 
confidently into battle to crush the will of the enemy, seems rather to 
speedwalk, talking to itself frantically while furtively casting an eye over its 
shoulder at the cameras that shadow it into war.
Developments in Maneuver 
“Maneuver,” still the first of the new elements, remains grounded in physical 
movement over terrain. However, it has been expanded to include tactical maneuver, 
operational maneuver, and close combat, and “information’s” major impact on the 
concept is that the three must be coordinated with one another as effectively as 
possible. The core concept of this category is tactical maneuver, which is related to 
the other two members of the categories in different ways. In relation to operational 
maneuver, it is both a continuation of the movement the forces make from their home 
stations to the port of debarkation and on to the battlefield, and the source domain to 
which operational maneuver is compared. In relation to close combat, tactical 
maneuver is the temporal predecessor and necessary cause for close combat, during 
which little or no movement of forces may actually occur.  While it might be difficult 
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to trace how a unit’s initial deployment strategy impacts its performance in close 
combat, the manner in which all three forms of maneuver are related in this element 
forces soldiers to consider how every stage of their movement might impact their 
combat readiness. 
Tactical maneuver serves as the core concept because, of the three types, it is 
the once most closely grounded on physical scenes human beings experience through 
our bodies on an everyday basis. Tactical maneuver “wins battles and engagements 
by positioning forces to close with and destroy the enemy and continually poses new 
problems for him” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-5). Successful tactical 
maneuver enables the soldier to approach the objective from a direction from which 
he can fire and move into it easily, ideally a direction from which the occupying 
enemy force has poor observation or fields of fire. The friendly force, which has a 
high ratio of firepower to the defender, moves as rapidly as possible while 
coordinating their movements. In an ideal tactical maneuver, the forces move so 
quickly onto the objective that the enemy forces are physically and psychologically 
overwhelmed, effectively disrupted without the attackers having to fire.  Its key 
features are movement and positional advantage.
Of the two other types of maneuver, operational maneuver is the closest 
analogue to tactical maneuver. Operational maneuver “places army forces and 
resources at the critical place and time to achieve an operational advantage, such as 
when a unit is deployed overseas” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-4). It occurs 
when a large number of army assets are moved to a theatre of operations, such as a 
war zone or location of a humanitarian mission, or within a theatre. The example 
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given in FM 3.0 is that of intratheater movements during Desert Storm, when two 
corps were moved west of Kuwait in order to attack Iraqi forces from their flank 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 4-4). 
Operational maneuver requires movement of major assets for operational 
advantage; however, it does not require that those assets move under their own 
power. While it is a step in the preparation for ground combat, unlike tactical 
maneuver or close combat, the possibility of response to direct fire is limited, since 
most movement occurs well away from the battlefield, if it exists at all. An aircraft 
conveying soldiers of a mechanized brigade may be attacked by enemy air defense 
assets, but the forces themselves cannot participate in the response to hostile fire. 
Because it occurs outside the context of direct combat, operational maneuver may be 
difficult to comprehend as an element of combat power. However, two elements of 
the frame of tactical maneuver are retained that explain its importance, movement and 
positional advantage. Placing the huge distances a unit must travel to get to an area of 
operations in terms of these elements brings them down to a more human scale.  They 
can be seen as operations in their own right that need the kind of detailed planning 
often applied to direct combat operations. This comparison also instills the need for 
soldiers to be as wary of their own protection during the entire length of a 
deployment, not just “in theatre.” During a movement to contact with enemy forces in 
tactical maneuver, security is critical to ensure protection of the unit and secrecy of 
the plan until battle begins. Similarly, routes into a theater must also be chosen in 
these terms. In today’s battlespace, there is no “rear area” in which a unit is 
completely unthreatened. 
92
Instead of being a metaphoric extension of tactical maneuver, close combat 
serves as its goal. It is the feature of warfare that distinguishes it from other human 
activities. In this frame, soldiers from the opposing armies face and fight one another. 
Close combat “is carried out with direct fire weapons and is supported by indirect and 
air delivered fires, and defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains ground” 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 4-5). 
The frame of close combat is best described using the experience of a single 
soldier. FM 3.0 gives a scenario from Vietnam in which soldiers are pinned down by 
an attack on their landing zone, apparently so quickly after exiting their aircraft that 
they cannot prepare foxholes and can use only the natural relief of the terrain for 
cover from hostile fires (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-5). Close combat occurs 
when enemy forces maneuver to the LZ and attempt to seize the terrain from the 
defenders. The defending soldier fires at the enemy while the enemy fires at him; as 
in tactical maneuver, they respond to one another’s actions but do not react to them, 
so that they retain control over the execution of their respective plans. Success for the 
defenders occurs when they have destroyed sufficient numbers of the attackers to 
force them to end the attack; for the attackers, when they have destroyed or disrupted 
the defenders until they can clear the remaining defenders from the objective, move 
forward, and establish and maintain control themselves. 
The distinguishing element of close combat is that the participants use direct 
fire weapons to engage the enemy and are engaged by those of the enemy.  In 
successful close combat, the combatant responds to the danger by returning fire but 
continues toward his objective, or continues to maintain his position on the terrain. 
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This direct interaction with the enemy and the struggle to possess terrain are also the 
heart of ground combat, which is the frame for combat power. While close combat is 
classified as a form of maneuver, movement is not a necessary condition in that both 
the defender and attacker are considered close combatants; the example scenario was 
narrated by soldiers who had defended the LZ.
The three types of maneuver together comprise a radial category. The central 
concept, tactical maneuver, is an ideal that involves forces moving under their own 
power towards an enemy in the defense in order to conduct close combat and defeat 
the enemy. Operational maneuver shares with tactical maneuver the components of 
movement, and the notion of obtaining a position of advantage in relation to the 
enemy; but frequently precludes any engagement with the enemy, since the soldiers 
and equipment are not configured for combat. Although it contributes to successful 
ground combat, because it involves the use of assets from other services or allies, 
operational maneuver enters the higher level of war. The main motivating factors in 
their relationship are movement and advantage.
This relationship between close combat and maneuver explains the 
organization of the category, which, from the perspective of both classical and radial 
category theory seems odd. The expectation is that the elements be ordered by the 
degree to which they fulfill the prototype of the category. Logically, that would place 
tactical maneuver first, followed by operational maneuver and close combat. Instead, 
the elements go from operational maneuver to tactical and end with close combat. 
That is, they go in the order in which a unit or soldier would actually progress as he 
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moves towards combat itself. It follows an order that is based on the frame of moving 
towards a physical location, that is, the frame of maneuver itself. 
Although “maneuver” has not been expanded to the extent that “protection” 
has been in the 2001a edition, the concept has been developed considerably from the 
previous edition. It represents the conceptual and physical expansion of the 
battlespace effected by the “information environment.”  The three levels of maneuver, 
which are never actually named in FM 100-5, are explicitly defined both 
independently and in relation to one another in 3.0. This differentiation, especially in 
the discussion of operational maneuver, highlights the causal link between the three 
types that had been overlooked in the previous doctrine. It also reflects the change in 
the operational threat; one that will use unconventional means to interdict a military 
force at any point in its employment, erasing both the line between friendly and 
enemy territory, and the distinction between politically and tactically sensitive targets.  
Every movement, from deployment from home station to moving on the battlefield, 
emanates “information” an enemy can collect and turn against the force.
Firepower and Its Relation to Maneuver
“Firepower” was previously tightly tied to maneuver; firepower created 
opportunities, and maneuver exploited them, while maneuver in turn positioned 
firepower to its best advantage. Like “maneuver,” it has been divided into operational 
and tactical forms. In this instance, however, rather than creating continuity between 
three seemingly disparate forms, the “information environment” instead breaks the 
necessary link between the two types of firepower and, at the operational level, 
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between “firepower” and “maneuver” as well. Tactical fires, like tactical maneuver, 
remains the core concept of this element, and in its expansion to operational fires 
retains the effect of damaging enemy materiel, as well as the advantage that friendly 
forces gain through that destruction. Otherwise, operational fires have lost the direct 
conceptual link to both fires at the lower level and to maneuver at their own level.
Operational fires generally utilize more powerful, longer-range systems than 
tactical fires, but this is not what distinguishes the two. These fires target enemy 
forces and assets that might eventually be committed to the battle, but are not 
imminently or directly engaged in combat with friendly forces. The example given in 
FM 3.0 is another scenario from the Gulf War, in which the destruction of the Iraqi 
Army’s reserve set the conditions for the ground war (Department of the Army 
2001a, 4-7). Operational targets can also be munitions factories or transportation or 
communications facilities that themselves don’t have any actual combat power, but 
support forces that do.  Unlike tactical fires, however, operational fires do not 
normally enable operational maneuver in the manner that tactical fires enable tactical 
maneuver. Operational maneuver’s goal is to get forces to the battlefield, while 
operational fires’ goal is to reduce enemy resources that will contribute to enemy 
combat power.
Like “maneuver,” the members of the category of “firepower” are not 
organized with the most prototypical member first. Instead, they are organized in 
terms of type of causality in relation to close combat, with operational fires discussed 
first. Operational fires are a contributing cause to success in close combat, while 
tactical fires make a direct contribution. They are also ordered in terms of 
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temporality, just as maneuver is, since the larger operational fires that help facilitate 
close combat must destroy the enemy forces that will affect the battle before it begins. 
Also like “maneuver,” the category of “firepower” has been markedly 
developed since the last edition. While different levels of firepower are mentioned 
explicitly in 100-5, they are not differentiated, but discussed collectively. In this 
edition, strategic, operational, and tactical levels all share the common characteristic 
of needing to be “synchronized with other attack systems against the enemy,” 
especially “maneuver” (Department of the Army 1993, 2-10). The number of types 
has been reduced to two, operational, but each has been discussed separately in 
relation to both one another and to “maneuver.” 
One of the more interesting changes in this category is the definition of 
operational fires. Its differentiation from tactical fires continues the principle started 
in “maneuver” in which the significance of actions outside the battlefield is 
emphasized.  Operational fires take this decentralization of the battlefield one step 
further by undoing a central concept of combat power, the coordination of maneuver 
and firepower. Because operational maneuver and operational firepower are not 
necessarily linked, and activity outside the scene of close combat can determine 
success, operational fires are not necessarily as closely and directly linked to close 
combat as in the previous edition, reflecting the conceptual expansion of the 
battlespace through the “information environment.”  Commanders and their staffs 
must now be aware of operations whose direct link to their own mission may be 
tenuous at best, because they may influence the opinions of numerous agents on and 
off the battlefield.
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The Changing Role of Leadership
Of the four original elements of combat power, “leadership” received some of 
the most marked changes in the updated manual.  It was shortened, reconceptualized, 
and placed in a different position in the list.  All of these modifications point to the 
fact that the “information environment” has so reduced the military force’s agency on 
the battlefield that the control of its primary agent, the leader, is similarly diminished.  
The commander may have authority over his own troops, but his very position as a 
commander causes others to suspect his credibility as an honest broker.
 FM 100-5 portrayed a combat leader as the ultimate deciding factor in 
success on the battlefield; “[t]he most essential dynamic of combat power is 
competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership ” 
(Department of the Army 1993, 2-11). Every aspect of a leader’s personality and 
ability was seen a crucial to his ability to lead, and his “moral character, firm 
willpower, and professional ability” at once galvanized soldiers and drove the other 
three elements of combat power. His charisma and ability were necessary, in fact 
nearly sufficient factors for victory; “Professional competence, personality, and the 
will of strong commanders represent a significant part of any unit’s combat power” 
(Department of the Army 1993, 2-12). This characterization of leadership reflects a 
battlespace in which the leader is capable of perceiving and impacting every relevant 
aspect of the mission.  It was positioned last in the elements of combat power to 
emphasize the fact that the leader wielded and enhanced the other three through the 
force of his will.
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In view of the changing nature of the combat environment, the concept of 
leadership itself has had to adapt.  The new discussion of leadership stresses continual 
self-development and fostering of relationships as more important than will and 
charisma. The leader accomplishes this by first honing his own cognitive abilities. He 
begins by studying and training in four basic skills; interpersonal, conceptual, 
technical, and tactical. (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-7). These are learning how 
to deal with people, how to understand and plan operations, what the capabilities of 
his unit are, and how to employ those capabilities in combat. That is, the skills 
progress from the smallest frame of interaction he will have in his capacity as a leader 
to the largest. The manual then discusses how he will impact his subordinates, which 
is by “instill[ing] their units with Army values, energy, methods, and will” 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 4-8). 
The leader takes the knowledge he has gained through study, training and 
experience, and transmits it to his soldiers, making this knowledge a contributing 
cause to their own improvement. That is, he moves from honing his own conceptual 
abilities to communicating with his subordinates.  Finally, the leader builds trust 
among his soldiers, which “encourages subordinates to seize the initiative. In unclear 
situations, bold leaders who exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s 
intent accomplish the mission” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-8). From 
exercising his own cognitive functions through study, he learns to better communicate 
with his subordinates, and finally transforms his unit from a group of soldiers into a 
solid discourse community. 
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This process moves from the most central element of leadership, the leader 
himself, outwards to encompass larger and larger portions of the entire frame of 
leadership, and increasingly complex relationships within that frame. The metaphoric 
movement outwards is reinforced by the causal links between each of the three steps, 
just as the causal links are made between operational and tactical fires. They also 
encompass larger and more complex arenas of conceptual activity.
This more thoughtful and less charismatic concept of leadership reflects the 
fact that the new battlespace is so much larger and more complex than the original 
battlefield that the leader cannot dominate its entire scope through his will alone. The 
significance of his personal characteristics has been dramatically downplayed, 
making leadership no longer “the most essential dynamic of combat power,” but “the 
most dynamic element of combat power” (Department of the Army 1993, 2-11; 
2001a, 4-7). Today’s leader must rely on his subordinates to accomplish the mission 
even without his direct presence.  
It is also the only one of the four original elements whose discussion has 
actually been shortened in the update. When so many conflicting agents impact 
success on the battlefield in so many different ways, most of whom are outside the 
direct control of military authority, it is difficult to characterize the role of any single 
agent as being decisive, let along sufficient for victory. This displacement is literally 
reflected in the rearrangement of “leadership” from the final position in the list of 
elements, the position of emphasis that asserted its role as the coordinator of the first 
three, to the middle position, sandwiched between “firepower” and “protection,” and 
subordinated to “information,” which has taken on the function of synchronizing the 
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other four. A leader often metonymically represents his entire unit, and his reduction 
and displacement as an element of combat power reflects the fact that combat power 
itself is no longer the primary force in the “information environment.”
Protection: From Passive to Proactive
The most complex of the original four elements in 3.0 is “protection,” defined 
as “the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply 
maximum force at the decisive time and place” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-8). 
The most basic form of protection involves a human being, a physical force that poses 
a danger or threat to him, usually an object moving towards him with the potential 
harm to him, and the barrier between the human and the threat that averts the harm. 
The  category is defined as follows:
Protection has four components: are force protection, field discipline, 
safety, and fratricide avoidance. Force protection, the primary 
component, minimizes the effects of enemy firepower (including 
weapons of mass destruction [WMD]), maneuver, and information. 
Field discipline precludes losses from hostile environments. Safety 
reduces the inherent risk of nonbattle deaths and injuries. Fratricide 
avoidance minimizes the inadvertent killing or maiming of soldiers by 
friendly fires (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-8).
Of the original four elements, “protection” was the most fully developed and 
expanded.  The “information environment,” by physically and conceptually 
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expanding the battlespace, has also increased the ways and opportunities by which a 
plethora of new agents can harm the force. In response, the notion of “protection” 
now encompasses more proactive measures, and places a greater emphasis on 
coordinating information within the force.
One of the most significant developments in “protection” was the concept of 
what needed protecting. In the previous edition, the soldier and the support functions 
that provided his most immediate needs for combat were the main object of  
“protection”; the “fighting potential of a force” as it was deployed into combat.  Like 
“maneuver,” the entities that contribute to that “fighting potential” now extend well 
past the battlefield, back along the entire route of his deployment and into home 
station.  It includes  “DOD (Department of Defense) personnel (to include family 
members), resources, facilities, and critical information,” which means, aside from 
the soldier himself, the government civilians who support his deployment, his family, 
the installation from which he deployed, and all the facilities that provide every 
aspect of his logistical support, from the detail that delivers his meals in the field to 
the manufacturer that actually produces them in the United States (Department of the 
Army 2001a, 4-8). 
The last element encompassed in “protection,” “critical information,” points 
to the conceptual expansion of the notion of “protected entity.” Because the 
infrastructure that supports soldiers is so physically dispersed, there are far more 
potential targets to hit.  But the first step to harming something is knowing that it 
exists, and what vulnerabilities it has.  “Protection” now means not just physical 
security, but information security as well, about the soldier and his unit’s operations, 
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and the logistical chain, and even about his family. Potential harm to a soldier’s 
family further develops the notion of “protected entity” in another manner as well; the 
soldier’s morale.  While morale was addressed in the previous edition, it only 
occurred in relation to field discipline, again confining the soldier to the battlefield.  
 The number and type of entities that need “protection” generates a 
corresponding increase in the ways and agents by which they can be harmed.  Threats 
are no longer just the enemy or the environment of the battlefield.  They now include 
anything that causes a soldier to worry about his family at home station, everything 
from creditors to the strangling bureaucracy of the military health care system, any of 
which can convince a soldier that he needs to return home to take care of them. Just 
as dangerous is the potential for fratricide.  Aside from the physical damage it causes 
to a unit’s assets, few things can be as demoralizing as knowing that a soldier killed, 
or was killed by, one of his own.
“Information,” therefore, along with its protection, dissemination, and control, 
holds the key to better “protection.”  By shielding both information itself and the 
systems that process it from potential enemies, the Army can shield the infrastructure 
it supports.  By taking care of family members’ needs, it can avoid problems that 
trouble the soldier’s morale.  By ensuring that all soldiers know how to avoid threats 
to their own safety and physical well-being, the soldiers become agents of their own 
protection.  And by promoting good communication amongst and between units, they 
prevent the soldiers from inadvertently harming one another.
There is an interesting progression of the elements that can cause harm to the
soldier that are addressed in the element of protection. The primary agents of harm 
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are the enemy through means other than direct combat, the environment, the soldier 
himself through carelessness, and the soldier through grave error.  The agents 
decrease in intentionality to cause harm as they increase with the gravity manner in 
which he is harmed. While casualties resulting from enemy surveillance and other 
activity are grave, they are generally less likely to have the repercussions or as direct 
an effect as fratricide or even safety violations.  The inclusion and organization of the 
types of fratricide avoidance reflects an increasing awareness that with limited 
resources thinly spread over a vast battlespace, the Army must put as much energy 
into avoiding failure as it does into winning the fight.
Information, the Fifth Element of Combat Power
The frame of “information” entails both cognition, in that it is seen as both the 
input to and result of thinking, and communication, in that these inputs and results 
are, in the context of the military, meant to be shared by members of an organization. 
Another aspect of “information” in both the Army and the general population is that it 
is heavily associated with the means to store and communicate it, especially
automated equipment collectively known as “information technology.” This 
metonymy of information to hardware helps address a problem particularly vexing in 
the military, how to handle a process that is inherently individual and subjectively 
experienced and give it the public, objective existence that would make it more 
suitable for military operations.
The inclusion of information as a form of combat power stems partly from 
several truisms about its role in military operations. If you know where the enemy is, 
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for instance, you can kill him. If you have good information about your own troops, 
you can direct their actions more effectively. The recent inclusion of “information” 
into the elements of combat power seems to originate from the proliferation of 
information systems fielded by Army forces, and the ability of the Army’s actions to 
be impacted by the manner in which they are represented in national and international 
media. This vastly broadened scene has forced military professionals at every echelon 
to confront aspects of the theatre of war that had previously been the purview of 
strategic planners.
In the context of Mission Command, “information” in terms of “relevant 
information” and the cognitive hierarchy is framed within the very public and 
physical domain of warfare by linking it to “effective action” in two ways, by 
generating action, and by emulating action as a causative force in and of itself. Its 
inclusion as an element of combat power continues in that same vein. Here, 
“information” is discussed primarily in terms of its ability to enable the first four 
elements. The discussion is comprised of four paragraphs, none of which discuss 
“information” itself on its own terms. 
The first paragraph discusses the changing relationship between information 
and combat power, characterizing “information” as a facilitator of their employment 
in terms of providing knowledge about the battlefield and as a way of impacting it. 
The second paragraph gives a more concrete instance of the assistance that it 
provides, concluding that more information received more quickly enables faster and 
better decisions. It ends by saying that information “enables Army forces to see first, 
understand first, and act first” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-11). 
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The first strategy is a form of antimetabole (Lanham 14). The text states, “In 
the past, when forces made contact with the enemy, commanders developed the 
situation to gain information. Today, Army leaders use information collected by 
unmanned systems to increase their situational understanding before engaging the 
enemy” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-10). The AB:BA logical form that these 
sentences take first sets up, and then reinforces the notion that there exists a 
relationship between the two. The first sentence states that fighting produces 
information, while the second reverses the relationship stating that information 
instead contributes to action. A common notion we have is that like contributes to 
like; if we add an element to an entity, and that entity becomes better, then somehow 
the addition has some characteristics either similar to or necessary for that entity. As 
an entailment of that notion, “information” must therefore bear some sort of similarity 
to the actions that comprise combat. 
The same strategy we saw in the first chapter, the creation of a causal chain, 
drives the second paragraph about “information.” It employs the same conceptual 
logic we saw in the gradatio in the first chapter, though the figure is not as rigidly 
used here.
The common operational picture (COP) based on enhanced 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and disseminated 
by modern information systems provides commanders throughout the 
force with an accurate, near real-time perspective and knowledge of 
the situation. Information from the COP, transformed into situational 
understanding, allows commanders to combine the elements of combat 
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power in new ways. For example, superior understanding of the 
situation allows commanders to avoid enemy engagement areas, while 
concentrating fires and maneuver at the decisive place and time. This 
ability increases the survivability of the force without substantially 
increasing passive protective systems, such as armor. Modern 
information systems help leaders at all levels make better decisions 
faster. Better decisions rapidly communicated allow Army forces to 
mass the effects of combat power more rapidly and effectively than the 
enemy. This enables Army forces to see first, understand first, and act 
first (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-10 to 4-11).
 Also as in the discussion of “relevant information,” we see that this paragraph 
creates a causal chain consisting mainly of contributing causes that lead from 
information to action. The type of action the commander takes is significant; he does 
not just make decisions, but “combines the elements of combat powers in new ways” 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 4-10). So, while the nature of “information” differs 
from that of the other four, it tightens the relationship between them, enabling their 
more effective employment and affixing this new element into the frame of action 
more tightly. This causal relationship is reinforced by the explicit use of the rhetorical 
figure of auexis, which creates a series by linking the cola through a repeated 
element; “this enables Army forces to see first, understand first, and act first” 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 4-11). It is also illustrated in the figure below, taken 
from the manual, which shows the links and relationships of the elements to one 
another.
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Fig 2.2  The Five Elements of Combat Power
After establishing that a causal and natural relationship exists between 
“information: and the other four elements, there still remains the need to explain 
exactly what the causal mechanism is. The third paragraph begins with the warning, 
“Information is not neutral; opposing sides use it directly and indirectly to gain 
exploitable advantages and apply them against selected targets” (Department of the 
Army 2001a, 4-11). The inherent neutrality of “information” seems to stem from the 
tendency to represent it as an independently existing entity, which has no loyalty to 
any one side of a conflict. Unlike “leadership,” “maneuver,” “firepower,” and 
“protection,” it is not an act that must be actually executed by members of actual 
armed forces.
In this sentence, we also see the first explicit use of analogical thinking, 
wherein “information” is compared to firepower; the passage continues, “Just as fires 
are synchronized and targeted, so is information” (Department of the Army 2001a, 4-
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11). The choice is not accidental. It leads the reader to consider the causal mechanism 
of firepower as a conceptual metaphor for information, thought, and communication. 
This comparison warrants a closer look at the source domain of field artillery. 
In the process of targeting, before the battle even begins, the targeting cell of the staff 
makes up a list of likely targets, which are also incorporated into the intelligence 
collection plan so that resources can be allocated to watch for it. When a target is 
located, the observer radios back to the fire control center, who direct assets to fire on 
the target. When the round itself is fired, the human agent pulls the trigger, which 
initiates a series of events, from the pulling of the trigger to the striking of the firing 
pin on the primer at the back of the round. This ignites the propellant, which burns 
and propels the round out of the barrel and towards the target. The round hits the 
target and damages or destroys it.
The human agent has direct impingement on the physical process at two 
points; aiming the weapon and pulling the trigger. The propulsion of the round 
downrange and the effect it has on the target are both effects of the design of the 
round itself, and both events, the movement and the effect of the impact, are 
predictable and relatively discrete in nature. This represents the dearest wish of those 
who design and implement PSYOP and other information campaigns; that the 
information be interpreted the same way by all members of the target audience (be 
discrete and predictable) that it be easy for any member of the military to deliver the 
message no matter what the means (impingement of the human on firing process) and 
that the effects be consistent with the intents of the designers (characteristics of the 
round). The final paragraph begins with a discussion of the new promise that 
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information and information technology holds for warfare, but oddly enough ends 
with a warning of its danger:
While subordinates have access to the broader tactical situation, 
commanders have access to layers of tactical detail. Higher-level 
commanders yielding to the temptation to direct minor tactical actions 
could reduce the benefits of advanced information systems and the 
situational understanding they support (Department of the Army 
2001a, 4-11).
This is where the comparison to the other elements of combat power seems to 
end. While there are always limits on the resources needed to move, shoot, and 
protect, and while sound leadership is always needed at every level, the amount of 
“information” available for communication, and therefore the time a commander 
could spend thinking about every level of an operation, is limited only by his own 
efforts to prevent himself from diving into those realms. 
One thing to note is the position of “information” in the list of combat 
elements. As the last of the five, it occupies the place once reserved for leadership. 
This reinforces the notion that the agency of a human leader is no longer the decisive 
factor for victory. Instead, the collective ability to think and communicate by all 
members of the institution may be more important in the modern battlespace.
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The Five Elements of Combat Power and The New Battlespace
The new battlespace reframes the elements of combat power and the manner 
in which they are implemented. One change is the increase in the span of time and 
space whereby the combat elements must be considered and employed. We see this 
most readily in the elements of “protection” and “operational maneuver,” whose
realms stretch well beyond the physical limits of the battlefield and now encompass 
actions at home station. Another, more telling change, is the conceptual expansion of 
all the elements to include the new element of “information” in a very limited sense,
which seems to correspond to the dwindling impact of “leadership” on the battlefield.  
Both elements now concern the coordination of the force itself, and do not seem to 
include enemies, civilian local nationals, the media and other outside agents.  Like the 
concepts of cognition and communication as they are outlined in Mission Command, 
“leadership” and “information” don’t engage anyone outside of the force itself; there 
is no sense in the realm of combat power, that one should communicate and influence 
perceptions as a way of shaping the operation.  This is despite the fact that these 
outside forces are the most powerful ones in the “information environment.”  But 
because their thoughts, interpretations, and reactions can’t be predicted or controlled 
in the same way as members of the military discourse community, the Army chooses 
to avoid that interaction and retreats to enhancing the traditional approach of building 
combat power to protect itself from the effects of the “information environment.”
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CHAPTER 3 - Information Operations
Introduction
Army doctrine can be extremely cumbersome.  As a repository of 
institutionally approved tactics, techniques and procedures that can take up to five 
years to update, it often seems to lag behind the requirements of the force it is 
intended to support.  It is also enormous: comprised of hundreds of volumes, the 
manuals needed to understand and conduct merely a battalion-level operation could 
number in the dozens.  Furthermore, they must be conceptually consistent with one 
another.  As a corpus, they are theoretically conservative, relying on proven concepts 
that have stood the test of time.  In most Army disciplines, these issues are mere 
inconveniences.  In the field of information operations, they are a true menace.  
“Information operations” is a blend of the domains of “information,” the 
activities of thought and communication, and “operations,” military actions or 
missions, recruiting from the same frames of knowledge as the metaphor Argument Is 
War.  Unlike this more common conceptual metaphor, in which thinkers map 
corresponding elements between the two domains, in this instance, thinkers construct 
the blend by recruiting both structure and elements from one domain and combining 
them with elements from the other domain. However, the blend draws so heavily 
from the domain of “operations” that the most central concepts of “information,” 
thought and communication, are either lost or distorted beyond recognition.  The 
awkward process of doctrine revision, which inhibits innovation and demands 
consensus, has helped effect this damage; because of it, the doctrine on information 
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operations actually obstructs the Army’s own efforts to effectively communicate with 
any party in the information environment except itself. 
The heavy reliance on warfare as a source domain and the need for consensus 
in doctrine not only encumber the development of IO, it may actually have reversed 
it. The original manual, FM 100-6: Information Operations, came out in 1996, 
followed by the revised edition in 2003.  In the intervening seven years, at least one 
final draft was published in 2000 (Department of the Army 2000, ii).  Between this 
final draft and the officially published doctrine, there are several small but key 
differences between the sections on IO effects and IO activities and capabilities.  The 
modifications that appeared in the official edition structured the doctrine more closely 
to the source domain of military operations, but in doing so eliminated concepts that 
would have incorporated more aspects of cognition and communication into the 
blend. 
The Blend of Information and Operations
The term “information operations” is what Turner and Fauconnier call a noun-
noun compound. These compounds blend the domains of each noun in a 
noncompositional manner that is motivated but cannot wholly be predicted by the 
conventional meanings of the nouns themselves, directing the thinker to sometime 
very peripheral aspects of the core concepts (Turner and Fauconnier 2002, 356). For 
instance, in their comparisons of “dolphin-safe,” which denotes the ecological 
friendliness of canned tuna, and “child-safe,” which refers to a container that prevents 
children from obtaining access to the contents, Turner and Fauconnier demonstrate 
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that in each instance the noun “safe” highlights different targets that are kept from 
harm, and different means by which each target is protected (2002, 354-355). In the 
first, the protected entity kept from harm is dolphins that hunt the tuna; they are kept 
safe when the human tuna harvesters use nets that prevent the animals from being 
entangled along with the hapless fish. In the second, the protected entity is a child 
who has found a container with dangerous contents such as medication, and the 
means of safeguarding is the lid of the container itself, which is designed specifically 
to ensure that children will have a difficult time opening it.
In both instances, the protected entity is drawn into the frame’s core concept 
via a very long and often circuitous conceptual route.  Dolphins, as predators of tuna, 
are only accidental to the main purpose of nets, which is catching the tuna 
themselves, and children’s interactions with medications depend on their boundless 
curiosity.  Similarly, the means of keeping them “safe” actually involves opposing 
mechanisms.  The dolphins are allowed out of the net, while children are prevented 
from gaining access to the contents of the container.
“Information operations” also draws from its source domains in a comparable
manner.  It is a military operation carried out both by and against the use of means 
drawn from the domains of cognition and communication. However, it does not deal 
primarily with thought and persuasion themselves, but with the means used to aid 
them. These “information systems” are far more tangible and easily incorporated into 
the domain of war than the cognitive activities are.
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If the “information” in “information operations” refers primarily to cognition 
and communication in terms of the hardware that supports them, then what does the 
term “operations” mean? In Army doctrine, “operations” are defined as:
1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operations, 
tactical, serve, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The 
process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, 
defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or 
campaign. (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development (J-7)).
While activities like postal operations and review of training can technically 
be “operations,” the prototypical Army operation is warfare, and the prototypical way 
to win a war is to attack. The first paragraph of FM 3.0 states,
Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and 
multinational operations. The Army organizes, trains, and equips its 
forces to fight and win the nation’s wars and achieve directed national 
objectives. Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the foundation 
of Army service—the Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the 
American people and its enduring obligation to the nation 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 1-1).
The noun-noun compound of “information operations” is attack and defense 
carried out via communication and cognition, and the systems that supplement them. 
Given this, it seems that the natural development of this blend would bear strong 
resemblance to the metaphor Argument Is War. In this metaphor, each side of a 
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debate is construed of as a military force whose success entails the failure of his 
opponent, and who carries out his activities through the use of words rather than 
weapons. Like conventional warfare, the ability to “fight” with words while arguing 
is leveraged against the enemy’s same ability. 
Fig 3.1  Information Operations and Information Superiority 
(Department of the Army 2001a, 11-6)
That is not the case with “information operations.” In “information 
operations,” the objective is to gain and maintain information superiority, “the 
operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability 
to do the same” (Department of the Army 2001a, 11-1). IO involves the ability to 
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carry out communication and information processing within each of the two sides. In 
terms of conventional operations, one attacks to prevent the success of the enemy’s 
defense. In IO, one works hard to communicate and transfer information while
preventing the other from doing the same. In information superiority, one party’s 
ability to communicate and process does not usually impact the other party’s “ability 
to do the same,” except indirectly as a means of coordinating efforts to do so. Each 
party conducts its own communications among its own members, and in that way 
communication is still a joint activity, but that cooperativeness does not extend to any 
other party in the battlespace.
“Information operations” is therefore an odd noun-noun compound in which 
the cooperative aspects of both communication and warfare are superimposed upon 
the two distinct processes of communications that are carried out by the separate 
parties within their own groups. The difference in the effectiveness of each of those 
two processes is contrasted to make them relate to one another in the same way that 
offense and defense do in conventional warfare. In this way, the connection between 
the term “information” and the cognitive and communication processes it represents, 
runs through data and the systems that carry it, to the processes themselves. The 
source domain of conventional warfare, which has destruction of the enemy as a 
prominent element, motivates the highlighting of the hard targets of “information” 
and “information systems,” which thrusts into the background the subjective 
cognitive experience and cooperative nature necessary to communication. The causal 
and temporal relationship between offense and defense in conventional warfare that 
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effects the widening disparity between the relative combat powers of the two sides is 
reduced to a merely temporal one. 
The ease with which hardware can be targeted by conventional combat 
operations is one factor that motivates its centrality in the blend of IO.  Another is the 
nature of discourse communities themselves. Within a given discourse community, 
the members can communicate effectively and easily because of their shared 
assumptions, perspectives, and vocabularies.  This makes the communication process 
seem almost transparent, and leaves the information systems in higher relief in the 
blend. The only way in which the adversary is conceived of as participating in this 
communication process is by interfering with it, making these the systems the object 
of defense.  When the friendly forces do communicate with the adversary forces, it is 
primarily to persuade them to surrender, which is a viable, but very limited, way of 
carrying out warfare through argument.
Background and Motivation
The discipline of information operations was developed by the Army in 
response to the changing nature of global conflict. Modern warfare is characterized 
by what are known as asymmetric threats, in which small, unconventional armed 
groups compensate for their lack of conventional combat power by using acts of 
terrorism to express their agendas, and by relying on international media and the 
power of the internet to disseminate their messages (Department of the Army  2001a, 
4-31). Information operations “fights” the asymmetric threat of today’s battlefield by 
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imposing the causal frame of kinesthetic warfare on human cognition, 
communication, and persuasion. 
Other branches in the Army are identified primarily by association with a key 
piece of equipment, such as armor, which is centered on the tank, or single key 
capability within the dynamic of war, such as intelligence, the gathering and analysis 
of information about enemy capabilities and intentions. IO, in contrast, synchronizes 
preexisting capabilities within the military structure to leverage the fifth element of 
combat power, “information.” Many of the capabilities it coordinates already belong 
to other branches or disciplines; OPSEC, or operations security, has long been the 
domain of the S3 or operations officer, while “physical destruction” is usually the 
responsibility of fire support. IO is defined as 
the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 
computer network operations, psychological operations, military 
deception, and operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and 
information systems, and to influence decisionmaking (Department of 
the Army 2003b, 1-13). 
The Structure of the IO battlefield
In conventional and other types of warfare, the Army has what are known as 
BOS, or battlefield operating systems. The BOS are defined as “the physical means 
(soldiers, organizations, and equipment) used to accomplish the mission. The BOS 
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group related systems together according to battlefield use” (Department of the Army 
2001a, 5-15). They consist of intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, 
mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support, and command and 
control (Department of the Army 2001a, 5-15). Like the military branches, each is 
generally associated with particular units or types of equipment. Some exceptions do 
exist, however, as with aviation units, which can be a form of fire support when sent 
to attack deep targets, combat service support when their lift capabilities are 
employed, or even countermobility if used to plant minefields. This heuristic enables 
a commander and staff to look at available resources in terms of potential use rather 
than designated type.
To parallel this common heuristic, the discipline of information operations 
includes the IO elements, which are divided into the core capabilities, the supporting 
activities, and the related activities (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-1). Unlike the 
BOS, which have concrete equipment and established units with clear chains of 
command and domains of responsibility, these elements can range across more than 
one unit, even throughout all the subordinate units of a larger structure, as is the case 
with the core capability of operations security. The job of the information operations 
officer and his staff is to coordinate these activities and capabilities across the entire 
unit rather than command them. 
Also unlike the BOS, the elements of IO are divided into three distinct 
categories. While the organization is never explicitly explained, the names of the 
categories themselves, “core,” “supporting” and “related,” suggest that the motivation 
for the division is how central the contribution each activity is to the goals of IO as a 
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whole.  They also suggest that the elements as a whole are a radial category, with 
“core” capabilities being the prototypical instances of IO and “supporting” and 
“related” being progressively less so.
The organization of these capabilities and activities, both within and across 
their respective subcategories, demonstrates how heavily the conceptual blend 
“information operations” relies on the domain of military operations for its structure 
and concept.  The order and division prioritize those aspects of “information” that fit 
most easily into the framework of warfare, privileging hardware over communication 
and cognition.  In terms of the agents within the domain of warfare, the elements deal 
first with those most central to conventional combat, the friendly and enemy military 
forces, and lastly with those traditionally seen as peripheral.  IO concentrates 
primarily on the ability of the two combatant sides to transfer data among themselves.  
It deals lastly with communicating with and persuading of civilian local nationals and 
other noncombatants.  This is despite the fact that how these parties feel about the 
U.S. military’s efforts can now make or break the success of the mission.
IO Capabilities and Activities
The core capabilities are operations security (OPSEC), psychological 
operations (PSYOP), military deception (MD), electronic warfare (EW) and computer 
network operations (CNO), which consist of computer network attack (CNA), 
computer network defense (CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE) 
enabling operations (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-1). As the names of the core 
capabilities indicate, four of the seven focus on hardware, either employing and 
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protecting friendly systems or attacking the enemy’s assets. Of the other three, two 
impede the enemy’s ability to perceive the battlefield accurately.  Friendly forces do 
communicate with other parties in the remaining one, but only in a very limited sense, 
in terms of both manner and content.
The first capability, operations security, or OPSEC, is defined as 
a process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and 
subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military 
operations and other activities to
•  Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence         
systems. 
• Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that 
could be interpreted or pieced together to derive essential elements 
of friendly information time to be useful to adversaries. 
• Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable 
level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 2-2). 
An example of OPSEC measures would be concealing the position of an artillery 
regiment relative to the unit it supports; normally, it is placed directly behind the 
main effort. While a unit that large cannot be concealed completely, it can be made 
difficult to detect through the use of good camouflage, strict noise and light 
discipline, and careful placement of emitters such as signal nodes, thus concealing its 
mission from the enemy. OPSEC most directly impacts adversary collection efforts 
by denying them information, directly affecting collection systems, and less directly 
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affecting the collective cognitive efforts of the enemy (Department of the Army 
2003b, 2-2).
Psychological Operations, or PSYOP, the next core capability, is unique 
among the elements of IO in that the friendly forces intentionally communicate 
directly with the enemy and other foreign audiences.  They are defined as 
planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately to influence the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and 
behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives (Director for 
Operational Plans and Join Force Development (J-7)). 
Typical PSYOP campaigns include such aims as urging soldiers to surrender, and are 
implemented through leaflet drops or loudspeaker speeches. Here, unlike for OPSEC, 
the means is not given, but like OPSEC, the aspect of the adversary’s domain the 
military wishes to reach is also the cognitive and emotional. Influencing these is not 
the final goal, since they are the first link in a causal chain that ends with the target’s 
behavior. Although PSYOP does involve communication, it highlights only the 
agency of the friendly side, and privileges its objectives, just as conventional warfare 
does.
Military deception, like OPSEC, also seeks to shape the enemy’s perceptions 
of the battlefield, but does so by deliberately portraying a false picture of the friendly 
forces instead of limiting the enemy’s access to information about it. They are
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actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military 
decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and 
operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or 
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly 
mission (Director for Operational Plans and Join Force Development 
(J-7)).
The first three capabilities do deal with activities central to the domain 
of “information,” but do so within the framework of conventional warfare.  
They assume that the other party is hostile and that destroying its capacity to 
think leads to friendly success on the battlefield.  By focusing on the friendly 
actions, on damaging the enemy’s cognitive capabilities, or on changing a 
foreign party’s behavior, these first three elements distort cognition and 
communication in ways that make them almost unrecognizable.
Electronic warfare (EW) involves “any military action involving the use of 
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to 
attack the enemy,” and includes electronic protection (EP), electronic warfare support 
(EWS), and electronic attack (EA) (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-7 through 2-8). 
EP consists of actions taken to protect a friendly unit that involve its electromagnetic 
emissions, to include masking or reducing them. EWS detects enemy emissions for 
targeting and exploitation purposes, while EA involves both preventing the enemy 
from using the electromagnetic spectrum, such as by jamming, and using 
electromagnetic energy as a weapon, such as lasers and radio frequency weapons 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 2-7 through 2-8).  All either protect friendly 
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capabilities to use the electromagnetic spectrum or destroy the enemy capability to do 
the same. EW, as a core capability of IO, parallels the structure of the conventional 
battlefield in its implicit division into offensive and defensive capabilities, and in its 
focus on the hardware rather than the human capabilities they support.
Not surprisingly, the next three elements of computer network operations 
(CNO), computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and 
computer network exploitation (CNE), have the same type of focus and structure as 
EW, with  CNO being comprised of CNA, CND, CNE (Department of the Army 
2003b 2-9). CNA consists of those operations designed to “disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers 
and networks themselves,” and, though it can include what is known as kinetic attack, 
i.e., firepower, usually refers to activities like hacking and the spreading of computer 
viruses. CND comprises those measures designed to protect friendly systems against 
similar attacks by the enemy (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-9 through 2-10). 
CNE is “enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from 
target or adversary automated information systems or networks” (Department of the 
Army 2003c, 2-11). While it does target enemy computer systems, unlike the first two 
elements of CNO, it does so in order to enable friendly understanding of the 
battlefield by providing intelligence. Intelligence is information about an enemy that 
enables one to destroy or otherwise harm him. As a result, it too retains the motive 
and structure of the source domain of conventional combat.
The seven core capabilities, then, address mainly the enemy’s physical 
infrastructure, and those that do involve cognition and communication do so within 
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fairly limited means, that is, construing as them as corporate activities whose “input” 
or information will determine a certain “output.” These elements demonstrate how 
heavily the writers of this manual recruit from the source domain of physical combat. 
In contrast, almost the reverse is true of the supporting and related activities; they 
tend to deal less with hardware and systems and more with communication and 
cognition, and, in terms of agents, with noncombatants. The more they address these 
abilities and audiences, the further down they are on the list of their respective 
categories, that is, the less central they are to information operations.
The Supporting Activities 
The six supporting activities are physical destruction, information assurance, 
physical security, counterintelligence, counter deception, and counterpropaganda 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 2-11). Like the core capabilities, the first half of this 
category deals with hardware, while the second half addresses cognition and 
communication. The last three of this group, like the first three core capabilities, 
presuppose hostile intent and thereby again confine thought to the battlefield and 
elide the cooperative aspect of communication.
The first, physical destruction, is recruited almost wholesale from the source 
domain of combat, differing only in that within the domain of IO its targets are 
specifically information systems. Defined as “the application of combat power to 
destroy or degrade adversary forces, sources of information, command and control 
systems, and installations,” it oddly enough has a rhetorical dimension as well; the 
manual tell us that it “can be employed as an additional means to influence 
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decisionmaker or groups, or to target INFOSYS in support of information 
superiority” (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-11). In both the physical and 
psychological domains, then, destruction displaces the enemy.  While it is not a core 
capability, its position as first of the supporting activities and its twin roles of 
physical and psychological coercion both emulates the nature of the core capabilities 
and sets the tone for the activities that follow.
Information assurance, the next supporting activity, is defined as:
information operations that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrityauthentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This 
includes providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 2-12).
By focusing on the integrity and purity of data and the systems that store and transmit 
it, IA enables cognition, but does so by assuring the quality of the “input” to the 
cognitive hierarchy, that is, something that has a public, objective existence apart 
from the subjective experience of cognition itself. It does this not by analyzing the 
information itself, but by safeguarding the hardware that processes it.  Physical 
security is similarly object-based; defined as “physical measures designed to 
safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, 
material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, 
and theft,” like physical destruction it directly parallels its conventional warfare 
counterpart (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-15).
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The next three supporting activities, counterintelligence (CI), counter 
deception, and counterpropaganda, again turn to the adversary, focusing on thwarting
their efforts to understand the battlefield, to interfere with our understanding of it, and 
to conduct PSYOP.  CI is defined as:
information gathered and activities conducted to protect against 
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 
conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, 
foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist 
activities ” (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development J-7). 
CI frames intelligence operations by the enemy as a type of offensive whose 
effects must be blunted. While its target is enemy intelligence operations, 
interestingly, CI does not attack the enemy’s collection systems, as physical 
destruction and CNA do, but gains knowledge and understanding of them. In a 
way, the cognitive abilities of the two sides go head to head within the frame 
of this element.  Pitted against each other in their efforts to gain a fuller 
understanding of the other side’s intentions, this element mirrors the 
competitive nature and binary structure of the conventional battlefield. 
That structure is apparent in the last two of the supporting elements, counter 
deception and counterpropaganda. The first of these, defined as “efforts to negate, 
neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain the advantage from a foreign deception 
operation,” like CI, counteracts the actions of the enemy by gaining a more thorough 
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understanding of the battlefield and all aspects of enemy operations (Department of 
the Army 2003b, 2-17).  
Counterpropaganda, defined as “programs of products and actions designed to 
nullify propaganda or mitigate its effects,” is an interesting deviation from the 
previous elements, in that its target is not the enemy, but the targets of enemy 
propaganda (Department of the Army 2003b, 2-18). It breaks from the structure of the 
conventional battlefield by acknowledging the existence of an audience that is not the 
enemy, but retains it in that it entails competition with the enemy for the “hearts and 
minds” of the people. It most closely evokes the connotations of the metaphor 
Argument is War in its entailment of two sides with agency. Because it focuses on a 
means central to communication and an audience peripheral to conventional warfare, 
it is dead last in the list of supporting activities.
The Related Activities
The last two elements, the related activities of public affairs and civil-military 
operations, seem to be designated as peripheral because they do not have an enemy 
system as a target, or because they do not employ some information system in their 
implementation. Public affairs, “those public information, command information, and 
community relations’ activities directed toward both the external and internal publics 
with interest in the Department of Defense” is not directed towards a particular 
audience, and is not doctrinally directed to influence them in any specific direction 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 2-22). While it is the element of IO that best 
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parallels Clark’s theory of communication, it cannot be a core element of IO because 
it lacks the directive to have a tangible impact on a military target. 
Civil-military operations are defined as: 
the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or 
exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the 
civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in 
order to facilitate military operations (Department of the Army 2003b, 
2-24).
They also cannot be a core element because they do not specifically deal with a 
component of an information system or the cognitive hierarchy. However, its 
inclusion in the elements of IO demonstrates the understanding of the relationship 
between action and persuasion expressed in “physical destruction,” that physical acts 
are forms of communication as well, in that they have rhetorical impact. 
The Relationship Between the Capabilities and Activities of IO
Of the seven core capabilities, then, operations security (OPSEC), 
psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MD), and computer network 
exploitation (CNE), deal with cognitive and communication abilities of both the 
enemy and friendly, while the remaining three, electronic warfare (EW), computer 
network attack (CNA), and computer network defense (CND), protect or attack 
hardware systems. The supporting activities show a similar division, with the first 
three, physical destruction, information assurance and physical security, dealing 
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primarily with hardware and information, and the last three, counterintelligence, 
counterdeception, and counterpropaganda, focusing on cognition and communication. 
The related activities continue this logic by placing public affairs, which is an explicit 
form of communication, before civil-military operations, whose rhetorical impact is 
secondary to its primary mission.
The radial category of the elements of IO encompasses military capabilities 
that address most dimensions of cognition and communication, almost evenly divided 
between focus on hard systems and human capabilities. The more central ones seem 
to have the most destructive effects on the enemy as part of their frame, and only one, 
PSYOP, presupposes any direct, overt interaction with the enemy. The adversarial 
intent of combat is preserved in almost all the elements, but the joint interaction exists 
only in PSYOP and the two related activities of public affairs and civil-military 
operations.  Even in these elements, the notion of cooperative activity is limited, 
portraying communication as conveying information. The joint interaction central to 
the source domain of conventional warfare is therefore placed into lower relief in the 
blend “information operations,” diminishing the agency of the enemy in the frame of 
IO.
The organization of the IO capabilities and activities also conceptually 
parallels that of the original BOS upon which they are modeled. Just as OPSEC, 
PSYOP and deception, ways of interfering with the enemy’s ability to think, head the 
core capabilities, so intelligence, information about how to kill the enemy, heads the 
conventional BOS.  And just as civil military operations and public affairs are 
conceived of as related to but not of IO, so combat service support and command and 
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control, which support and coordinate but do not provide combat power, are the last, 
and least prototypical, of the BOS.
The Frame of the Conventional Warfare and the Information Operations Effects 
While the IO elements are modeled on the battlefield operating systems, the 
IO effects stem from the two major conventional military operations, offense and 
defense.  Although, like the elements, the effects are a blend of the domains of 
“information” and “operations,” they have a significant disjunction with both sources. 
Unlike communication, which is a joint activity, the IO effects focus on unilateral 
activities designed to prevent the other parties from acting.  Unlike warfare, whose 
activities of offense and defense entail one another, the IO offensive and defensive 
effects do not interact in this manner; destroying the enemy’s ability to communicate 
and think does not necessarily enhance the friendly side’s ability to do either.
Neither of the causal linkages central to each of the source domains inheres in 
the relationships between offensive and defensive IO effects.  However each retains 
one aspect of their respective source domains as a motivating factor in the makeup of 
their respective categories, in terms of both the inclusion and organization of their 
members.  The offensive IO effects are motivated by the prototype of causation in 
both the domain of warfare and the physical domain as a whole, that of an object 
striking upon another object and destroying or moving it.  The defensive effects are 
motivated by the event shape of the ideal defense, in which a defending force 
anticipates, recognizes, and then neutralizes an attack, then presses its advantage and 
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conducts a counterattack to regain the initiative. Warfare conceptually permeates both 
of these sides in several different ways.
Offensive Information Operations Effects
Comprised of “destroy,” “disrupt,” “degrade,” “deny,” “deceive,” “exploit,” 
and “influence,” offensive IO effects are defined as “the integrated use of assigned 
and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to 
affect enemy decisionmakers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific 
objectives” (Department of the Army 2003 paragraph 1-61).  They are ordered from 
the activity with the most clearly defined causal frame to that with the most 
ambiguous one. The seven effects form a radial category whose first member and 
causal prototype, “destroy,” is the primary effect of field artillery. The first four 
effects, as well as the sixth, are based on physical or military definitions whose 
polysemy is motivated by the domain of “information.” The objects of these effects 
are primarily the systems that support cognition and communication rather than the 
human agents themselves. Except for the final effect, all of them damage the enemy’s
ability to think or communicate, but only the last, “influence,” exercises the friendly 
ability to do either.  Yet even this last outcome of communication is conceptually 
structured in terms of the causal frame of “destroy.”
According to FM 3-13, offensive IO “facilitates seizing and retaining the 
initiative by creating a disparity between the quality of information available to 
friendly forces and that available to adversaries” (Department of the Army 2003b, 1-
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16). Of its two source domains, the more well-developed in the Army community is 
that of offensive operations.  The purpose of these missions is to:
. . . seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy 
decisively. Army forces attack simultaneously throughout the area of 
operations (AO) to throw enemies off balance, overwhelm their 
capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or 
destruction. (Department of the Army 2001a, 7-2). 
Both IO and conventional offensive actions involve two parties, the adversary 
and the friendly sides. In both, the friendly side conducts some activities that advance 
its own objectives, and others that prevent the adversary from attaining his. As 
discussed previously, in a conventional attack, one of those activities is firepower, a 
key means by which one can “overwhelm their capabilities [and] disrupt their 
defenses” (Department of the Army 2001a, 7-1).  By destroying the integrity of the 
enemy’s operations, the friendly forces create conditions to “seize, retain, and exploit 
the initiative” (Department of the Army 2001a, 7-1). The means by which one defeats 
the enemy are the same method that directly contributes to one’s own success. The 
prototypical way of attaining both in conventional operations is through firepower.
Firepower therefore serves as the model for attaining success in information 
operations because its agent, object, means, activity and effect are apparent.  It 
inherits most of its frame from the more general domain of physical causation 
discussed above.  In terms of military operations, the agent is the firer, the object is 
the target, the means of destruction is the munition, the act is firing, and the endstate 
is destruction. There is no question about the kind of causal mechanism, about how or 
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whether the firer’s actions contributed to the endstate, or whether the endstate has 
been reached.  Because of this certainty, “destroy” serves as the prototype for the six 
other effects, and as such it is the first effect discussed in the manual.
In terms of IO, “destroy” is defined as 
. . . “to damage a combat system so badly that it cannot perform any 
function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely 
rebuilt (FM 3-90). Destruction is most often the use of lethal and 
nonlethal means to physically render adversary information useless or 
INFOSYS ineffective unless reconstituted (Department of the Army 
2003b, 1-16).
The manual referred to in the definition, FM 3-90, is titled Tactics, and the definition 
itself refers to a degree of damage so thorough that the target can no longer function, 
and is also used as a term to describe the desired endstate of the target after a fire 
mission (Department of the Army 1996, 1-2). The IO offensive effect of “destroy” 
has an almost identical frame as the more conventional understanding of “destroy,” 
but has two specific targets, the information itself and the information system that 
conveys it. The only modification from its source frame is that viruses or other 
malicious software, rather than projectiles, are the primary means of destroying 
information. While the means and the target are changed the target’s resulting 
endstate remains.  
The disturbing aspect of this effect is that it retains nothing of the source 
domain of “information” except the most peripheral aspect, the hardware. The agent 
himself does not think or communicate within this frame, and intervenes in the 
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patient’s abilities to do so by making sure he never will again.  One can, of course, 
use the term “destroy” metaphorically to refer to a particularly effective 
counterargument used in a debate, by saying “I completely destroyed his strongest 
point.”  The key difference is that in doing so, one would not walk over to one’s 
opponent and shoot him in the head, or even rip up his reference material.  In IO, not 
only would both the opponent and his sources be gone, as would any possibility of 
ever communicating with him again, but communicating to him would actually 
jeopardize the mission of destroying them.  Communication is therefore eliminated as 
a possibility as a requirement for and result of the action.
The next offensive effect, “disrupt,” has its roots in another kinetic combat 
capability, obstacles built by combat engineers, known as countermobility measures. 
It is defined as “a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and 
indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s formation or tempo, interrupt 
his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal 
fashion” (Department of the Army 2001b, 5-16). In relation to IO, the term means 
“breaking or interrupting the flow of information between selected C2 nodes,” and is 
effected primarily through electronic attack, or jamming (Department of the Army 
2003b, 1-16).
The frame of the core meaning of “disrupt” includes the attacker, the target, 
and the obstacle. The target is an enemy unit comprised of several subelements that 
are moving in coordination with one another towards an objective, and the movement 
itself is planned and timed so that the units are able to converge their combat power 
and conduct a successful attack. For instance, an enemy conducting a two-prong 
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attack should have both the main and supporting efforts reach the objective at the 
same time so that the defender will have to choose where to commit his reserve. If 
obstacles are placed so that the flanking force is slowed down and does not arrive at 
the kill zone at the same time as the direct attack does, the defender can then focus his 
resources on fending off only one attack at a time. This means that any advantage of 
numbers or combat power that the attackers had possessed is negated by their 
inability to coordinate their forces.
The importance of maintaining movement through space and the negative 
impact of its disturbance are key features of electronic attack, and the primary means 
of effecting disruption in IO. In this frame, the agent is the electromagnetic attacker, 
the patient is the target who is the intended recipient of electromagnetic emissions, 
the means of causation is the emanation of competing electromagnetic energy by the 
attacker, and the result is that the target cannot receive the intended emanations by his 
counterpart, and therefore can’t accomplish his plan.  
“Disrupt” in IO has as clear a frame of action as does physical destruction, 
since the actors are easily identified, and the means and result are almost as definite. 
Like “destroy,” the only aspect of “information” that it retains is the hardware, 
entailing nothing of the friendly sides’ ability to think or communicate, and engaging
the enemy’s ability only in terms of the electronic emanations that facilitate them.   
In contrast, the offensive effect “degrade” has a much less clear 
correspondence between the target and source domains, complicated by the fact that 
there are multiple target domains in a single definition. In IO, it is defined as 
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using nonlethal or temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or 
efficiency of adversary command and control systems, and 
information collection efforts or means. Offensive IO can also degrade 
the morale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the 
quality of adversary decisions and actions (Department of the Army 
2003b, 1-16).
“Degrade” in the field artillery realm is to fire at a target until it is reduced in 
effectiveness rather than catastrophically damaged. It uses the same the frame of 
causation as “destroy,” differing mainly in terms of the degree of damage it causes, 
not the type.
Unlike the two previous effects, in which there was only one, primarily 
physical target domain, in “degrade” the target domains are more rampant, and more 
truly metaphoric, than those of “destroy” or “disrupt.” The five targets of “degrade” 
are adversary C2 (command and control) systems, information collection efforts or 
means, the adversary’s value, his morale, and his decisions or actions (Department of 
the Army 2003b, 1-16).
The first two objects of “degrade,” adversary C2 systems and information 
collections efforts or means, involve mainly hardware systems, although information 
collection means can include human spies. Degrading C2 involves jamming or other 
types of electronic warfare, and degrading collection efforts, OPSEC and deception 
measures, and counterintelligence. In each case, information is “transferred” from one 
location to another. C2 systems “move” information from one radio or computer to 
another. In collection efforts, information “moves” from the target of collection to the 
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collector, and into the systems that process them. Even though there are obvious 
differences between human and electronic collectors, the means of degrading them 
can be similar – putting out false or conflicting indicators. 
An interesting metaphoric extension of “degrade” is the notion of “degrading” 
the morale of an enemy. The IO effect conceives of this aspect of human personality 
as an independently existing object that functions physically, and whose functionality 
can be impaired. The recipient of the action is the morale of the target. The agent is 
the attacker, the patient is the emotional dedication of the enemy to his cause, the 
means by which the degradation is effected is psychological operations, and the effect 
is a lessening of commitment. This is a very tight compression, because it elides the 
entire communication process between the attacker and his intended victims, the 
means of physical contact, the receipt of the information and its interpretation by the 
target, his response, and the attacker’s ability to monitor the response. The whole 
coordination process and, most importantly, the cooperative aspect of 
communication, are eliminated in this metaphoric extension. 
“Degrading” the morale of a target is easy to describe in terms of desired 
effects, but more difficult in terms of means and explication of the causal of chain. To 
say one’s morale is degraded is to conceive of the emotional state in terms of physical 
functionality that can be higher or lower. But because the cause and effect mechanism 
of cognition and emotion are less easily determined than physical causation, the 
means and resultant effect are correspondingly difficult to determine. 
This indeterminacy applies also to degrading the quality or effectiveness of a 
decision, and a target’s value. These aspects of a decision, like the value of a target, 
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can apply to so many aspects of a person or organization, from the physical to the 
mental and emotional, that determining how to degrade it rests primarily on what 
feature to focus on. This notion of a decisionmaking ability being a separate, 
independently existing function conforms to the characterization of cognition as 
collective activity carried out by corporate entity, one that does not depend on the 
contribution or agency of any one individual human being for its effective execution.  
The next effect, “deny,” is more straightforward. In common civilian usage, it 
means to state that an accusation is not true.  In its core military sense, to “deny” the 
adversary is to prevent him from using an asset critical to his own success.  While it is 
not defined explicitly, its meaning can be derived from that of “denial measure,” 
defined as “[a]n action to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, or 
facilities. It may include destruction, removal, contamination, or erection of 
obstacles” (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)). One 
can “deny” an enemy the use of a bridgehead by damaging it, setting up obstacles 
covered by fire that prevent him from reaching it, or even using nonpersistent 
chemical agents. “Deny,” in information operations, entails “withholding information 
about Army force capabilities and intentions that adversaries need for effective and 
timely decisionmaking” (Department of the Army 2003b, 1-16). It returns to the 
common civilian definition in that it entails communication, but instead of actively 
refuting an accusation, one prevents the release of any information at all.   In this 
frame the agent and patient are the same as in other offensive effects, but the means 
conceives of information as an object or force that emanates from the military’s own 
activities and forces, and the desired effect is the ignorance of the adversary about 
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friendly activities and resources. OPSEC, one of the core elements of IO discussed 
previously, is a key means of denial.
“Deceive,” the fifth offensive element, like deny, closely resembles its civilian 
origins.  Military deception (MD) “seeks to mislead adversary decisionmakers by 
manipulating their understanding of reality. Successful deception causes them to 
believe what is not true” (Department of the Army 2003b, 1-16). Its frame in terms of 
agent and patient is the same as that of “deny,” but the causal means is emitting false 
indicators rather than quashing of all information. It has no corollary in combat 
operations, since its domain is primarily conceptual in nature. Though it does involve 
some “transfer” of information, it requires that the recipient be unaware that such a 
transfer, let alone distortion, has occurred. This intentional reduction of the agency of 
the recipient makes it a completely unilateral act.
“Exploit,” on the other hand, is a metaphoric extension of the core military 
sense, which involves both offense and defense. In the source domain of combat, the 
attacker is attacking, and his target is the defensive line of his enemy. He wants to 
cause a breach in those defenses, which he does by the traditional kinesthetic means 
of firepower. When the line breaks, the attacker pushes his forces into the opening 
and wreaks havoc in the defender’s rear area. To “exploit,” then, is to break through a 
barrier and move into the area it protects. 
“Exploit” in IO terms, means “to gain access to adversary command and 
control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information,” 
and has clear metaphoric correspondences to its source domain in combat 
(Department of the Army 2003b 1-16). The attacker is still the same agent, but the 
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initial target is the metaphoric barriers the defenders have set up around their 
information, such as firewalls and other security measures, while the two subsequent 
targets are the information system and the perceptions of the enemy. The means is a 
variety of methods of hacking, and the result is twofold. One, the attacker “gains 
entrance” and recons the enemy’s information system. Two, the attacker “plants” bad 
information into that system. The IO sense maintains the elements of a barrier, a 
break in the barrier, and movement into the barrier. In the source domain, the 
movement is carried out by the attackers, and the break in the barrier necessarily 
entails failure of the defense and destruction of the defending forces. The defenders 
are also aware that such a breach has taken place. 
In the target domain, the “ break” in system security exists, but the enemy’s 
information system actually must keep running for the attacker to be able to “recon” 
it, meaning that the element of movement is mapped onto both the access of the 
attacker into the system and the continued functioning of the defended system. It is 
enabled by the defender’s lack of awareness that the system has been breached; once 
he knows it has happened, he can very effectively end the attacker’s exploitation of 
the information system by shutting down or diverting his own operations. The 
attacker harnesses the activity of the defender, rather than breaking his ability to act 
as he must in the kinetic scenario. It therefore has definite causal relationships like 
those of its source domain, though the elements in the causal frame are slightly 
different.
The final offensive IO effect is “influence.” To influence is to: 
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cause adversaries or others to behave in a manner favorable to Army 
forces. It results from applying perception management to affect the 
target’s emotions, motives, and reasoning. Perception management 
also seeks to influence the target’s perceptions, plans, actions, and will 
to oppose friendly forces. Targets may include noncombatants and 
others in the AO whom commanders want to support friendly force 
missions or not resist friendly force activities. Perception management 
achieves the influence effect by conveying or denying selected 
information to targets (Department of the Army 2003b, 1-16).
The more common civilian use of “influence” involves the agent, the patient, the 
usually undetermined means of causality, and the undetermined result.  It focuses 
mainly on the fact that some sort of causation action has taken place rather than 
explicating the means or results.  In terms of the IO offensive effect, the agent is the 
attacker, and he has multiple targets.  Unlike its civilian counterpart, the military term 
specifies the causal mechanism; like “deceive” and “deny,” it is effected by 
controlling the information the target does or does not receive.  By conceiving of 
communication as transferring or sending a physical entity or force, it not only 
conforms to common metaphors of communication, it fulfills the expectations set up 
by the frames of the other offensive IO elements.
Of the seven offensive IO effects, the first two, “destroy,” and “disrupt” 
employ primarily physical means, differing mainly in degree of damage, and have the 
most concrete link between cause and effect. The next one, “degrade,” is far less 
definite in its causal mechanism, though the result, lower functionality, is easier to 
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define at least in its physical sense. The last four effexts deal primarily with 
conceptual abilities and communication. The striking point about these elements is 
the emphasis of the physical over the conceptual and communication domains, which 
conforms to the expectations set up by the definitions of the IO elements.
 That emphasis continues in the organization of the offensive effects. In 
general, they seem to be ordered from the one with the most clearly defined causal 
frame “destroy,” to the one with the least easily discernable causal mechanism and 
most ambiguous resultant state, “influence.” It is plausible that since either the 
beginning or the end of a grouping is a position of emphasis, that “influence” as the 
final element of offensive effects is actually the most important. This is supported by
the fact that “information,” is the last and most important of the five elements of 
combat power. However, the dominance of the physical domain in the IO capabilities 
and activities, followed by the same trend in the defensive IO effects, makes that 
unlikely. 
Defensive Information Operations
Defensive IO is defined as:
the integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, 
personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information 
and information systems. Defensive information operations ensure 
timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying 
adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and 
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information systems for their own purposes (Department of the Army 
2003,1-63).
Defensive IO are primarily concerned with protecting system integrity and 
resisting adversary attack, that is, maintaining the status quo rather that advancing a 
capability. In that sense, it recruits heavily from the source domain of conventional 
warfare. However, conventional defensive operations are focused more on beating the 
enemy to the punch than waiting for an incursion into their domain. Their purpose is 
outlined as follows; 
The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat enemy attacks. 
Defending forces await the attacker’s blow and defeat the attack by 
successfully deflecting it. Waiting for the attack is not a passive 
activity. Army commanders seek out enemy forces to strike and 
weaken them before close combat begins (Department of the Army 
2001 paragraph 8-2). 
Just as in offensive operations, the source domain of defensive operations in 
conventional warfare is far more fully developed than that of communication and 
thought. It is also heavily based on offensive principles, since it is conceived of as 
little more than a interim phase between offensives, defeating enemy attacks rather 
than simply withstanding them. In fact, in an ideal defensive, one conducts 
counterattacks not only to spoil an enemy attack, but, if the enemy is sufficiently 
surprised and weakened, to exploit the opportunity and resume the offensive. It 
consists of several components; preparation of the defense, contact with the enemy, 
massing of effects/counterattack, and reconsolidation of the defense. Like offensive 
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IO and the IO elements, the four defensive IO effects, “protection,” “detection,” 
“restoration,” and “response,” mirror many aspects of its source domain of combat. 
Unlike the other effects and elements, it exclusively addresses hardware and 
completely elides the cognitive abilities of any party on the battlefield.
The first effect is “protection,” defined as: 
all actions taken to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive 
equipment and information. In IO, protection occurs at the digital 
perimeter to control access to or mitigate the effects of adversary 
access to friendly decisionmakers and INFOSYS (Department of the 
Army 2003b 1-17). 
It applies exclusively to the digital systems rather than to indicators of activity. Its 
closest correspondence to conventional defense would be the preparation of the 
defense, since its focus is ensuring that the electronic “terrain” is held securely.  
Activities such as reinforcing overhead protection, digging foxholes deeper, and 
placing observation posts map onto constructing digital firewalls, nesting information 
systems behind multiple security barriers, and installing programs that warn of 
hacking attempts.
The next element is “detection,” “to discover or discern the existence, 
presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems,” and it too occurs at the 
“digital perimeter” of a system (Department of the Army 2003b, 1-17.) While 
collecting information about an attacker is certainly key to any defense, it is not a 
distinct phase, since there is usually little doubt in conventional ops that an attack has 
occurred. This is because human soldiers, unlike hardware, have awareness.  
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However, it is important to detect an attack early enough to respond effectively; 
realizing that the enemy is conducting his initial reconnaissance allows the defender 
much more time to prepare than if he discovered their plans as the enemy artillery 
preparation was striking throughout the depth of his area of operations.
The difficulty of detecting digital “attacks” makes the next phase, 
“restoration,” challenging as well. Restoration is “to bring information systems back 
to their original state. Restoration is reestablishment of essential capabilities of 
INFOSYS damaged by enemy offensive IO” (Department of the Army 2003b, 1-17). 
To do so, the information manager must recognize the extent of damage and 
understand the system’s previous capability, in addition to as recognizing that an 
attack has taken place. “Restoration” has a counterpart in some forms of defense, 
such as the mobile defense, in which an enemy is deliberately permitted to move into 
the defensive lines to put him in a more vulnerable position for a counterattack 
(Department of the Army 2001b, 5-35). However, that penetration is planned for, and 
the defender is careful to position recon assets to ensure that he is aware of the 
enemy’s movements at all times, so that he can reconsolidate his previous position. 
That planned counterattack is the conventional equivalent of “response.” In 
IO, “response” is “to react quickly to an adversary’s information operations attack or 
intrusion. Timely identification of adversaries, their intent and capabilities, is the 
cornerstone of effective response to adversary offensive IO” (Department of the 
Army 2003b, 1-17). Like “attack detection,” in conventional ops it’s not normally a 
separate phase, since either the lines are never meant to be penetrated, or if they are 
meant to be “breached,” as in the mobile defense, the means of defeating the enemy 
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attack entails reconsolidating the position. The counterattack in a mobile defense, and 
the forward movement of the counterattacking force to restore the original front line, 
map onto the efforts of information managers to destroy hostile programs, repair the 
damage, and bring the system back to full operating capacity.
What is striking about IO defensive operations is that they all deal exclusively 
with attacks on hardware systems and not even metaphorically with similar “attacks” 
on the force’s collective ability to think or communicate. This is despite the fact that 
several IO supporting activities, counterintelligence, counterdeception, and 
counterpropaganda, deal with those efforts explicitly.  Defensive IO effects elide any 
cognitive activity by all possible parties in the “information environment.”
Conclusions
Together, these three categories, elements, offensive effects, and defensive 
effects, reflect the heavy recruitment of IO from the concrete, physical domain of 
operations, and motivate a reliance on the systems aspect of “information.” It 
therefore limits the structure available to understand and analyze thought and 
persuasion.  By doing so, the manual clings to the domain with which its authors are 
most familiar, allowing them to dodge the difficulties of addressing these activities.
Further evidence of this evasion emerges in the differences between the final 
draft of this manual, released in September 2000, and the actual published version, 
which came out in April 2003. During the initial and final draft stages, other schools 
and agencies within the Army are invited to review the manual; the final draft 
incorporates any comments the schools make during the initial review.  As is civilian 
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publication, the military tries to keep the review process as short as practically 
possible to ensure the work is still relevant, and therefore, customarily there is little 
difference between the final and published versions, so the time lag between the two 
is correspondingly short.  Two and a half years indicates that at least one agency had 
major issues with the publication.  
I believe that the changes made to the IO offensive and defensive effects in 
the published version reveal those contentions.  While each of the individual effects 
was explained more fully, key changes were made to the frames of several of them.  
In “degrade,” the morale of the enemy was added as an object of the effect, 
broadening its frame into the psychological realm.  The other changes, however, 
reveal a sharp narrowing of the scope of IO, and therefore a more prominent role for 
conventional capabilities.
In the offensive IO effect “disrupt,” the writers dropped the line, “ 
Additionally, disrupting adversary C2 by providing truth and factual information 
about friendly forces and intent.” (Department of the Army 2000, 1-13 to 1-14). This 
sentence presumes that the enemy or adversary would be attempting to discredit 
friendly forces by issuing propaganda about them.  It also entails several potential 
audiences; the adversary’s own forces, local civilian populations, overhearing 
audiences such as those of other countries interested in the outcome of military 
action, and, most troubling, the friendly forces themselves.  By eliminating this line, 
the writers avoid having to explain how persuasion works, and can steer clear of the 
disquieting possibility of American troops succumbing to enemy propaganda.
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They continue to sidestep this issue in the next deletion to this section, with 
the lines  “The primary IO elements used to conduct defensive IO are counter 
deception, counterpropaganda, and information assurance (IA). Counterdeception and 
counterpropaganda aid protecting the decision maker and the friendly forces” 
(Department of the Army 2000, 1-15 through 1-16).  While IA, in dealing with 
information systems, conforms to the expectations set by the defensive IO effects, and 
draws on preexisting conventional capabilities, counterpropaganda and 
counterdeception indicate potential weaknesses in the psyches of the friendly forces 
best left untouched.
In contrast, both discussions on offensive and defensive IO in the published 
version state that their definitions purposely omit part of the joint definition 
(Department of the Army 2003b, 1-16; 1-17).  In relation to offensive IO, the writers 
deleted this statement:
These capabilities and activities include but are not limited to 
operations security, military deception, psychological operations, 
electronic warfare, physical attack and/or destruction, and special 
information operations3, and could also include computer network 
attack (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-
7)).
In relation to defensive IO, the writers deleted this sentence:
Defensive information operations are conducted through information 
assurance, physical security, operations security, counterdeception, 
3 Special information operations, or SIO, require an additional review process, and are not explicitly 
discussed in the manual.
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counter-psychological operations, counterintelligence, electronic 
warfare, , and special information operations (Director for Operational 
Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)).
The purported reason for the omission is that the Army does not want to limit how the 
different elements are used. Another possibility is that these sentences undermine 
conventional warfare as the primary conceptual source for this new and very 
fashionable discipline.
For instance, in the joint definitions, both defensive and offensive IO include 
electronic warfare and operations security. If these elements can be used both 
offensively and defensively, this overlap blurs the boundary between the two types of 
effects, and forces the reader to reconsider the relationship of warfare to 
“information.”  Also, since electronic warfare involves mainly jamming systems, and 
operations security means denying information, it opens the question of how physical 
actions impact cognitive activity.
Looking closely at the domains of communication, persuasion, and cognition 
leads one to reconsider the relationship between the frames of warfare and 
“information” as it is laid out in this manual. A PSYOP message intended to 
counteract false claims by hostile forces can be either defensive, in that it may 
prevent the local population from retaliating against the friendly forces, or offensive, 
in that it can undermine the credibility of the false messages.  A hostile force, despite 
the falsity of its claims and its lack of combat power, can dominate the “information 
environment” and weaken the U.S. position without firing a shot.  Claiming that all 
IO capabilities and activities can be used in both ways could be interpreted as 
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removing unnecessary constraints on their use.  But it also allows the writers to avoid 
confronting the nature of thought and communication, leaving soldiers on the ground 
with inadequate and sometimes dangerous tools to deal with the hazards of the 
“information environment.”  At a time when U.S. forces are losing the “information 
war” around the world, such evasion is not only irresponsible, it can be deadly.  
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Chapter 4: PSYOP and The Four Step Targeting Process
Introduction
While Lakoff and Johnson examine the metaphor Argument Is War because it 
illustrates their theory well, they do take issue with it.  As they explain the mappings 
between the target and source domains, the authors also consider alternative 
metaphors for argument.  Conceiving of argument as a dance, for instance, would 
highlight its cooperative nature and imbue it with the grace of the target domain.  
Conceiving of it as a journey would underscore its character as a process of 
exploration (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 90-91).  Conceiving of it in terms of warfare, 
however, depicts it as an inherently hostile activity in which one party wins at the 
expense of the other, and also instills it with the deadly violence and destruction of its 
source domain.  Lakoff and Johnson would therefore be surprised to find out that 
there is actually a worse metaphor, one currently used to train soldiers whose military 
occupational specialty is persuasion.
One of the most difficult struggles that the writers of Army Psychological 
Operations, or PSYOP, doctrine face is explaining their discipline to the Army at 
large.  Because communicating with and persuading other audiences is a cognitive 
rather than a physical process, and because it is difficult to quantify its effects, 
conventional forces have often ignored or disparaged its contributions.  Although 
their field has risen in prominence due to the emergence of Information Operations, 
PSYOPers find that they must persuade members of their own team before they can 
even begin to address other audiences.
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To achieve this, they have incorporated a key planning formula of 
conventional operations into their own capstone manual.  The four-step targeting 
process, a heuristic used to select, prioritize, engage, and assess targets for kinetic 
destruction, is the subject of its own manual, FM 6-20-10, produced by the Army 
Field Artillery School at Ft. Sill Oklahoma (Department of the Army 1996, 2-1).  By 
mapping the source domain of field artillery onto the target domain of communication 
and persuasion, the PSYOP writers conceive of persuading an audience as firing a 
weapon at a target. When taken to the logical development of its source domain, the 
conceptual metaphor Persuading An Audience Is Firing A Weapon At A Target 
culminates with the death of the audience.
 On the face of it, this metaphor is so absurd that it seems hardly plausible that 
it be taken seriously, let alone be incorporated into doctrine.  However, it has its roots 
in very productive metaphors that have been extensively studied by many cognitive 
linguists.  When one compares Persuading An Audience Is Firing A Weapon At A 
Target (Persuading Is Firing) to the metaphors Argument Is War, Communication Is 
Sending, and Thinking is Moving, and analyzes the source domain of persuasion 
itself, the conceptual motivations behind the PSYOP metaphor become clearer.  
Unfortunately, the entailments and connotations of its source domain so thoroughly 
shape and permeate the target domain that it cripples the further development of 
PSYOP in military thought.
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Argument Is War
This metaphor, so pervasive in our language and foundational to our current 
understanding of rhetoric, has as its target domain a form of communication, 
argument. Like Persuasion Is Firing, Argument Is War highlights the conflict between 
the two parties. In an argument, two people who hold differing positions on a given 
issue try to persuade one another that the position each holds is more viable and the 
one their fellow arguer holds is erroneous.  Each arguer has evidence to support his 
view, and has followed a path of reasoning to reach his or her conclusion.  Each 
instance of communication centers on an attempt to state his or her own position, 
support or prove that position, or to disprove the other person’s.
Because argument is a form of communication, however, the parties often 
have far more commonalities than not.  First, they have obviously both agreed that the 
topic over which they are contending is important enough to risk conflict over.  
Secondly, they both agree to participate in the process.  And thirdly, though they have 
differing viewpoints, they both believe that they share enough of a common 
understanding of their language that they can comprehend one another’s meanings.  
These foundational commonalities are often overlooked because we focus on the 
differences that spark the argument rather than the commonalities that make it 
possible.
These differences are also the focus of conventional warfare, which is what 
makes it a productive source domain for metaphors of argument.  Like 
communication, it requires two parties, and oddly enough, it is also a cooperative 
endeavor in the sense that both parties must be fighting one another for combat to 
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take place; should one refuse to fight, the resultant surrender or retreat effectively 
ends the battle.  During the battle, the offense moves and fires at the defense.  The 
objective of the attackers is to take ground, and the defenders, to hold ground.  While 
it is not absolutely necessary for the attackers to kill the defending forces in order to 
take terrain, it usually is, so that forward movement entails this destruction.  Even 
when the defenders give up of their own will, they are physically displaced.  The 
terrain over which the two forces are fighting is often conceived of as being 
necessarily occupied by one party or another, even though it could be occupied by 
neither.  It is therefore a contrary posing as a contradictory, whose false contradictory 
status rests on our preference for oppositional pairs (Turner 1991, 73-74). Some, like 
Lakoff and Johnson, might be discouraged by the productivity of this metaphor, 
because it seems to indicate that we are predisposed to viewing an activity as 
fundamentally human as communication and discussion as a form of combat.  
However, its productivity is not necessarily a result of its hostile connotation, but of 
the basic metaphors that compose it.  Battle and its constituent subframes combine 
aspects of argument as both a process and a product.  Attacking, demolishing, and 
shooting are all metaphors that describe one particular act in the process of argument, 
namely, the discrediting of the claims of one rhetor by the other.  They are also ways 
of transferring kinesthetic energy to an object, in a manner similar to, but more 
violently than, such actions as “push,” “kick,” or “move,” and with the added element 
of destruction. 
The metaphor Argument Is War also draws on several metaphors of mind and 
cognition, including The Mind is a Body (“She’s been training hard for this debate”), 
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Thought Is Object Manipulation (“Uh-oh, they’re pulling out the big guns of Marxist 
thought”) and Thought Is Movement (“He retreated and agreed to a plea bargain 
when he saw the evidence”).  Its correspondence with these already established 
metaphors for conceptual activity helps account for its productivity in the domain of 
argument.  However, as intricate as human thought itself is, argument is an even 
richer and more complex domain.  Because it involves the interactions of two thinkers 
and their efforts to communicate, as well as the subject matter they discuss, it offers a 
wider array of potential mappings between it and the source domain of war.
As an example, in argument, “thought” can correspond to both the subject 
matter of the debate, and the intellectual “position” of the opponent. The physical 
movement towards the objective in the source domain of war can therefore map onto 
two different elements of the target domain of argument, the intellectual “ground” of 
the debate’s topic, which the arguer wants to possess, and the will of the opponent.  
One can “gain ground” by demonstrating wider knowledge of the topic, which often 
corresponds to one’s ability to make one’s opponent “change his position.”  These 
and other multiple mappings also make Argument Is War so productive. 
Its appeal seems to lie not only in the productivity with which it can be 
mapped onto the target space, but the manner in which its inherent violence seems a 
fitting metaphor for the passion with which people argue. Strong emotions such as 
anger and love are often expressed in terms of heat, as Lakoff has already 
demonstrated (1987, 380-415). A powerful buildup of heat often results in a violent 
explosion, and since arguments over important topics evoke vigorous emotional 
responses both in relation to the topic itself and the desire to be right, the destruction 
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of warfare seems a fitting expression of that passion and the heat of the disagreement 
it sparks.
Speech Acts And The Target Domain of Communication 
The hostility of the source domain of warfare obscures the cooperation 
necessary for argument to take place. Another cooperative aspect it conceals is the 
successful achievement of the individual joint acts, or speech acts, that comprise an 
argument.  These speech acts have both a physical and a conceptual dimension.  
While the physical dimension is the most noticeable, it is only a necessary, not 
sufficient component of speech acts. A close examination of the nature of speech acts 
typical to arguments reveals another critical difference between the target domain of 
argument and source domain of war.  
While a common way of distinguishing argument from other forms of 
conversation is through the anger and hostility often associated with it, that feature is 
really an accidental, not a necessary, characteristic. What distinguishes argument 
from other types of discourse is the goal each participant has in entering into the 
conversation, to persuade the other person to change his view on a given topic, as 
well as the speech acts each utilizes. Searle lays out his theory in his book Speech 
Acts, in which he describes the elements of a speech act and their contributions to its 
effect. Some characteristic speech acts of argument are “argue,” “persuade” and 
“convince.”  
Speech acts are unique among human activity in that people actually consider 
something that someone says as an action whose existence and effects are as real and 
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valid as any physical activity (Searle 22). A speech act includes both the utterance, 
such as “Sam smokes habitually,” and what the speaker intends to do with the 
utterance, that is, what impact he wishes to effect (Searle 22-23).  In this case, the 
utterance could be a statement, or, with differing emphases or tones, a lament or an 
order.
Searle’s examination of the speech act describes the frame mainly from the 
speaker’s perspective. In his work, he examines what makes a given utterance a 
speech act as opposed to merely a statement. Central to his theory is the distinction 
between the illocutionary act, that is, the kind of act that the speaker is performing, 
and the perlocutionary that, is, the impact that the act actually has on the hearer 
(Searle 23, 25).  The parts of the speech act are the utterance, its propositional 
content, the preparatory conditions for the illocutionary act, the element of sincerity 
on the part of the speaker, and the essential elements that define the act (Searle 66).
While speech acts are usually described primarily from the perspective of the 
speaker, the speech act must be understood and accepted on those same terms by the 
hearer in order to be complete.   Let us take the speech act of a sarcastic insult, in 
which the speaker S responds to the suggestion that he buy his teenage children a new 
car to share, the utterance U, “Great idea, how about I buy one for each of you?”  If 
the hearers take the meaning of utterance U as congruent with its conventional 
association, then the mock hasn’t happened, that is, it has failed as a perlocutionary 
act.  The hearer must also not only understand the fact that he has been insulted, but 
actually feel insulted for the act to be truly complete, and must also accept the 
speaker’s ability to insult him.  While even a three year old might be capable of 
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attempting an insult, almost any adult who might be the target would probably not be 
truly insulted, taking the act rather as evidence of the fact that the child needs a nap. 
This represents a key difference between speech acts and physical acts.  A 
person can carry out a physical act without the consent, participation, or knowledge 
of any other human being.  A physical act, such as building a house, also leaves 
physical evidence independent of the memory of the builder.  The tangibility of the 
results, the indisputability of its occurrence, and the absolute agency of the builder 
make this type of act appealing as a model for speech acts.  The power and magnitude 
of combat, its risks, and the prizes of victory make warfare an especially compelling 
source domain not only for argument, but many other domains of human endeavor, 
such as sports competition (“They battled it out for the title”) or problem solving 
(“They declared a war on poverty”). While a speech act can initiate actions that have 
a tangible effect, as when a speaker requests that the hearer close a door, their 
immediate impact is mainly conceptual.
Because a speech act depends for its success on participation by and impact 
on the hearer, how a speech act is classified is at least partly dependent on how she 
reacts to the speaker’s utterance.  A successful argument, in the sense that both its 
participants understand it as an argument, includes the speech acts “argue,”  
“convince” and “persuade.”  A close examination of these speech acts reveals not 
only that they have an impact on the hearer, but also how the hearer must participate 
in each act in order for it to be complete.
When a speaker argues, he states the utterance U, “Ms. X is the best candidate 
for senator.”  It has the propositional content P, concerning a judgment about a given 
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situation. As preparatory conditions for the utterance, the speaker S has evidence for 
truth of P, and wants H to believe P.  Also, it must not be obvious to either S or H that 
H believes P.  Its condition of sincerity is that S believes P to be true, and an essential 
component of this speech act is that it count as an attempt by S to get H to believe P.  
While these are the components that define an argument, they do not determine the 
quality of an argument, and that factor depends on whether the hearer H believes 
concedes that the argument is good or valid.  
 In order to be complete, “argue” requires only that the hearer H acknowledge 
that the speaker attempted to carry out the speech act.  “Convince” and “persuade,” 
however, also require that the hearer conduct a conceptual act of his own for their 
successful completion. “Convince” entails that the hearer firmly believes what the 
speaker is saying.  Taking the same utterance U and the same propositional content P, 
this act has the preparatory conditions that S wants H to believe P, and that S has 
evidence for worthiness of P.  Also, it must not be evident that H will believe P of his 
own volition, and its condition of sincerity is that S believes P and wants H to believe 
P. It is essential that the act count as an attempt by S to get H to believe P.  However, 
no matter how often S states the utterance U, “Ms. X is the best candidate for 
senator,” that act is not complete until the hearer H agrees with it.  The act requires 
H’s agreement, a conceptual act of will, for its success.
“Persuade” is another central speech act of argument, with the propositional 
content P involving the future act A of H.  This act could be stated in an utterance U 
such as “You should vote for Ms. X for Senator.”  Preparatory conditions for this act 
are that S wants H to do A, and H does not want to do A.  Also, it must not be 
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obvious to either S or H that H will do A of his own volition.  The conditions of 
sincerity involve both participants, in that S must sincerely desire H to do A, and H 
must sincerely not want to do A.  It is essential that as a result of S’s attempt to 
persuade H that H performs act A as a direct result of the speech act by S. As for 
“convince,” the success of the speech act “persuade” depends on an act of volition on 
the part of P, that is, he must perform the act that S attempts to persuade him to.
Unlike “assert,” the speech acts “argue,” “persuade” and “convince” have as 
necessary conditions the resistance of H to the truth of the proposition, not just his 
ignorance of the proposition itself.  All three must be recognized by H as attempts by 
S to change his mind on the topic.  However, “persuade” and “convince” have a 
further feature that distinguishes them from “argue.”   In order for “convince” to be 
complete, H must change his own inclination to disbelieve P, not just acknowledge 
S’s attempt to persuade him as sincere, and must do so as a direct result of S’s 
statement. The act of “persuade” entails not just a cognitive act, an act of will, but an 
additional act on the part of H. H must both agree to perform an act and then actually 
carry it out.   Whether it be inclination, belief, or action, the speech acts central to 
argument depend on an act of will on the part of the hearer to be counted as a success.
This will is critical even in terms of defeating the enemy in the domain of 
warfare. FM 100-5, Operations, the previous edition of FM 3.0, defines “will” as “the 
disposition to act toward achievement of a desired end state” (Department of the 
Army 1993, 6-7).  “War,” it tells us, “ is a contest of wills.  Combat power is the 
product of military forces and their will to fight…Ultimately, the focus of all combat 
operations must be the enemy’s will.  Break his will and he is defeated” (Department 
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of the Army 1993, 6-7).  As history has shown in numerous instances of 
unconventional warfare, from Vietnam to Iraq, superior firepower on the part of 
American forces cannot overwhelm poorly equipped forces with strong resolve. 
Although physical violence and action are what make war a rich target domain for 
many activities, a surprising correspondence between the two domains is the 
importance of a psychological element.  It comes as no surprise that the will of the 
hearer is necessary for success in domain of argument and persuasion; it’s less 
apparent that changing it is a necessary, and even sufficient condition for success in 
the target domain of warfare.
The Conduit Metaphor
The complex mappings possible between the domains of argument and war 
are not the only motivation behind the continued use of the metaphor Persuading Is 
Firing.  Another metaphor with which it shares many correspondences is The Conduit 
Metaphor.  Joe Grady’s analysis of it demonstrates that this metaphor, long 
considered a single concept, is actually a compound comprised of several basic 
metaphors.  Each of these constituent metaphors is productive for a number of target 
domains, not just communication.  Each also expresses important understandings 
thinkers have about key elements of the communication process.  The fact that they 
have been understood as comprising a single, larger complex metaphor is a product of 
the target, not the source domain.  However, the unity that thinkers map backwards 
from the source to the target domain itself expresses a key understanding we have 
about communication, that despite its complexity and the numerous activities that we 
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carry on both simultaneously and in sequence, we carry them out effortlessly, 
experiencing them as a single, seamless endeavor, oblivious to the endless 
coordination and thought processes that make it possible. 
The Conduit Metaphor, first presented by Michael Reddy in 1979, is 
discussed by Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live By to demonstrate the 
manner in which one domain can highlight or hide aspects of another (Grady 205).  
Reddy bases his analysis on comments he collected made by professors on students’ 
papers, using examples such as the following:
It is very difficult to put his concept into words.
Harry always fills his paragraphs with meaning.
His words carry little in the way of recognizable meaning.
The passage conveys a feeling of excitement.
John says he cannot find your idea anywhere in the passages.
I have to struggle to get any meaning at all out of the sentence.  
You know very well I gave you that idea.
Your feelings are finally getting through to me.
The man’s thought is buried in these terribly dense and difficult passages 
(Grady 206-207).
In Reddy’s analysis, these and other examples illustrate that thinkers believe 
language is a conduit, through which speakers can transfer what Reddy calls 
repertoire members to one another (Grady 206).  When they communicate, writers 
and speakers “place” their repertoire members, or RMs, into the medium or signal, 
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enabling the reader or listener to find them and place them in their own minds (Grady 
206).  
Lakoff and Johnson break Reddy’s analysis into the following mappings, 
finding the following systematic correspondences between the domains of 
communicating and transferring of objects:
Ideas Or Meanings Are Objects.
Linguistic Expressions Are Containers.
Communication Is Sending (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 10).
Grady, however, has pointed out that there are several problems with this 
account of Reddy’s examples.  One is that the idea of “sending” something as a way 
of conceiving of communication has little basis in experience (Grady 208). While 
people do send packages and letters through the mail, the postal system is not central 
to most people’s experience of communicating with one another (Grady 208).  Also, 
if the postal system were the primary source domain, then it should be far more 
productive than it is; significant aspects of that frame simply can’t be mapped onto 
the target domain; no one speaks of “opening” an essay, “sealing” ideas in a poem, or 
using express delivery, postal workers or envelopes in metaphors of communication 
(Grady 209).  Finally, Grady notes that Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis does not 
account for other ways in which similar metaphors are used (Grady 209-210).  
Information or ideas can be “contained” in music (Bach packs many ideas/moods, 
etc., into a piece of music), or physical indicators (My doctor couldn’t get a lot of 
information out of the x-rays; the crime scene contains very little evidence) (Grady 
209).  
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Grady, based on his early work on primary or primitive metaphors with Sarah 
Taub and Pamela Morgan, proposes that Reddy’s example is composed of at least 
five separate, more basic metaphors (Grady 210-216).  Each of them accounts for 
some of the examples that Reddy and Lakoff and Johnson use, and each is 
independently motivated (Grady 210).  They are Constituents Are Contents, 
Achieving A Purpose Is Acquiring A Desired Object, Information Is Contents, 
Transmission Of Energy Is Transfer, and RMs Are Possessions/Learning Is Acquiring 
(Grady 209-216).  Although these metaphors have many correspondences with one 
another, when applied to communication, each highlights important aspects of our 
experience of the process.
All the metaphors share correspondences with Thinking Is Physical 
Functioning, especially its major submetaphor, Thinking Is Object Manipulation.   
These five constituent metaphors all depict the speakers and listeners as inserting, 
extracting, or struggling with RMs, highlighting the agency and activity of the 
participants in the communication process (Grady 209-216).  As a group, they make a 
fairly complete portrayal of communication process as a whole.
In Constituents Are Contents, the utterance or other form of communication 
maps onto a physical container, while the RMs map onto its contents (Grady 211).  
The metaphor is used in such expressions as “His website does not have a lot of 
content,” or, “Emily Dickinson can pack a lot of meaning into a single line.”  It 
highlights critical aspects of the speaker’s agency, representing the enormous 
conceptual work speakers do when they express an idea, revise a piece of writing, or 
shape a sentence.  
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An entailment of this metaphor is that if a writer “puts” a lot into a work, a 
reader will “get” a lot out of it. This corresponds to the metaphors, Achieving A 
Purpose Is Acquiring A Desired Object, and RMs Are Possessions/Learning Is 
Acquiring RMs, which highlight the work the listener must do in the communication 
process (Grady 212-213). They are the basis of such expressions as “I had to struggle 
to get meaning out of his paragraphs,” and “I got the gist of what she was saying.”  
These representations of communication emphasize the fact that the author has 
something of value to say, that the reader wants to hear it and learn it, and that he 
benefits from having done so. Together, they highlight both the reader’s involvement 
in the process, and his motivation for that involvement.
Information Is Contents, while related to Constituents Are Contents, enables 
yet another metaphor, Becoming Accessible Is Emerging (Grady 213).  While the 
Constituent metaphor emphasizes the fact that we believe meaning is compositional, 
Information Is Contents emphasizes the fact that, in complex expressions, the 
meaning may not be readily apparent.  Because the container that holds them hides 
contents, those contents must often be removed before they can be fully perceived.  
This entailment motivates Becoming Accessible Is Emerging, which is the basis of 
such expressions as “Her ideas aren’t unearthed in just one reading,” or “Modern 
students must scrape away layers of obsolete vocabulary before Shakespeare’s genius 
becomes apparent to them” (Grady 214). It also emphasizes the fact that 
communication is not automatic, and that the parties must coordinate extensively on 
many levels for it to be successful.
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Transmission Of Energy Is Transfer underlines the most important 
characteristic of communication, its cooperative nature (Grady 215).  This metaphor 
motivates such expressions as, “We have to be careful how we word this, since we 
want to send a positive message,” and “His enthusiasm just radiates off the page and 
inspires me to follow his example.”  Because transfer between people entails both a 
sender and a recipient, and because both sending and receiving entails an act of will, 
transferring information entails the agency of all participants and the causal 
connection between their activities. 
This final metaphor also reveals yet another motivation behind Persuading Is 
Firing.  The domain of transfer involves two physical entities, a third entity that 
passes between them, and the force necessary to effect the transfer, as when a child 
throws a rock at a target.  The important difference between this scene and that of 
persuading or convincing someone is that the impact of the rock on the target and the 
damage it effects happen as a direct result of the thrower’s will, but completely 
independently of the target’s will.  If the target is inanimate, it has no will.  If it were 
human, he would desire not to be hit by it; it would happen despite his own desire.  
Persuading and convincing require an involvement by the “target” that the scene of 
physical transfer does not.
However, that will is apparent in other parts of the Communication Is Sending 
metaphor.  Collectively, these five metaphors portray many aspects of the 
communication process as both Searle and Clark explain it.  They also highlight the 




The two factors of will and cooperativeness that characterize warfare and 
communication, and the agency on the part of all participants that they entail, are 
precisely what is missing from the source domain of Persuasion is Targeting.  
Firepower is a critical subcomponent of the domain of warfare, and the sheer 
destructive capability it contributes is what distinguishes warfare from other forms of 
human conflict, employing firepower is not merely warfare on a smaller scale.  The 
scene of firing a weapon entails relationships between the elements of its frame that 
differ markedly from warfare itself, ones that necessarily exclude will and joint 
activity between the two parties.
There are some metaphors for communication that do recruit from the source 
domain of firing a weapon, including the aforementioned “big guns” example.  Others 
are
She took aim at his weakest evidence.
He fired a parting shot.
He hit the bull’s eye with that last comment.  
These, however, are limited uses of the source domain of firing that highlight 
very specific aspects of an argument, examples more along the line of, Argument Is 
An Artillery Battle, or perhaps, Argument Is A Gunfight.  In these examples, both 
parties are “taking aim” and “firing” at one another, and any “injuries” their cases 
sustain seem to be the results of their own ineptitude.   In other words, both sides 
have agency in the frame of this particular source domain.  The first refers to 
important evidence, the second to a final comment intended to be a stinging shot, and 
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the last denotes a particularly astute argument, in the limited sense of a specific claim 
supported reason, or assertion.  Their small scope means that other elements within 
the larger frame of firepower and the relationship between them are not as easily 
recruited, which means that these entailments don’t interfere with the effectiveness of 
the metaphor.
Extended metaphors present more opportunity to observe the disparities 
between the target and source domains because they recruit from larger areas of those 
domains.   With skill the different aspects can be woven together so that the 
highlighted elements of the target domain are seamlessly blended in through the 
relations in the source domain. Without skill, the gaps turn into chasms, making one 
more aware of the disparities between the target and source domains than their 
similarities.
These gaps appear in the doctrinal definitions for both “target” and “targeting” 
in the source domain of firepower, and in the definitions of these same terms in the 
target domain of PSYOP.  The writers of PSYOP doctrine attempt to make numerous 
complex mappings between these two domains, and their efforts are at least partly 
explained by the many metaphors of mind, thought, and communication whose 
source domains come from the physical world.  Their expert theory of war far 
outweighs their inexpert knowledge of communication and persuasion, resulting in 
mappings whose impoverishment can only be explained by this imbalance.
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PSYOP and Its Integration into Military Planning 
The metaphor used in Army PSYOP doctrine, Persuading Is Firing, is 
expressed in the explicit comparison of the target domain of PSYOP to the source 
domain of targeting in FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, which states, “Just as 
in indirect fire planning, PSYOP must be truly integrated into the targeting process 
and its functions of decide, detect, deliver, and assess” (Department of the Army 
2000, 7-32). The PSYOP mission is unique in the Army, differing markedly from the 
more conventional BOS discussed earlier, and there are comparatively few PSYOP 
units in the active duty force.  As a result, until recently most conventional units have 
had little opportunity to work with them and understand the contributions they can 
make.  
Using a metaphor with a source domain firmly grounded in conventional 
Army culture, then, gives the PSYOP community the opportunity to explain its 
mission, assets, and employment to the Army as a whole.  In the limited connotations 
prompted by the cited passage, such a comparison could be instructive.  The four-step 
targeting process is the result of centuries of collective experience planning battles 
and the effective integration of fires into the maneuver portion of an operation.  
Because assets on the modern battlefield can move very quickly, their movements 
must be closely coordinated both to ensure their efficient employment and prevent 
possible fratricide. The level of detail and shared awareness entailed in the targeting 
process would provide an appropriate platform for PSYOP soldiers to explain the 
nuances of their discipline and promote the contributions their craft can make to an 
operation.
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Unfortunately, the comparison does not end here.  Further into the document, 
the authors advise the reader that PSYOP soldiers must adopt the heuristic of the 
four-step targeting process to ensure that their assets and capabilities are fully 
integrated into the the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP):
FM 101-5 states that ‘targeting is closely related to the MDMP,’ but 
where and how they are integrated or related is not always clear. 
PSYOP targeting must help the battle staff to integrate the targeting 
functions into the existing MDMP and must reflect the results of the 
targeting process. The requirements of the PSYOP targeting process at 
the unified or JTF level and below must be achieved within the 
MDMP and must be achieved without separate processes or 
additional sets of phases (or steps) (Department of the Army 2000, 7-
32; italics mine).
Because PSYOP’s integration into the military planning process is limited to 
only those aspects that most clearly map from the source domain of indirect 
fire planning, the resulting extended metaphor in the continuation of the 
passage, which details how to use the four-step targeting process as a heuristic 
for PSYOP planning, cannot consider two necessary elements of the frame of 
a successful argument, the audience’s agency and their will.
The Source Domain of the Targeting Process
The targeting process is motivated by certain ongoing conditions of modern 
warfare; the increasing number of enemy targets available on the battlefield, and the 
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limited number of assets available to engage them.  These conditions are exacerbated 
by the facts that collection assets needed to locate them are comparatively scarce, and 
that any asset that engages a target risks revealing its own position and becoming a 
potential target itself.  The four-step targeting process is a method of efficiently 
selecting targets on the battlefield and matching them with both the available indirect 
fire assets and collection systems needed to ensure they are accurately detected, 
decisively engaged, and appropriately damaged at a time and place that best serves 
the needs of the friendly mission. It is a highly specialized method that, while it 
entails some common understandings of the use of artillery and draws from normal 
decisions that people must make as they prioritize needs, is not found outside the 
military.
The immense number of possible targets on a battlefield is confirmed by the 
definition of a “target” used by both joint and Army forces.  According to Joint 
Publication, 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, a target is 
a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or 
destruction by military forces. Targets also include the wide array of 
mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions 
that an enemy commander can use to conduct operations.
One of the first things that a targeting cell must do is narrow the range of possible 
targets for consideration in the planning process.  In the Army, the first consideration 
is what the enemy needs, which is the basis for the definition of high value targets, or 
HVTs, defined as 
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a target the enemy commander requires for the successful complete of 
the mission.  The loss of high-value targets would be expected to 
seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friend 
commander’s area of interest” (Director for Operational Plans and 
Joint Force Development (J-7)).
While this definition eliminates many potential targets, those remaining must 
still be rated according to how much their destruction will aid the efforts of 
the friendly side. So, for instance, while both the enemy’s field artillery units 
and his reserve force may be necessary to his success, the friendly side may 
not be able to engage them both effectively at the same time. A high priority 
target is therefore defined as
a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to 
the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets 
are those high-value targets, identified through wargaming, that 
must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of 
the friendly commander’s mission (Director for Operational 
Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)).
In having to choose between the two targets discussed above, then, the targeting cell 
would probably put the artillery group higher on the  high priority target list, or 
HPTL, because its firepower would be necessary to create the breach in friendly lines 
that the enemy reserve would exploit.  
These, however, are just the first of many decisions a military staff must 
make.  Not only are the assets available to locate and engage targets limited, they also 
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have a set range of capabilities, and, depending on what unit they belong to (organic 
or requested from higher) and the kind of down time they need for maintenance to 
function properly, may not be available at the time needed.  The procedures for 
aligning needs to resources are know collectively as the targeting process:
the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response 
to them on the basis of operational requirements and capabilities. The 
emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources (targets) the enemy 
can least afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage, 
then further identifying the subset of those targets which must be 
acquired and attacked to achieve friendly success (Department of the 
Army 1996, 1-1).
The targeting process consists of four steps:  decide, detect, deliver, and 
assess.  They are defined as follows.
DECIDE - The decide function, as the first step in the targeting 
process, provides the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence 
collection and attack planning. Targeting priorities must be addressed 
for each phase or critical event of an operation (Department of the 
Army 1996, 2-1).
DETECT - Detect is the next critical function in the targeting process.  
The G2 or S2 (the intelligence officer, who is responsible for 
determining the possible enemy courses of action and also controls the 
collection assets dedicated to finding him) is the main figure in 
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directing the effort to detect HPTs identified in the decide function. To 
identify the specific who, what, when, and how for target acquisition, 
the G2 or S2 must work closely with all of the following (Department 
of the Army 1996, 2-10).
DELIVER - The deliver function of the targeting process executes the 
target attack guidance and supports the commander’s battle plan once 
the HPTs have been located and identified.(Department of the Army 
1996, 2-12).
ASSESS  - Combat assessment (CA) is the determination of the 
effectiveness of force employment during military operations. CA is 
composed of three elements: BDA. Munitions effects assessment 
(MEA). Reattack recommendation. (Department of the Army 1996, 2-
14)
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Fig 4.1  The Four-Step Targeting Cycle (Department of the Army 1996, 1-5)
This process works best in traditional warfare with two opposing armies that 
are state-supported and have established organizations, identifiable equipment, and 
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published doctrine and tactics; that is, a situation in which there is a certain amount of 
predictability in terms of what is on the battlefield, where it is going to be, and what it 
is going to be doing.  To prepare for the targeting process, the intelligence soldiers of 
a unit make a situational template of the enemy’s forces (Department of the Army 
2004, Glossary-15).  That is, they take a sketch of what an enemy force’s assets are 
and how they are arrayed on the battlefield according to doctrine, superimpose the 
drawing on a map of the actual terrain, and, adjusting for terrain considerations, 
determine where the enemy’s forces are most likely to be at what time.  For instance, 
let us say that in a given scenario the enemy’s main effort in a defense will be to the 
east.  Doctrinally, the field artillery unit that supports it should be located directly 
behind that main effort, so that it will be able to range out as far forward as possible 
in front of those troops.  If, however, the terrain in that area is too hilly for artillery 
forces to lay their guns out level, that fire support unit may be located behind the 
supporting effort instead. 
The first function of targeting, “decide,” is based on this templating; it 
presupposes a great deal of fairly detailed knowledge about the enemy organization, 
equipment, and functions, as well as a similar level of information about the terrain. 
In this step, targets are determined, then prioritized based on both their usefulness to 
the enemy and the ability of the friendly side to impact them, that is, according to the 
criteria of both HVTs and HPTs.
The targets themselves are mainly physical in nature and have discrete spatial 
boundaries and identifying characteristics.  They also have a clear role within the 
organization they support, as well as apparent causal relationships between this role 
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and how they contribute to the unit’s mission; ordnance, for instance, provides both 
ammunition handling and mechanical repair capabilities, while armor and 
mechanized infantry units provide maneuver.  Every military unit has what is termed 
a center of gravity, or COG, an asset that is key to its combat power and without 
which that power will be lost (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development (J-7)).  In most Soviet-style formations, this is usually the artillery, 
since Soviet doctrine emphasizes its use through all phases of combat.  In an air 
defense artillery unit that targets enemy aircraft from a distance, that COG is the 
target acquisition radar, which acquire aircraft at a distance sufficient to allow the 
weapons system to engage them effectively, somewhere between the weapon’s 
maximum effective range and the distance at which they pose a threat to the ADA 
unit’s own and supported troops. 
In fact, most of the intelligence discipline within the frame of conventional 
warfare can be reduced to determining two things about elements within enemy 
forces, size and rarity.  Size, whether in terms of numbers of soldiers or actual caliber 
of gun tube, is an easy predictor of the kind and scope of impact the force; a larger 
caliber artillery piece can deliver more munitions farther, and can deliver a wider 
variety of munitions, such as chemical and nuclear.  Rarity is a factor because 
valuable weapons are resource-intensive, and therefore difficult to support.
Because scarce resources that can leverage large amounts of combat power 
are often well protected, this protection is a major factor in deciding how to attack 
them.  For many targets, attack helicopters are a preferred method because human 
pilots can search for individual elements, such as vehicles and other pieces of 
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equipment, and destroy or damage them more with more certainty than indirect fire 
might.  However, as attack helicopters move out to and engage a target, they must 
have their own protection, called suppression of enemy air defense, or SEAD, which 
entails additional resources and coordination (Department of the Army 1996, 
Glossary-8).  They are usually reserved for targets higher up on the HPTL; lower 
priority targets, or those that need only be damaged or suppressed, may be allocated 
to indirect fire.
Once the targets are selected and matched with means of engagement, the 
staff planning the attack, called the targeting cell in many organizations, must ensure 
that sufficient means are available to determine and confirm the target’s location at 
the planned time of attack.  Each of these means, called collection assets, is capable 
of detecting one or more types of indicators emitted by the target, such as its 
movement, its heat, or its electromagnetic or seismic emissions.   Some kinds of 
collectors provide more accurate or detailed types of information; LRS, or long range 
surveillance units, are units of specially trained observers that infiltrate deep into 
enemy territory to gather information about high-value, difficult to access enemy 
targets.  While they are a scarce asset, because they are human observers rather than 
passive collectors, they can provide a wider, more detailed range of information, and 
can offer their own assessments of the situation as well. The reliability of the 
information collected during the detect phase of the targeting process is not just a 
matter of allocation of resources; every time a weapon is fired or an asset is launched, 
that action is an indicator of the unit’s own activities, and potentially exposing them 
to detection and harm. 
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During the course of the battle, the third function, “deliver” is executed.  
While the targets and means of detection and attack have all already been designated, 
ensuring that the attack guidance is executed in an effective manner is no simple task.  
Despite all the efforts of the plans staff, targets may not appear at the time and place 
predicted, or they may be more heavily protected than anticipated.  As a result, lower 
priority targets may move up the HPTL.  To fulfill the intent of the mission, the attack 
helicopter may engage the enemy’s reserve rather than its artillery group.  Targets of 
opportunity may also present themselves, which would require the staff to include 
them on the HPTL.  
The impact on the target, and whether it was achieved, are the basis of the last 
step, “assess.”  The preferred method of assessing is to send collection assets out to 
the target and determine if the desired effect was achieved or not. The damage is 
assessed from two perspectives, battle damage assessment or BDA, which is defined 
as “the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of 
military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective” and 
munition effects assessment, which determines the relationship between the damage 
and the munition used to inflict it (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force 
Development (J-7)).  However, since assessment does not contribute directly to 
ongoing combat operations in the same manner as the first three steps, if the friendly 
side was able to achieve its objectives, no matter what level of damage the target 
sustained, it is unlikely that this follow-up would be undertaken.  Throughout the 
entire targeting process, the ability of the friendly force to carry out its own mission is 
the imperative that determines and prioritizes any actions taken.
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The Gap in the Targeting Process
The four-step targeting process is mainly a heuristic for planners who must 
integrate firepower into a larger scheme of maneuver, and, as such, it considers 
firepower from two perspectives; how it supports the plan, and what resources it 
requires.  While it does consider actual execution during the “deliver” phase, this is 
mainly in terms of execution of the overall operation, not in terms of the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures involved in destroying the target.  
The actions on the objective, however, are as important to the domain of the 
targeting process as a source for the target domain of persuasion. The actions of a gun 
crew as they execute a fire mission will help illustrate those elements. Before the 
crew ever fires its mission, it has a list of the targets it is assigned to engage, giving 
the expected time of engagement, the position of the target, which gives them an 
estimate of the distance, and the type of munition they must use, some of which are 
more effective against armor than personnel, for instance.  Upon receiving the order 
to fire, the crew orients the weapon in the proper direction and angle to reach the 
target, and also loads up the round with the required number of bags of propellant to 
ensure it travels the needed distance.  Following established procedures, the crew 
initiates the firing sequence.
This frame of action and the relationship of its different elements are a critical 
portion of the source domain, one that serves as the defining structure in the 
metaphor.  This frame includes the human agent, the firer, the means of effecting the 
act, which are the weapon and the round, the patient or recipient of the act, the target, 
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the effect on the target, its destruction, and the act of firing itself.  The firer, having 
aimed the weapon, pulls a trigger or lanyard, which ignites the propellant, pushing the 
round out the barrel towards the target.  Its trajectory has already been conceptually 
determined by the scheme of maneuver that the fire mission supports, and physically 
determined by the angle and orientation of the gun tube, as well as by the amount of 
propellant used.
Firing partakes of the general frame of causation in which there is an agent, a 
patient, an act, and a change that the agent effects. By way of comparison, a simpler 
act of causation is that of pushing.  In it the agent applies continual, sustained force 
on the object, prototypically with his hand.  As a result, the object typically moves.  
Notice that in pushing the agent is active throughout the entire act, from the time his 
hand impinges on the object, during the initiation of motion, and throughout the entire 
duration of movement.  He is directly involved in the entire process.
The act of pushing serves as a good comparison for some of the important 
points about the scene of firing.  In this causal frame, the firer aims the weapon and 
pulls the trigger, initiating the first event in a causal chain that sends the round to the 
target. One important difference between the frame of firing and that of pushing is the 
duration and manner of impingement.  In pushing, the agent makes direct contact 
with the object and is active during the entire movement, both in providing the force 
and guiding the direction of the movement.  By contrast, in firing, the firer is active 
only during the opening point of the sequence, initiating the causal chain and 
providing guidance by aiming the weapon.  He may direct visual contact with the 
target, but never physical contact.  The object that does directly impinge on the target, 
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the round, travels under its own power towards the target.  Its effect on the target is 
predetermined by the type of munition loaded.  Given that all other factors (the 
trajectory, the weather, etc.) hold true, the nature of that effect is absolute; the target 
will be destroyed when the round hits it.
There are some key points about this source domain that structure the 
relationship of the elements in the metaphor.  First, the mission in terms of the 
objectives and goals of the planners, is paramount, and determine all other planning 
considerations.  Second, the manner of detecting and engaging the target is 
predetermined well before any actual physical contact with the target.  Third, at least 
in the core scene of firing an artillery round, the person who engages the target has no 
direct physical contact with it. Fourth, the act of firing is unilateral and irrevocable; 
once the round is out the tube, there is no recalling it.  Fifth, the nature of its result is 
also absolute; the target will or will not be hit, and if it is, it will be destroyed.  
Finally, within this frame, the target is completely passive.  Its only possible “action” 
is to undergo a change of state.
The Relationship of the Core Scenes in the Source and Target Domains 
The discipline of targeting is complex and difficult, and involves the 
contribution of many individual planners who each have broad domains of expertise 
in equally difficult professions.  It is also one that every soldier is immersed in during 
the entire time he or she is in the Army; one of the most important skills a soldier 
learns in basic training is marksmanship, which gives him personal, subjective 
experience in a frame common to military culture as a whole.  
184
Given both the pervasiveness of the frame and the range of professional 
expertise involved in it, it is no surprise that as a source domain it is readily available 
to contribute to many metaphors and blends used in daily military life.  One can say, 
“I’ll take the HEAT round for this,” when deciding to take responsibility for a 
difficult or unpopular decision.  Another expression is to say one has “eyes on (a 
target),” to indicate that one has direct knowledge of a person or situation.  Finally, if 
the boss is having a bad day, his subordinates may warn one another to “stay out of 
his kill zone.”
PSYOP, whose soldiers are also part of the discourse community of the Army, 
has also recruited from this domain in explaining itself as a discipline both to 
members of its own discourse communities and to the Army at large.  Its version of 
the four-step targeting process imposes a great deal of the structure of the original 
onto the target domain of communication.  In its manuals, though there are numerous 
references to other military manuals and documents, there are no references to any 
work on communication or rhetoric.  The writers of the manual have only inexpert 
models of communication and persuasion to draw on in the writing of the text, 
making the contributions from this domain less well defined and relatively 
impoverished compared to the source domain.
One of the most readily apparent mappings between the source and target 
domains is that of the “target.” In terms of the source domain, the military has a well-
developed notion of what a target is and how it relates to the battlefield, with 
technical definitions for not only the target itself, but for at least two other 
subcategories of targets, high-value and high-priority.  That is, targets are considered 
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three ways; in the frame of the overall mission, in the frame of the enemy 
commander’s mission, and in terms of the ability to engage the target effectively.  
In contrast, no formal definition exists for the term “target audience” in any 
Army PSYOP field manual, or in the joint manuals related to it.  An informal 
definition does exist in FM 3-05.20, Psychological Operations.  It states:
The key to all PSYOP is to ensure that the messages, themes, and 
actions are directed at the correct individual or group of individuals 
who possess the ability to take, or refrain from taking, the action 
desired. Key decision makers are individuals who may have the ability 
to achieve a U.S. national or military objective. They are natural 
targets of U.S. influence involving the use of one or more elements of 
national power, to include the military and informational pillars of 
national power. While key decision makers are one avenue to pursue 
in reaching the commander’s objectives, many other audiences are 
equally as important. PSYOP can and frequently do target the people 
that influence the leaders, the individuals carrying out decisions made 
by the leaders, and the individuals that collect information or 
intelligence. The analysis usually boils down to these questions: What 
do we need to accomplish? Who can help? Who can hurt? How do we 
influence them? (Department of the Army 2000, 7-32)
The definition of a target audience, then, has several entailments.  They are people 
responsible for making decisions, and those who can impact the mission, and that 
impact is the result of some deliberate action.  The analogy to both targeting and the 
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military hierarchy, discussed in Chapter One, are clear.  The primary “targets” are 
“decisionmakers,” that is, leaders of groups of people who decide what their 
organization will do and how their subordinates will do it.  This presumes that other 
groups of people are organized to the same degree and in the same manner as the 
military.   As in the definition of the “target,” the first consideration is how the 
actions of that group or decisionmaker can impact the friendly mission.  In contrast 
with the source domain, the mission, organization, desires, motives and objectives of 
that “target” are not explicitly considered when selecting them.
One aspect of the audience that seems to be taken for granted is that the major 
way that it will affect a mission is either by acting or not acting.  Within the domain 
of targeting, and indeed in the military as a whole, action is prototypically considered 
in terms of physical combat; a target is chosen because it can maneuver or provide 
firepower, or directly aid those who shoot and move.  There is a partial mapping of 
this purpose in the passage’s description of other parties that PSYOPers target; “the 
people that influence the leaders, the individuals carrying out decisions made by the 
leaders, and the individuals that collect information or intelligence”(Department of 
the Army 2000 7-32).  This group forms a small radial category whose prototype is 
the decisionmaker; all others are seen as contributing to his decision, either by 
influencing it, executing it, or informing it, but the power is still seen as residing with 
a key leader, as it does in the military.  Those who execute the decisions are 
analogues of those who maneuver or shoot, while those who influence and provide 
intelligence parallel the staff and the collection systems, and are not agents in their 
own right.
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The last four questions in the passage firmly set the framework for the 
selection of the target audience.  The thing they “hurt or help” is the ability of the 
friendly force to carry out its own mission, that is, “what we need to accomplish.”  
The primary way of influencing them will also be determined in that frame.
As much as this passage obviously draws from the domains of both targeting 
and military decisionmaking, there are some interesting disparities between its 
assertions and these source domains.  Returning to our primary source domain of 
targeting, one of the critical aspects of a high value target is that the enemy 
commander needs it to accomplish his own mission.  That is, the frame presupposes 
that the enemy commander has such an asset, and that it will not contribute to the 
friendly side’s objectives.  This passage does entail through the use of the term 
“decisionmaker” that the organization he heads may have their own goals and 
objectives, but unlike those of the enemy commander in the scene of targeting, those 
goals and objectives are never considered on their own terms.
In any discussion of rhetoric and persuasion, the needs and objectives of the 
target audience are the primary considerations.  The audience’s perspectives are the 
key to determining the terms of the argument as a whole, whether one should address 
a given audience, and if so, what lines of reasoning, types of evidence, and nature of 
rhetorical appeal one uses in the construction of the argument.  The goals and 
objectives of the rhetor are of course also key, but they too can be modified based on 
the considerations of the target audience. 
Such modification of a goal presupposes that argument, as a form of 
communication, is a cooperative effort, and that both sides have agency in relation to 
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it.  As our examination of the PSYOP targeting process progresses, what emerges is 
that the lack of independent agency gradually begins to hamstring the heuristic itself; 
in the long run, it can no longer be productive on its own terms.
The PSYOP Four-Step Targeting Model
The PSYOP targeting process, while having its roots in both military and 
civilian discourse, starts out seeming reasonable, but deteriorates as the heuristic is 
developed.  The first function is the “decide” function, which is described as follows:
“What specific target audiences, nodes, or links must we attack and 
what objectives must we achieve with specific PSYOP assets to 
support the commander’s intent and the concept of the operation?” 
(Department of the Army 2000 7-32).
The problems begin with the direct objects of the first question of this 
compound sentence, “target audiences, nodes, or links”  (Department of the Army 
2000 7-32). The Army’s consideration of the target audience starts out at a deficit, 
since there exists no formal definition in doctrine for “target audience,” and the 
closest discussion available in Army doctrine fails to consider that audience as a full 
agent with its own goals and concerns. This sentence diminishes the concept even 
further; the “target audience” is grouped together with two other physical objects, 
with no real differentiation between the three.  
Perhaps because they are physical objects, “node” and “link,” do have 
established definitions in doctrine. The first, “node,” is defined as “the physical and 
functional grouping of communications and computer systems that provide 
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terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information 
exchange,” while a “link” is defined as “in communications, a general term used to 
indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points” (Director for 
Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)).  These terms are clearly 
defined because they have easily defined roles to play in the communication process.  
However, they are also pieces of the physical infrastructure supporting 
communications, not agents who carry it out.  By grouping the audience with these 
pieces of equipment, the doctrine writers have reduced its functionality to two 
activities; it enables a mission, either the enemy or friendly, and it is “targeted.”
In the “decide” phase, all three of these targets are candidates for attack.  
“Attack” means prototypically to engage with firepower in order to destroy, and 
within that frame, “nodes” and “links” seem appropriate targets.  In this passage, 
there seems to be no indication that the term might be a metaphor for the manner of 
engaging a target audience, no indication that different means might be considered for 
any of the three targets.  Even if “attack” did serve as a metaphoric extension of the 
concept into the domain of persuasion, it still retains the hostile intent, passivity of the 
target, and destructive endstate connoted by the core concept.
The second major clause of the sentence, “what objectives must we achieve 
with specific PSYOP assets” is odd mainly in terms of the copulative used to connect 
it with the first clause, “and” (Department of the Army 2000, 7-32).  In physical 
targeting, attacking a target is achieving an objective; targeting is process of matching 
each target to an asset, so the fact that the two clauses would not be linked with a 
copulative that establishes that relationship seems odd in this context.  It highlights 
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the desire that the writers have that the same kind of clear causal relationship at the 
center of the act firing a weapon to exist in the frame of PSYOP
The next step of the targeting process is “detect,” which asks the questions: 
What resources are necessary to determine the vulnerabilities, 
susceptibilities, and accessibility to reach the desired targets and 
audiences? How do we assess attitudes and impressions, and how do 
we design products to overcome censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted 
communications?” (Department of the Army 2000, 7-32). 
“Detection” in conventional targeting is a fairly straightforward matter, based entirely 
on determining indicators associated with enemy actions and equipment.  The most 
pressing issue is availability of assets, not what indicators can be detected.  The 
notion of “detect” in PSYOP seems to question the existence of these fundamentals.
In the first question, the notions of “target” and “audience” seem to be a bit 
more fully developed that they had been in “decide,” in that they are given particular 
attributes, “vulnerability,” “susceptibility” and “accessibility.”  However, since they 
are construed in terms of weakness or usability, it’s not a great development. 
“Vulnerability” is how open an object is to harm, “susceptibility” is the weaknesses 
that enable it being either attacked or influenced, and “accessibility” is how easily an 
object is used and reached.   While “susceptibility” does entail some notion of 
agency, it does so only in terms of its frailties.  Overall, however, this question frames 
the “target” entirely in terms of its flaws and frailties, and never seems to 
acknowledge that the “target” may have ideas, desires, and abilities of its own. It also 
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differs markedly from the source domain in that it seeks a particular aspect of the 
entity to target, rather than indicators that help determine its location.  
The next question, “How do we assess attitudes and impressions?” seems to 
have no real corollary in the domain of physical targeting, since the methods of 
assessing a target are well established, so that to the extent that one asks “how,” one 
questions which assets are available, and what level of resolution of information 
about the target can they provide (Department of the Army 2000, 7-32).   This “how” 
seems to be much broader in scope, asking, “How do we gather objective information 
about what are essentially subjective, individual experiences?”  It indicates a serious 
gap in the mappings between the target and source domains.
The final question of “detect,” like the association of target audience to 
physical links and nodes, is interesting in the manner in which the three factors it 
addresses are equated; “How do we design products to overcome censorship, 
illiteracy, or interrupted communications?” (Department of the Army 2000, 7-32).  
While all three can present difficulty when considering how best to address any 
audience, they are vastly different issues.  Censorship, which entails the deliberate 
oppression by a government or power to keep people from communicating from 
outside parties whose views might endanger its own stability, is a sociopolitical force.  
Illiteracy can also have social roots and impacts, but is at base the lack of a certain 
cognitive skill.  Finally, interrupted communications is  an infrastructure problem.  
This is perhaps the most tangible issue in communicating with a foreign audience, but 
none of the three factors considered are nearly as difficult to at once define and 
overcome as the sociocultural issues that stand between the speaker and his intended 
192
audience.  This list does not even address the most insurmountable obstacle, outright 
hostility and refusal to accept the credibility of the speaker, factors that, again, lie 
within the agency of the listener.
The next function, "deliver," continues the deterioration of the concept of the 
“target.” In the source domain, the planners are concerned mainly with managing the 
delivery of predetermined effects and redirecting assets to previously identified 
targets.  However, while that kind of in-process adjustment is routine during normal 
human conversation, most PSYOP campaigns produce media such as posters and 
radio spots that require much more time to revise, and in fact cannot be revised once 
they have been distributed. Instead, PSYOPers mirror that concern in the question, “ 
How (with what assets) and when will we attack these enemy ‘targets’?” (Department 
of the Army 2000, 7-32).  
The disturbing aspect of this question is not that it lacks the element of 
coordination central to spoken communication, but that it overtly characterizes the 
interaction as an assault. The quotation marks around the word “targets” are true to 
the original text.  Quotation marks used in this manner generally indicate that the 
term enclosed is not being used in the most literal sense, and that the speaker wants to 
ensure the audience knows this.  The writers acknowledge that the “targets” in the 
sense of “target audiences” should not be destroyed in the same sense as physical 
targets.  Unfortunately, no such modification is indicated for two equally troubling 
terms, “enemy” and “attack.”  The hostility conveyed by these terms in the context of 
an act of communication makes the act under consideration seem more likely to 
produce verbal abuse than persuasion.
193
In the source domain of targeting and artillery, the “deliver” function used as a 
planning heuristic is more a matter of choice among known assets than the 
brainstorming prompt it seems to be in the realm of PSYOP.  “Assess” seems to have 
the same problem.  In targeting, the “assess” function has three components, battle 
damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and reattack 
recommendation.  The first two assess the extent of the damage from the perspective 
of first, the impact on the target, and secondly, the efficiency of the munition.  If the 
target did not sustain a sufficient amount of damage, the battle captains must decide 
whether to reattack the target; it may be too late in the battle to do so effectively, 
since any further advantage gained may not be able to contribute to mission success.  
In the end, however, if the mission can be achieved without reengaging the target, 
reattack will not be recommended.
In PSYOP, “assess” also refers to results of the attack. Unlike its source 
domain, however, this function questions fundamentals by asking a series of 
questions that would have already been answered in the first stage of planning by the 
targeting cell: “What defines success for the PSYOP objectives and how will we 
assess the impact? Is there an effective method to establish a direct link between a 
message and a specific attitude?”  (Department of the Army 2000, 7-32).  The first 
question is answered in conventional operations fairly easily, since the determining 
factor is how long the target is inoperable.  One example is the SEAD mission 
mentioned earlier, which is fired at enemy air defense units to keep them from 
engaging attack helicopter sorties during ingress, egress, and time on target.  A 
certain amount of fires dropped on any ADA position will force the operators of the 
194
system to take cover and prevent them from operating the system.  Although PSYOP 
does attempt to base its mission on the behavior of its target audiences, the link 
between message and behavior is far less tangible, as the second and third questions 
indicate.
The difficulty in determining a cause and effect apparent in “deliver” and 
“assess” stems from the insistence in forcing the frame of a fire mission onto that of 
persuasion.  In PSYOP, the sole agent is the speaker, the means are prepackaged and 
determined almost exclusively by the rhetor’s needs, and the audience’s sole action, 
like the action of the target of an artillery strike, is to undergo a change of state. In the 
core speech acts of argument and persuasion, the acts of the rhetor are necessary, but 
not sufficient for its success. The ability of the audience to understand, and the act of 
will they perform in actually agreeing to be persuaded or convinced, are absolutely 
necessary components for the success of the speech act.  To the extent that the manual 
views the target audience as human with will, it does so only in terms of their 
weakness and ultimate utility.
The Inadequacy of the Four--Step Targeting Process as a Heuristic for PSYOP
While the metaphor of Persuading An Audience Is Firing A Weapon At A 
Target is clearly motivated by mappings between the physical aspects of the 
communication process and the event shape of a round being fired towards its target, 
it has obvious problems. These are unfortunately exacerbated by one of the primary 
means of disseminating PSYOP products, leaflets that are dropped from aircraft.  
Delivering leaflets differs from a bombing run only in the nature of the payload, not 
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the actions of the crew, which only reinforces impoverished mappings between the 
target and source domain. 
The most palpable shortcoming of this metaphor is its very partial portrayal of 
the communication process, which focuses only on the agency of the speaker.  It 
covers only a small portion of the process that the Conduit metaphor does, in which 
two of the five metaphors highlight the role of the listener or reader, two focus on the 
relationship of thought or RMs to the message, and the last on the relationship of the 
speaker to the hearer.  In contrast, the four step targeting utilizes only this last 
metaphor, Transmission Of Energy Is Transfer (Of Ideas).   
The extremely limited account of persuasion and communication curtails any 
real ability to analyze the audience in terms of their own needs, perspectives, and 
reactions.  It leaves absolutely no framework in which to discuss the audience’s own 
possible actions.  By construing of a target audience as an enemy whose only action is 
to die, this construction is both hostile and contemptuous, equating rhetorical power 
with kinetic power, and thereby vastly underestimating the might of the pen over the 
sword.  Unfortunately, this metaphor receives reinforcement from the physical 
domain of PSYOP, in which leaflets containing PSYOP messages are often delivered 
by bombs.
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Fig 4.2  Loading leaflet bombs   (Director for Operations (J-3),  IV-6)
There are other, less apparent, but no less deadly disanalogies between the 
target and the source domain.  If an artillery mission or an air sortie misses its target, 
there are often redundancies built into a fire plan to ensure it is taken out, if 
necessary.  If there is a “miss” with a PSYOP campaign, there can be other more 
pressing problems.
A misfire by an artillery battery rarely comes back to land on the firers.  A 
poorly planned PSYOP campaign can backfire, not only failing to persuade its target 
audience, but also perhaps angering them.  The PSYOPer can become the subject of 
tirades, or, even worse, parody and ridicule.  These “misses” undercut the credibility 
of the firer, and can actually hamper his ability to persuade again.  Even worse, a 
“misfire” in the information environment can undo previous gains, by placing the 
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PSYOPer’s credibility in doubt or even put him in a worse position that he had been 
before he attempted to speak.  All these possible results depend on the understandings 
and actions of the target audience, who, because they have little kinesthetic power, 
have more and different kinds of rhetorical power available to them in the 
information environment.  By failing to account for these possibilities, the PSYOP 
targeting process does not help defeat anyone but its users.
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Chapter 5 – Metaphors of Success And Failure In Peace Operations
Introduction
Every morning in recent memory, Americans have awoken to news of the 
fighting in Iraq.  The first order of business is usually the number of U.S. troops 
killed or wounded, with media coverage especially intense when landmarks such as 
the 1000th soldier killed in combat are reached.  The death of a soldier is always a 
somber event, but the focus on those deaths seems disproportionate to the number of 
troops in country.  If hundreds have been killed in combat, and thousands engaged in 
direct combat, what are the other 140,000 soldiers in the region doing?  
The U.S. Army’s Army Knowledge Online website gives insight into what 
many soldiers believe they are helping to accomplish in the region.  The site, which 
features news, useful links to sites that deal with career and financial management, 
and an email system, features on its main page a picture from current operations that 
changes on a regular basis.  This image usually depicts soldiers providing services to 
a local national, such as bandaging a wound or distributing food or toys to children, 
activities involved in the larger, vastly underrepresented civil affairs efforts in the 
region.  For instance, the picture featured on 14 June 2004 features a young specialist 
sharing apply jelly from his MRE with Afghani children during a Coalition Medical 
Assistance (CMA) (U.S. Army 2004).   Even troops who may question or disagree 
with the motives for going to war do take heart in knowing that they can provide 
some benefit to peoples who have suffered under the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.  
Many soldiers believe that the popular media’s focus on soldier deaths stems 
from their prejudice against the military. However, the problem may not necessarily 
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be political or ideological in nature. Conventional combat operations, which are 
primarily physical activities, are not only a good source of dramatic news footage and 
emotional appeal, they also fulfill our expectations for the source domains of 
metaphors for success and failure. Peacekeeping operations, which include providing 
stability, building the local infrastructure, and relinquishing power to a local 
government, not only fail to conform to those expectations; they contradict them by 
reversing them. While these missions have many salient physical components, their 
most critical activities are actually rhetorical in nature. Success in peace operations is 
therefore difficult to portray because its most important effects are conceptual rather 
than kinetic, and, in both its physical and conceptual dimensions, the events resemble 
the conditions for failure in conventional operations. An examination of the doctrinal 
principles that govern both peacekeeping and conventional operations reveals how the 
Army itself recognizes this difference, and struggles to reconcile it.
Common Metaphors of Success and Failure in the Event Structure Metaphor
Success and failure often involve long-term endeavors in both physical and 
non-physical activities.  Describing the individual acts involved in a project like a 
dissertation, or an event like the French Revolution, would not give most people an 
understanding of the overall process, and why it was or was not successful.  The 
Event Structure Metaphor is a dual metaphor that imposes human understanding of 
physical causation onto intellectual, historical, psychological, and group events, 
giving a unity to multiple events with otherwise ambiguous relationships. Its source 
domain is physical movement, and its target can be any endeavor whose scale in time 
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and space is beyond human perception. By compressing or expanding these events in 
time, bringing them to human scale, and instilling them with the certainty of physical 
causation, this metaphor allows us to grasp and contemplate major events or 
phenomena that would otherwise be too vast or complex in their own right. Some of 
its major submetaphors are:
States are Locations
Changes Are Movements
Causation Is Forced Movement (from one location to another) (Lakoff and 
Johnson 2000,179).
The source domain for this extended metaphor, movement through physical 
space, is one people encounter and participate in on a daily basis, making it easily 
activated as a structuring mechanism for a variety of other activities, such as falling in 
love, conducting a political campaign, or undergoing medical treatment.  This domain 
structures both the individual activities we undertake to become successful and the 
condition of being successful (or of being a failure).
 States Are Locations is a common way in which we represent the state of 
being successful (Lakoff and Johnson 2000,180-181). This very productive metaphor 
includes examples like the following:
He’s at the top of his game.
That department is at the cutting/bleeding edge.
She really thinks ahead.
He rose above his physical disability to become the first paraplegic awarded a 
commercial driver’s license.
His vision is vastly more far-reaching than that of any of his peers.
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These common expressions represent success as being above and in front of others in 
the same field of endeavor. These physical frames entail things behind and below the 
achiever, which can be both the actions he took to attain this position, such as lower 
paying jobs that are “rungs” on the “corporate ladder,” or other, less accomplished 
people in the same field. The concept of success as a location relative to others 
complements another component of the Event Structure Metaphor, Changes Are 
Movements (into and out of bounded regions), (Lakoff and Johnson 2000 183).
She led the crusade for a smaller class size in this district.
She’s reached the pinnacle of physical fitness.
He’s in the inner circle now.
While conceiving of success in terms of being higher than and in front of 
others is already competitive in nature, these metaphors add the dimension of 
exclusivity to the condition.  In the first example, only one person can be in the lead, 
while in the second, the successful person is perched in a relatively small space that is 
difficult to access.  The last example of the inner circle combines the aspects of 
exclusivity and difficulty of access in a small space that can only be reached by 
moving through larger, nested, and presumably impediment-filled outer spaces.  Our 
everyday experience fulfills our expectation of this structure, so much so that to say 
of someone, “He’s in the corner office on the top floor” or “She’s got a key to the 
executive washroom,” is almost metonymic with the head of a large firm.  Exclusivity 
reinforces the notion of competition entailed in many representations of success.
Many long-term activities are subject to causes beyond the control of the 
individual agents. Causation Is Forced Movement portrays those causes in terms of 
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the ability to move through space, that is, to move themselves or other things into and 
out of a given location or bounded region (Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 184).  It’s the 
basis of such expressions as:
The number of applications to the university skyrocketed with the basketball 
team’s success.
He hitched his star to the oil boom
The cancer demolished her strength.
Here, long-term events with numerous possible agents and causes are construed of as 
single physical forces, combining Causes are Forces with External Events Are A 
Large Moving Object, another component of the Event Structure Metaphor (Lakoff 
and Johnson 2000; 184, 192).  This kind of compression unifies the disparate agents 
and homogenizes the numerous potential causes into an actor and cause with human 
scale.  A successful person either harnesses the movement for his own uses, or avoids 
the potential harm by moving out of its path.  
This last discussion focused on one branch of the Event Structure Metaphor, 
the States Are Locations Branch (Lakoff and Johnson 2000,180-183).  The other half 
of this dual metaphor, Attributes Are Possessions, is also highly productive for 
success and metaphor, both in representing the rewards of success (She held onto that 
job with both fists) and the state of being successful itself (He snatched victory from 
the grasp of his opponent).  The two branches can even be combined, as we see 
below:
Janice fought her way through the pack of her colleagues to take the 
lead in research early.  She avoided the twin pitfalls of lack of funding 
and poor focus by making connections with others in the field early 
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and often.  Her drive earned her head of the division, a position she 
clung to with both hands and used to further the careers of those who 
had aided her in her climb.
This rather mixed metaphor easily conforms to the expectations we have of 
both branches of the Event Structure Metaphor, but also highlights other important 
submetaphors in our understanding of success.  First, success is a location both higher 
than and in front of others, recruiting from the metaphors Up is Good and Physical 
Progress is Career Progress (Master Metaphor List).  Both branches also represent 
success as the result of an inherently competitive endeavor, in which others are left 
behind.  This restrictive sense of victory has correspondences with another metaphor, 
Acquiring A Desired Object Is Achieving A Purpose, since only one person can hold 
onto an object at a time (Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 197).  Success, then, is moving 
forward and up while dodging obstacles, beating competitors, and harnessing 
opportunity to arrive at an exclusive location to acquire a prize.
However, we can and do conceive of success and failure in noncompetitive 
terms.  A couple can have a successful marriage, a teacher can be successful because 
he creates a good environment for learning, and a scientist can be successful by 
achieving a research goal.  This model of achievement, which measures 
accomplishments on their own terms, allows for more than just one “winner”; if 
anything, the more participants that achieve their goals, the greater the success is.  
Failure in these terms is more difficult to gauge than in a competitive scenario, since 
in the noncompetitive model any measure of progress means a step towards success.
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The Force Dynamics of Competition
Our common understanding of success depicts the successful person as 
struggling against forces that are rallying to prevent his progress.  Talmy’s notion of 
force dynamics, in which he explains the relationships between opposing forces in the 
physical world, and our metaphoric extension of those dynamics onto such domains 
as the psychological and the social, is useful here.  In this model, there are two force 
entities, the agonist and the antagonist.  Each has an intrinsic force tendency, either 
towards action or towards rest, and a level of strength in relation to the other, stronger 
or weaker.  The total interaction of the force tendencies and relative strengths result in 
the system as a whole either moving, or remaining at rest (Talmy 413-414).  Four 
basic force dynamic patterns, taken from Talmy, are illustrated below (415-416).  
They demonstrate some possible relationships between the agonist and antagonist, 
and the resulting state of the system:
1. a. The ball kept rolling because the wind was blowing on it.
b. The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing on it.
c.  The ball kept rolling despite the stiff grass.
d.  The log kept lying on the incline because of the ridge there.
(Talmy 416)
The four systems are related in terms of the agonist’s and antagonist’s innate 
tendency, their relative strengths, and the resultant motion.  In a and b, the agonist’s 
tendency is to remain at rest, but in a the antagonist’s greater strength prevails, so that 
the system is in motion, while in b the agonist’s strength prevails, so that the system 
remains at rest (Talmy 416).  Similarly, in c and d, the agonist’s tendency is to move, 
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but in c its tendency overcomes the predisposition of the antagonist, resulting in the 
overall motion of the system, while in d the antagonist prevails, resulting in the 
system remaining at rest (Talmy 416). 
Fig 5.1 Talmy’s Force Dynamics
These examples illustrate steady-state systems, but in the real world, entities 
often increase or decrease in strength, and systems can change their overall 
movement.  Such is the case with common understandings of success.  Success is a 
fairly complex pattern of force dynamics, one that Talmy illustrates in three phases; 
an initial phase in which the agonist exerts force but is initially weaker than the 
antagonist, a second stage in which the agonist gains in strength relative to the 
antagonist while continuing to exerts force, and a final phase in which the agonist 
prevails, the antagonist succumbs, and the system moves in accordance with the 
agonist’s exertions (Talmy 436).  These phases are also related to what Talmy calls 
factivity, or how much knowledge a speaker has about what phases have occurred and 
what the final outcome is when reporting it (Talmy 436). For instance, if we say 

























but not necessarily that we know of the later phases (Talmy 436).  The statement 
“John succeeded in buying a car” entails knowledge not only of the outcome, phase 3, 
but the initial effort and changes of system state in phase 2.  Our understanding of a 
successful person involves her initial efforts, her continued persistence, and her 
eventual triumph.  
Fig 5.2  Success
The Principles of War, Offensive Operations, and Metaphors of Success
Army offensive operations embody both the event shape of the source domain 
for the metaphors and the force dynamics of success.   While this is most obvious in 
the physical domain, the concepts by which war is conducted have extended those 
properties metaphorically into the conceptual and psychological domains. There is a 
unique congruency between the source domain for success and the physical actions 
that achieve it in warfare that does not exist in many other human undertakings. 
Success in warfare is moving faster getting further, arriving first and taking 
possession with both the mind and the body, dominating the enemy in every possible 
dimension.  
To demonstrate this, we can return to the attack in chapter 1, in which forces 












embodies several of the nine principles of war laid out in FM 3.0; offensive, 
objective, maneuver, mass, economy of force, unity of command, simplicity, security 
and surprise (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-11 – 4-12).  The manual states: 
The principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. [They] are 
not a checklist… Rather, they summarize the characteristics of 
successful Army operations. Their greatest value lies in the education 
of the military professional. Applied to the study of past campaigns, 
major operations, battles, and engagements, the principles of war are 
powerful tools for analysis  (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-12).  
All of the principles are based on some physical phenomenon common in 
conventional warfare, but each is a metaphoric extension of its core meaning into the 
conceptual and psychological realms.  This polysemy transforms physical activity 
into heuristics for conceiving of and planning for battle, methods of conceptualization 
and analysis that at once enable victory while fulfilling our expectations for the 
source domain of success. The ones most important for the attack are “offensive,” 
“maneuver,” “objective.” and “surprise.”
The first principle, “offensive,” means to “seize, retain and exploit the 
initiative… the essence of successful operations to dictate the nature, the scope, and 
tempo of an operation, forcing the enemy to react and impose their will on the enemy 
adversary or situation” (U.S. 2001a, 4-13). “Offensive“ is not only a principle of war, 
but the technical term for an attack.  Its value as a heuristic lies in this core concept, 
which presupposes the primary goal of moving forward to inflict harm on an 
opponent, with the secondary purpose of preventing him from harming you. In its use 
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as a planning concept, the initiation of movement that defines the relationships 
between offense and defense has now been extended to mean initiating any action, 
whether it is physical or mental. “Initiative” in the context of the definition is a 
metaphorical object that the person who acts first can manipulate and use for his 
advantage one that he can “seize, retain and exploit” (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-13). That 
is, it has become a particular type of object, a tool or enabler that must not just be 
possessed but used to give its owner an advantage. 
“Initiative” enables one to set conditions optimal for completing the mission, “to 
dictate the nature, the scope, and tempo of an operation” (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-13).  
The attacker makes decisions about the terms under which he will fight the defender, 
making him first in terms of both authority and logic in the frame of the battlefield.  
The side with “initiative” defines the type of battle to be fought, how much of the 
enemy force he wishes to engage, and how quickly the process of battle unfolds.  
“Offensive” as a tenet means being first to move and act in almost every dimension of 
an operation.
Being first is important because of another element of the source domain of 
the attack brings to the definition, the restrictive economy of physical occupation.  
Because only one party can be positioned on a given piece of ground, and therefore 
only one party can hold it, getting there first gives one an advantage.   It also seems 
that having the initiative makes one’s desires primary as well. This restrictive 
economy continues in another aspect of offensive, “impos[ing one’s] will on the 
enemy, adversary or situation” (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-13).   Will, like initiative, is 
another metaphoric entity that is placed “on top” of a person to prevent him from 
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acting.  It can also be placed “on top” of a situation, to prevent it from changing in a 
manner disadvantageous to the attacker; both the will of the enemy and possible 
“will” of the situation need to be restrained because they are either incompatible with 
or directly opposed to the attacker’s wishes.
 Because the meaning of “offensive” extends metaphorically well beyond the 
physical domain, it makes the principle of occupying a piece of terrain first, which is 
what actually happens when one is defending, no longer necessary.  The principle of 
“offensive,” then, means to dominate a situation physically, intellectually, temporally, 
and psychologically, and presumes the incompatibility of other party’s objectives 
with one’s own. Its elements of forward movement, possession, and restrictive 
economy conform to our expectations for many metaphors of success.
Inherent in “offensive” is the principle of “maneuver.”  In its central sense, 
“maneuver” means to move in relation to obstacles on the ground, as when one 
maneuvers one’s way through a crowd.  It also entails a goal beyond those 
impediments.  As a principle of war, “maneuver” means moving in such a manner 
that one can 
place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the use of 
flexible combat power or through the employment of forces through 
maneuver and fire/fire potential to accomplish the mission.  Place and 
keep him at a disadvantage and keep him off balance (U.S. Army 
2001a, 4-43). 
 Attacking the enemy from two different directions to prevent him from focusing his 
force, as depicted in the scenario above, is one way of employing “maneuver.”  
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Placement of forces in relation to their target is almost as important as the assets 
themselves.
Like its companion “offensive,” “maneuver” has developed a polysemy that 
extends aspects of its core meaning to the domains of planning and mental 
dominance.  In the definition above, this metaphoric movement takes place in several 
subtle moves in two different parts.  The first part involves employing maneuver 
“through the use of flexible combat power or through the employment of forces 
through maneuver and fire/fire potential to accomplish the mission” (U.S. Army 
2001a, 4-14).  From movement of actual forces, maneuver has been extended to fire, 
in which the element of movement is transferred from the firing unit to the 
ammunition moving towards its target, and then to fire potential, which is planned 
firepower; this means that one can adhere to the principle of maneuver by simply 
intending to fire, eliminating actual movement as a necessary element of the principle 
of “maneuver”.
In another component of the definition, maneuvering in relation to an enemy 
has developed into the principle moving to “place the enemy in a disadvantageous 
position”; that is, though the enemy may actually be stationary in the defense, the 
attacker “moves” not himself, but the defending forces into a state of disadvantage, 
which leaves the attacker in the state/location of advantage (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-14).  
Because the frame of warfare is a contrary posing as a contradictory, thinkers often 
assume that anything that constitutes an enemy’s disadvantage is automatically an 
advantage for the opposing force.
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One attacks and maneuvers in order to get somewhere, and in the military, as 
in other communities, that place is the “objective.”  The term, like its counterparts in 
the principles of war, has evolved beyond a spot on the ground.  “Objective” is “the 
principle of direct[ing] every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and 
attainable objective” (U.S. Army 2001a, 4-12).  The central meaning of the term is a 
place on the ground that one does not have that one wants to occupy and possess.  A 
piece of terrain is valuable, or decisive, if it has some feature that will give the 
occupier the ability to continue to move forward again, such as a hilltop, which would 
afford observation and fields of fire over the terrain below, or a road network, as in 
the scenario described in the first chapter, which would provide quick access to, and 
thereby control of, other parts of the terrain. 
“Objective” has clear correspondences with the event structure secondary 
metaphors of States Are Locations, Change Is Movement In And Out Of A Bounded 
Region, and another component of the Event Structure Metaphor, Purposes Are 
Destinations, because it is a bounded region into which a force moves that is the 
destination of a movement (Lakoff and Johnson 2000, 179).  “Objective” also has 
correspondences with Achieving Success Is Acquiring A Desired Object, because an 
objective is metaphorically taken from the defender (Lakoff and Johnson, 197).  Like 
“offensive” and “maneuver,” it continues the restrictive economy and contrary logic 
of the physical domain, imposing it on the intellectual domain of planning for war.  
Another principle of war foundational to the military’s approach to war and 
the world is “surprise.”  “Surprise” means to “[s]trike the enemy at a time or place or 
manner for which he is not prepared so that he cannot react effectively” (U.S. Army 
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2001a, 4-14).  A classic case would be the invasion at Normandy, which took place in 
weather conditions so poor that the defenders did not expect the attack.  Surprise, 
however, is rarely absolute; in a war one expects to be attacked, but doesn’t often 
know when and where it will happen. 
When dealing with matters of deception and surprise, the mind is often 
portrayed as a container.  In this metaphor, the human mind “holds” thoughts and 
ideas and lets them “out” by communicating them, intentionally or inadvertently, to 
other people.  The material of which the container is made is solid; if a person’s 
thoughts are known to another, his mind is transparent, and if they remain hidden, his 
mind is opaque.  The notion of transparency is often a metaphor for truth and honesty; 
in the context of war, it means vulnerability.
In the principle of “surprise,” military planners construe the mind as a 
selectively opaque container; ideas and plans about deception are just as real as ideas 
and beliefs about reality, but an appropriately cautious planner will either attempt to 
conceal his plans completely from the enemy, or modify the enemy’s perceptions 
enough to prevent him from acting effectively on his own behalf. “Surprise” is a 
conceptual principle, but like “offensive,” “objective” and “maneuver,”  its aim is 
dominance over the enemy.
The ideal attack, then, is one with a preplanned, clearly defined goal in which 
the attackers move forward towards a key piece of terrain, attacking along a route or 
in such a manner that the defenders are physically or psychologically placed at a 
disadvantage. This enables the attackers to kill the enemy or drive them off the 
objective and seize it while retaining enough of his own strength to continue forward 
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movement.  The attacker dominates the defender physically, conceptually, and 
psychologically.
Fig 5.3 - We overcame the enemy at his border. (Talmy 420)
In terms of Talmy’s force dynamics, a successful attack is the result of a shift 
in the relative strength between the agonist, the attacker, and the antagonist, the 
defender.  Talmy cites a particular usage of the word overcome as exemplifying this 
dynamic, as illustrated above. Like the second phase of the force dynamics of 
success, the agonist’s relative strength increases, and, like the final phase, the system 
as a whole moves in accordance with the agonist’s tendency.  Also like our 
understanding of the source domain for success, the greater the force the agonist must 
overcome, the more overwhelming the victory. However, unlike the target domain of 
actual success, in which others would not necessarily fail as a result of one person’s 
success, in this understanding of combat, the enemy’s failure is a necessary, and 
almost sufficient condition of your own success. 
There is another key difference between military and civilian concepts of 
success.  While many people conceive of success in terms of physical movement, in 
most instances, they don’t usually act in accordance with those concepts; someone 
endeavoring to learn Spanish does not physically relocate closer to Spain every time 
+
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he achieves a new level of fluency, or take textbooks from other language students 
and carry them around.  In the successful execution of a conventional offensive 
operation, however, a military force actually does move forward, displace an enemy, 
and take possession of his terrain.  Army offensive operations fulfill common 
expectations for the source domain of metaphors of success in a concrete and material 
way that other kinds of goal-oriented activities do not, bringing a whole new 
dimension of meaning to the concept of “a metaphor we live by.”
The Event Structure Metaphor and The Event Shape of Failure
Failure, like success, is usually the result of a series of concerted efforts, not a 
single attempt at a given endeavor. These efforts are compressed into a larger, single 
event in which a person is moving through space but, rather than moving forward and 
up quickly, the one who fails either moves very slowly, stagnates, or even travels 
backwards and down.   Hence, the metaphor produces such sayings as:
 He’s at the bottom of the heap/pecking order/food chain. 
She’s behind the times, behind the power curve.
Their relationship is going nowhere.
These expressions participate in the metaphor, States Are Locations, in which failure 
is a location behind and below others who are more successful (Talmy 179). The 
process of failing as moving into these bounded locations in such expressions as, 
“He’s drifted to the back burner.”  The actions of the failing person are often 
construed as being weak and ineffectual, with the result being that the metaphoric 
force he exerts is insufficient to “propel” him forward or up, as when we say, “She’s 
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just floundering, and barely keeping her head above water.”  Events and other actors 
are also portrayed in terms of force, but in this instance, they are powerful forces that 
shove the actor out of desired locations, into undesirable ones, or push him down or 
back:
The reorganization kicked him out the door.
She was shoved downhill to make way for his cronies
Finally, those who fail are unable to either acquire or retain a desirable object 
are also failures, those who “let opportunities slip through their fingers,” or who 
“can’t get a grip on their careers,” some one who metaphorically loses a valuable 
possession.  In fact a “loser” is a metaphoric synonym for someone who fails.
The event shape of failure is of someone struggling to move forward and up, 
but moving slowly backwards and down in relation to others, who has insufficient 
strength to continue moving, and who as a result cannot acquire or retain a desired 
object, and ends up motionless and empty handed.  This representation of failure, like 
a common notion of success, entails two parties who are competing, and while the 
success of one does not require the failure of the other, it entails it, in that successful 
is a small number small space, and relative to other places.
The force dynamics of failure have the same three phases as success, as
illustrated below.  However, there are two possible outcomes.  Either the agonist fails 
to overcome the strength of the antagonist and the system remains at rest, as in A, or 
the agonist is overpowered by the antagonist himself, as in B.  
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Fig 5.4  Force Dynamics of Failure
The first is the force dynamic of a stalled offensive, while the second is that of a 
successful counterattack by the defense. In either case, the defender retains 
possession of terrain, and the attacker is weaker in both relative and absolute terms.  
Both spell defeat for the attacker.
Like the principles of war previously examined, the logic of the image 
schema, namely the restrictive economy and presumption of contradictory outcomes, 
is expressed in the fact that the failure of the competition necessarily entails the 
success of the victor. Similarly, being in front entails someone in the rear, and being 
on top entails someone else on the bottom.  However, just as in common metaphors 
of success, these are necessary parts of the frames of the source domains, not of the 
target domain. Because the contradictory image-schema logic of being on top, in 
front, and in possession are so heavily ingrained in our conceptual systems, it is 



















Peace Operations and our Expectations for Metaphors of Success and Failure
Peace operations are part of stability operations and support operations, or 
SOSO.  SOSO includes such activities as humanitarian aid, arms control support, 
support to foreign internal defense, noncombat evacuation operations, and peace 
operations. These and other operations are the subject of FM 3.07, Stability 
Operations and Support Operations.  Because the aim of peace operations is to make 
the inhabitants of the occupied country self-sufficient, these missions contradict our 
expectations for metaphors of success.
Peace operations are defined as
multiagency operations involving diplomatic and humanitarian 
agencies, with military support.  They may be conducted to prevent or 
control a conflict, in support of a peace settlement, or in response to a 
complex emergency” (U.S. Army 2003b, 4-2).  
They include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and civil-military operations. The 
distinction between enforcement and keeping is important; while peace enforcement 
bears more resemblance to conventional combat, peacekeeping is closer to the 
ultimate conditions for success in peace operations.  A typical scenario illustrates 
both the differences and commonalities between the two.
Peacekeeping forces ideally move into a country only after the belligerent 
parties ask for outside assistance. To stabilize the situation, the military force will use 
its power to separate the belligerent factions, conduct inspections of weapons storage 
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facilities, launch raids of suspected terrorists, and enforce the terms of any peace 
agreement that is in place.  While these peace enforcement actions are going on, the 
Army often concurrently works with local national and international organizations to 
establish the physical and governing infrastructure with the goal of building them up 
to the point that they can handle the affairs of the country without external support. 
Over the course of time, as the local government assumes more responsibility for the 
country’s affairs, the peacekeeping force reduces its presence in the country, by both 
relinquishing responsibilities and decreasing the number of troops.   Once the local 
nationals can maintain the stability and infrastructure, the military force leaves.
Peace enforcement, defined as “the application of military force, or the threat 
of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance 
with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order,” 
consists of those combat-like operations the military carries out in the course to 
establish order, while peacekeeping, defined as “military operations undertaken with 
the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate 
implementation of an agreement . . . and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-
term political settlement,” consists of activities such as patrols and support to the 
local government that help maintain the order necessary for the development of 
national infrastructure (Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development 
(J-7)).  In many instances, the activities differ primarily in terms of degree of force 
used rather quality of action, and can happen simultaneously in closely collocated 
positions.  A military force can find itself conducting a raid in one part of a city while 
building a school in another.
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Successful peace operations, like successful offensive operations, have several 
characteristics that serve as a heuristic in Army doctrine. This section will examine 
seven of the ten; “restraint,” “civil-military operations,” “credibility,” “legitimacy,”  
“impartiality,” “transparency,” and “consent,” (U.S. Army 2003b, 4-13 – 4-14).  
These are all vital considerations in peace operations, but they make understanding 
success in these operations very difficult.  First, they entail the peacekeeping force’s 
deference to the local nationals in the physical domain. Second, unlike the principles 
of war, whose core concepts are kinetic, most of these characteristics are conceptual 
in nature, with only tenuous origins in the physical domain.  Finally, all entail 
deference to the local nationals in the conceptual domain, since many of these 
characteristics depend on their perceptions and understandings of the situation, not 
those of the military force. The ultimate endstate of a successful peace operation is a 
self-sufficient country with a government capable of ensuring the order and safety of 
its people. Because the peacekeeping forces ultimately leave, the overall operation 
has the physical and conceptual event shape of a withdrawal.  It thereby conforms to 
the expectations for failure in both these dimensions, so that even while a force is 
succeeding in its peacekeeping mission, it carries out actions congruent with failure.  
In the physical domain, peacekeepers must practice “restraint” and conduct 
“civil-military operations,” both of which involve curbing a force’s ability.  
“Restraint,” the more immediate form of this confinement, is defined as “the prudent 
and appropriate application of military power.  Restraints on weapons, tactics, and 
levels of violence characterize the environment of peace keeping operations” (U.S. 
Army 2003b, 4-16). Because peacekeeping missions involve setting the conditions for 
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peace, the soldiers must avoid any activity that might spark an outbreak of violence.  
From the core physical meaning, restraint entails two forces.  The agonist force 
attempts to move forward, but the antagonist force, the restrainer, is exerting more 
force in the opposite direction to make the antagonist move more slowly, move 
backwards, or stop. 
Metaphorically, in both Army and common usage, “restraint” means for an 
individual human to prevent himself from using a capability or power already in his 
possession. The agonist and the antagonist are the same agent conceived of as divided 
in two, with one part thwarting the impetus of the other.  An example of this might be 
a rule of engagement.  A rule of engagement, or ROE, defined as “a directiv[e] issued 
by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations 
under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement 
with other forces encountered,” is a legal constraint placed upon a soldier that dictates 
how much force he may use, and under what conditions he may use it (Director for 
Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)).   While a soldier always has 
the right to defend himself, she might have the following ROE imposed on her 
actions; “Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission” (U.S. Army 
2003b, C-5).  This limitation is in direct contradiction to the overwhelming firepower 
normally used in a conventional operation.  The Army definition of “restraint” in 
peace operations adds another factor to complicate the issue.  While the agonist force 
and the antagonist force are the same agent, they are two different kinds of force – the 
physical violence emanating from actions and weapons, and the self-imposed, mental 
discipline to keep oneself from using it.  
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Fig. 5.5 Restraint
Talmy refers to this situation as an instance of intrapsychological force (431).  
It depends on a common metaphoric understanding of the self as a divided self, two 
entities that compete for mastery of the actions of the self as a whole.  During a peace 
operation, soldier might not fire his weapon in a situation that, were he in war, would 
warrant him doing so.  One could then say, “SGT McGuin restrained himself from 
firing.” As illustrated in the force dynamic system illustrated below, the NCO’s 
psyche is divided in two; the agonist is his predisposition to fire, while the antagonist 
is his conscious effort not to do so. In effect, the soldier is preventing himself from 
taking actions that might result in a tactical victory, taking the role of the defeated self 
and triumphant enemy at once.  “Restraint” runs counter to the principles of both 
offensive and maneuver, forcing the peacekeeping force to move more slowly, to 
stop, or even withdraw rather than fight. This system not only fulfills expectations of 
the divided self metaphor, it conforms to our understanding of a failed attack and our 
expectations for the source domain of failure.
Although civil military operations consist of military forces working to help
rebuild a country, in the long term, as in “restraint,” the ideal is for those forces to 
stop their reconstruction efforts despite their ability to continue.  This mission is a 
critical part of any peacekeeping operation, since it sets up the conditions of stability 
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that underlie long term peace in a region.  It consists of such activities as building of 
physical infrastructure and utilities, initiating and training governmental institutions 
such as hospitals and police forces, and advising the heads of financial and 
educational institutions.  These operations 
should focus on empowering civilian agencies and organizations to 
assume full authority for implementing the civil portion of the peace 
effort.  As the operation progresses, civil organizations should assume 
greater responsibility for civil functions and require less assistance 
from the military force  (U.S. Army 2003b, 4-18).  
This means that in the beginning of a peace operation, there are more troops 
moving forward, taking terrain, and seizing control.  The event shape of the beginning 
stages of a peacekeeping operation is very close to that of conventional warfare, and 
therefore fulfills our expectations for our conceptualizations of success.  Unlike 
conventional attacks, these operations are not designed to further the continued 
forward movement over the opposing force, only to temporarily impose order and 
permit civil affairs soldiers to do their work.  As the mission progresses, the 
peacekeepers’ focus gradually changes from conducting preemptive raids to more 
regular presence patrols, from confiscating weapons to training local groups in 
hospital administration.  The empowerment of the local government leads to the need 
for fewer and fewer occupying troops, who relinquish more and more control to their 
counterparts.  In the process, they lower their physical profile, give up terrain, and 
eventually redeploy back to their home bases.  
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This is a particularly complex force dynamic pattern, with at least five phases.  
The agonist is the peacekeeping force and the antagonist is the local nationals.  In the 
first phase, the agonist is stronger than the antagonist, and the system as a whole 
moves in accordance with his tendency.  In the second phase, his strength diminishes 
relative to the antagonist’s, slowing the system’s movement.  In the third phase, 
equilibrium is reached between the two entities, and the system comes to a rest.  In 
the fourth phase, the antagonist gains in relative strength until, in the final phase, the 
system moves in accordance with his tendency, and the agonist is the one overcome.
This event shape poses two serious problems for those carrying out peace 
operations.  First, as operations in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate, completing a 
peace operation often takes years, during which time the soldiers may repeat many of 
the same tasks over the same terrain, making visible progress in the lives of the local 
nationals difficult to discern, and making the soldiers feel as if they, and the mission 
that they carry out, are stagnating.  That is, they believe they are failing.  Secondly, 
over the long term, a successful civil military effort has the physical event shape of a 











In the physical domain, “restraint” mirrors the force dynamic of a thwarted attack, 
while “civil military operations” enable a withdrawal.
The conceptual dimension of peace operations involves a similar sort of 
capitulation, relying on the preconceptions and will of the local nationals for their 
success.  While traditional warfare does consider the views of the enemy, it does so 
only in terms of limiting, distorting, or destroying his ability to understand the 
battlefield.  Both “impartiality” and “legitimacy” contradict that aspect of war, in that 
both depend on the perceptions of the local nationals.  They also contradict the 
principles of “offensive” and “maneuver,” because instead of out thinking the warring 
factions and placing them at an intellectual disadvantage, these characteristics 
emphasize the dependence the peacekeepers have on them.  The FM defines 
“legitimacy” as 
required to sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of 
the government to govern, or a group or agency to make and carry out 
decisions.  It is a condition growing from the perception of a specific 
audience of the legality, morality, and correctness of a set of actions 
(U.S. Army 2003b, 4-19).
“Impartiality” is defined as
a fundamental of peace operations that distinguishes PO from 
offensive and defensive combat operations. Impartiality requires the 
PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, showing 
no preference for any faction or group over another (Department of the 
Army 2003b, 4-20).
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In both these definitions, not only is the peacekeeping force dependent on the 
perceptions of the group over whom it has physical dominance, it must attempt to 
cultivate that view among several different, disparate groups, none of which 
individually may be nearly as homogenous as a conventional enemy. This means that 
the perceptions of multiple, physically weaker parties have a direct impact on the 
physical activities of the militarily stronger party. 
 The characteristic of  “transparency” furthers this dependency by requiring 
the peacekeepers to make themselves vulnerable to the very parties over which they 
must exercise control.  The FM explains its importance in this manner; 
Transparency means that the peace operation force must communicate 
its intentions and capabilities to all audiences inside and outside the 
area of operations. This differs from offensive and defensive ops 
where you conceal your intent and capabilities (U.S. Army 2003b, 4-
15).   
When commanders apply this principle to their actions in a peace operation 
environment, they strive to ensure that all segments of the local population and the 
overseeing audience of the international community who are closely observing them 
know what they plan to do, how they plan to do it, and what means they have 
available. In terms of the metaphor of The Mind Is A Container, rather than 
representing the mind as an opaque container, which aids in deceiving the enemy, the 
principle of “transparency” is intended to convey honesty and openness by making 
the peacekeeper’s means literally and their motives metaphorically visible and “up 
front” to the various parties they are trying to control. 
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While being visible in the mental domain connotes honesty, in the physical 
context of combat it means being exposed to the enemy and thereby vulnerable to 
physical attack.  “Transparency” in motive and capability entails relinquishing mental 
dominance over the opposing force. This means that, in direct contradiction to the 
principles of conventional war, where physical and conceptual vulnerability of the 
force directly contributes to its failure, in the mission of peacekeeping, transparency 
is a necessary element of success.
Together, “impartiality,” “legitimacy,” and “transparency” highlight the fact 
that peace operations are as much about communication and persuasion as they are 
about physical force. In fact, the writers of the FM make “credibility” key to the 
operation’s success.  It is defined as follows;
Credibility reflects the warring faction’s assessment of the capability 
of the PO force to accomplish its mission. The force must have the 
proper structure and resources with appropriate ROE to accomplish the 
mandate. It discharges its duties swiftly and firmly, leaving no doubt 
as to its capabilities and commitment. All personnel consistently 
demonstrate the highest standards of discipline, control, and 
professional behavior on and off duty (Department of the Army 2003b, 
4-17).
Although the writers equate “credibility” primarily with combat power and discipline, 
the important factor in this discussion is that, like “impartiality,” “legitimacy,” and 
“transparency,” it depends on the perceptions of the local nationals.  In fact, in the 
broader rhetorical sense of “credibility,” these last three factors contribute to this 
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factor.  Peace operations depend as much on a force’s ethos, its ability to engage 
others fruitfully in the “information environment,” as they do on their kinetic 
capability.  If anything, overuse of combat power can undermine that ethos, making 
any amount of firepower a liability in direct proportion to its amount. This is an 
example of what military planners now call the asymmetric battlefield, one in which 
physical and technological force is countered, often quite successfully, by 
psychological or rhetorical force, powers to which military might may have little 
appropriate response.  
The characteristic “consent,” continues this trend. Unlike the principles of 
war, “consent” is never explicitly defined. Instead, it is discussed in terms of its 
effects on peace operations.  “Consent,” according to FM 3.07, “determines the levels 
of operation, and can be at different levels among the different parties and at different 
levels.  Closely linked to consent is compliance with an agreement or mandate” (U.S. 
Army 2003b, 4-14). As intangible as this factor is, without it, no amount of combat 
power can make the peacekeeper’s mission a success.
“Consent” can be understood in terms of one party giving permission to 
another party to execute an action.  It is a speech act, like agreement.  It can be 
conceived of as a metaphoric object that one possesses. Its ability to act as a direct 
object aligns it more closely with some of our expectations in regards to both success 
and combat, and with common metaphors of thought.  “Consent,” like many objects, 
can be given:
They handed her that promotion
The enemy relinquished the hilltop without a fight.
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The village elders gave their consent to the food distribution plan.
In the second case, the enemy’s relinquishing of the hilltop is a surrender rather than a 
bestowal, but still entails an act of will on his part. However, unlike other objects, 
“consent” cannot be taken:
Helen took the position that came open in accounting.
Alpha Company took the hill.
?The salesman took the consent of his customer.
Also, objectives cannot be received:
He received that corner office.
The task force received the consent of the mayor to divert the convoy through 
the town.
?Bravo company received the hilltop from the enemy.
 In conventional operations, the opposition of wills and the agency of the victor are 
foundational to the concept of war.  This is why, although an enemy can “give up” an 
objective, the friendly side does not “receive” it; the victor is always the agent, not 
the patient.  In peace operations, however, the peacekeepers are the patients, since 
they must have consent given to them by the local nationals.  Their will, the will of 
the militarily weaker party, is paramount.  In conventional operations, while the 
mission and situation might impose some limitations on the type of action the soldier 
takes, the one restriction not imposed is the will of the adversary; if anything, 
destroying his will can be sufficient for success. 
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An Unfortunate Example
Peace operations defy our understanding of success and failure in 
conventional combat in three ways. First, they are far more complex operations, 
having more conceptual than physical factors that ultimately contribute towards 
success. Second, of these factors, it is the conceptual characteristics that matter most 
and set the context for the physical ones; this means that, unlike in combat, a physical 
act can never be considered solely on its own terms. And finally, in both dimensions, 
the peacekeeping force must relinquish the initiative to the local national factions.  
What this means is that all the signs of failure in conventional warfare (diminishing, 
withdrawing, relinquishing, and surrendering) and all the actions that contribute to 
that failure (giving the adversary the initiative, restraining power, and exposing your 
intentions) are the hallmarks of a good peace operation.  In a peacekeeping operation, 
one’s physical failure means the enemy’s physical and mission success, and oddly 
enough, one’s mission success as well. 
In addition, the event shape of a successful peace operation, moving 
backwards, lowering of profile, and relinquishing physical and rhetorical “ground” 
slowly over a long period of time, is exactly the opposite of that of a successful 
offensive, moving forward, increasing in presence, and taking terrain quickly. 
Together, what this means is that the event shape and conditions for success in peace 
operations conform to our understandings of the event shape and conditions for 
failure in conventional operations. The contrast in conditions between the operations 
for both parties is summed up as follows:
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Can no longer move 
forward
Fig 5.7  A Comparison of Peace Operations and Conventional Combat 
What this means is that the conditions for success for local nationals in peace 
operations conform to the conditions for success for a military force in offensive 
operations, while the conditions for the military force in peace operations conform to 
the conditions for failure for a military force in offensive operations.
The physical event shape for peacekeeping fulfills so many of our 
expectations of the source domain for failure that even people who clearly advocate 
the mission have difficulty expressing what success looks like.  In a recent edition of 
the Army Times,  Donald Rumsfeld’s strategy for U.S. forces to move the Iraqi 
government was quoted as a headline:  “Leading From Behind; U.S. security forces 
gradually passing baton to Iraqi authorities”(Crawley 10).
The text of the story has a perfectly legitimate explanation for this seeming 
paradox.  The strategy involves putting the responsibility for maintaining order in 
major Iraqi cities on the shoulders of the newly trained local police forces; U.S. 
troops in the form of quick reaction forces would be prepositioned at strategic 
locations that would enable them to deploy quickly to support the local police in case 
the situation becomes too large for them to handle (Crawley 10).  This way, the U.S. 
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would “lead” metaphorically by instituting the strategy and training the host nation 
police force, but would be “behind” literally by being physically located away from 
initial contact, and metaphorically by having the local authorities respond to any 
situation first.
Despite its perfectly valid and laudable intention of giving the Iraqi police 
forces authority over their own people and responsibility for their own actions, 
Rumsfeld’s characterization of his plan has many other problems.  Besides being 
oxymoronic, another issue with his characterization is the many ways in which “being 
behind” as a source domain maps onto different target domains.
In the domain of courage, being “behind” is a metaphor for both physical 
cowardice (“He’s hiding behind his mom’s apron”) and moral cowardice (“She hid 
behind the regulation to avoid taking responsibility for her actions”).  Whether the 
danger is physical or emotional, concealing oneself is not just a matter of self-
preservation; it entails doing so and (or even worse, by) allowing someone else to 
take the brunt of the blow instead.   Also, as has been discussed, to be behind is to be 
the loser (“He’s behind the times,”) or the injured, weaker, or disadvantaged party 
(“No child left behind”). 
What is particularly striking is that so poor a metaphor is invoked by the 
leader of the U.S. Department of Defense, and quoted by a newspaper serving the 
needs of the American soldier, in other words, in a context that is as supportive of the 
mission and the troops as anyone could find anywhere. In fact, the metaphor reverses 
the intention of the policy it expresses by highlighting the role of the American forces 
rather than that of the Iraqis.  
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Conclusions
When planning any operation, the first items the military normally considers 
are physical  - troop strength, unit position, and logistical support.  Factors like 
psychological operations and public affairs are regarded as enablers to the concrete 
activities of conducting patrols and building infrastructure.  In fact, these types of 
activities are often disparaged by both soldiers and Americans as “mere rhetoric,” 
considered dishonest and manipulative.  As a result, the military has found itself 
losing the “information war” in situations even where it has superior combat power. 
Yet the use of persuasion and communication actually dovetails well with the 
desired endstate of peace operations.  For what else is the goal of a peace enforcement 
mission except to develop an environment in which the battling factions can build 
peace?  Once the factions are no longer fighting amongst themselves, they have the 
larger tasks of negotiating truces, discussing common goals, and forming accords for 
the long-term stability of their country.  Establishing an “information environment” 
conducive to these aims is the main mission of a peace operation; indeed, as the FM 
itself has stated, such a mission depends on this kind of environment for its initiation, 
let alone success.  Given these factors, it seems clear that good communication with 




As I write this, the historic election in Iraq has concluded, and the world 
watches in anticipation as the political power structure in the country begins to 
emerge.  In the weeks leading up to the vote, the media continually wrung its hands 
over the increasing violence that terrorists launched as they attempted to deter the 
Iraqi people from participating. On election day itself, when the citizens turned out in 
enormous volume in the face of relatively minor violence, the media shifted its focus 
to the heroism of the people who voted in defiance of the terrorist threats.  Despite the 
voluminous coverage of the drama between the terrorist attacks and the people’s 
courage, the media missed a humbler, but more profound miracle; the fact that a vote, 
which is essentially a speech act, can be more powerful than a car bomb.
The Army has made that same sort of oversight as it struggles with the role of 
“information” in its own operations.  The military recognizes the fact that thought, 
communication and persuasion are not only necessary for effective combat power, but 
in some situations can supplant it, which it formally acknowledges by devoting 
doctrine, training, personnel, and other resources to the new discipline of 
“information operations.” Unfortunately, in institutionalizing this latest element of 
combat power, it makes the assumption that because “information” can be as potent 
as firepower, maneuver, leadership and protection, it can be controlled and employed 
in the same manner. This belief has led it to instruct its soldiers to conceive of 
thought as the actions of a corporate entity whose aim is to purge information of 
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inconsistencies, of communication as the transmittal and receipt of data, and of 
persuasion as firing at and killing a target audience.  
In imposing the more familiar frame of conventional combat onto conceptual 
acts, the Army has simplified these endeavors, but it has also robbed them of both 
their complexity and their power, and this mistake is expressed in the way that it has 
approached and invested in “information operations.”  The military spends billions on 
those aspects of “information” that are less critical to thought, communication, and 
persuasion, but that fit more readily into the frame of physical movement and 
causation upon which war is based.  In contrast, they appear to expend nothing on 
understanding the nature of those acts themselves. As a result, the Army has a vast 
inventory of computer hardware and software, as well as communications equipment 
ranging from secure radios to GPS satellites, all of which help enhance the speed and 
distances over which communication can take place.  However, in all three 
psychological operations manuals, whose purpose is to teach soldiers how to 
communicate and persuade, there are ample references to other military publications, 
but not a single reference to a work on rhetoric, persuasion, communication, or 
language theory.  Despite massive investment in structures that merely enhance the 
activities of thought communication, there is no attempt to actually understand them. 
This neglect has directly contributed to the difficulties the force has had in the 
Middle East, instances in which the Army can easily dominate the kinetic 
environment but has repeatedly found itself hamstrung in the “information 
environment.” The combined firepower of all the Army’s infantry fighting vehicles is 
impotent in the face of the rhetoric of Al Jazeera news and the infamous pictures of 
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prisoner abuse from the Abu Gharib scandal.  At the same time, paradoxically, there 
were few kinetic battles that generated more “combat power” than news coverage of 
the dramatic capture and heroic rescue of a single, low-ranking logistics soldier, 
Private First Class Jessica Lynch.
This continued reliance on traditional conceptual structure, in both the 
investment in communications hardware and imposition of the frame of warfare on 
persuasion and argument, is not just bad for the Army’s public image.  It is bad for its 
soldiers, who must confront and contain the violence aggravated by the military’s 
public relations blunders.  It is bad for the peoples of the nations that it attempts to 
help, who are so often the real victims of these attacks.  And it is bad for world peace 
and stability; because the United States military far outstrips any other in its ability to 
organize, project, and apply its combat power and logistical resources across the 
globe, it contributions and errors will shape the outcome of every major crisis for the 
foreseeable future.
Perhaps one of the most telling facts about the Army’s doctrinal approach to 
the domain of “information” is that one of the best discussions about it is not in the 
manuals that are actually dedicated to it. It’s in FM 3.07, Stability Operations and 
Support Operations, which explains numerous military missions that confound the 
frame of conventional combat.  In the chapter on peace operations, one of the most 
formerly derided of military operations that has now become the Army’s main 
mission, the writers stress the fact that information operations is the key to success in 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The discussion is neither complete, in that it 
does not engage theories of persuasion and communication, nor is it instructive, in the 
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sense that it does not give explicit directions on how to carry out these activities.  But 
it does touch on some key points that the PSYOP and Information Operations 
manuals seem to elide or ignore.  
FM 3.07 acknowledges that the “information environment” is paramount to its 
success; (“Information is the peace operations commander’s primary means to 
influence groups of people to change attitudes and behavior. IO can affect the center 
of gravity directly”) and that it is often outside the peacekeeper’s ability to 
understand, let alone control; (“The PO force will be a latecomer to a situation that 
has a long, complex, and convoluted history” (Department of the Army 2003, 4-24)).  
It also states that the rhetorical situation impacts, and can overrule, tactical success:
The commander must carefully consider the effects of IO before taking  
action. Destroying a belligerent’s electronic warfare capability may 
bring  favorable tactical results, but it may also have a destabilizing 
effect on the  peace process (Department of the Army 2003, 4-24).
and that, in the information environment, events have effects vastly disproportionate 
to their tactical contributions:
Individuals, by interacting directly with the media or on-line, can 
become a powerful source of information that can challenge the more 
traditional sources. Local events and the immediate impressions of 
individuals about those events can have international significance as 
the gloal media broadcasts them (Department of the Army 2003, 4-24).
It also emphasizes that despite these difficulties, the Army cannot afford to avoid the 
“soft” disciplines of persuasion and communication; “the fundamentals of 
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transparency and legitimacy demand that he [the commander] engage openly within 
this complex environment” (Department of the Army 2003, 4-24).
For better or worse, the United States is now the leading military power in the 
world.  It has been, and, for the foreseeable future, will continue to be called to deal 
with conflicts and crisis situations all over the world.  And because the military, 
especially the Army, is the only large, deployable infrastructure to which the United 
States government can order to carry out its will, its ability to engage and negotiate 
the “information environment” will shape the fates of people across the globe.  
Because it deals with massive numbers of soldiers that it must control during the 
course of enormous operations, this institution has often taken the path of least 
resistance by explaining complex operations using the most common denominator.  It 
continues to do so at its peril.  The Army therefore has the duty and obligation to its 
soldiers, its country, and the world to look outside the conceptual confines of its own 
institution and understand and engage the disciplines of thought, communication, and 
persuasion on their own terms.
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